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ABSTRACT 
 
Generating sufficient domestic revenues to finance economic growth has been a critical hurdle for 
many African countries and, for decades, foreign capital has complemented domestically generated 
resources to finance growth. However, global financial crises over the past few decades tend to 
curtail, if not dry up the flow of capital to African governments. The unreliability of foreign capital 
with its attendant strings and sudden stops in the event of economic and political crisis has spurred 
the need for alternative sources of financing development. Despite the realisation that bond markets 
provide a viable source of funds for the African continent, the literature on the importance of bond 
market development and its interaction with other sources of funding remains underexplored. 
Moreover, the sparse empirical literature about bond market development in Africa is vague and 
largely overlooked. At the same time, knowledge of African bond markets is vital for channelling 
funds not only to efficient agents in particular, but also for fostering transparency and the flow of 
information within the continent’s capital markets. This thesis endeavours to address the vacuum 
apparent in extant literature and proposes a theoretical framework through a thorough assessment 
of the determinants of bond market development in African emerging market economies. The thesis 
examines four critical pillars of bond market development: (a) the environment for the creation of 
bond markets; (b) the relative performance and characteristics of bond markets across and within 
developing and developed economies; (c) the modelling of bond markets and (c) the institutional 
factors that underpin the efficient functioning of bond markets. Using macroeconomic, social, 
institutional and historical data on local currency bond markets from 26 African economies and 49 
listed firms, this thesis extends previous studies on bond market determinants through tighter 
robustness measures by accounting for downside risk in a generalized methods of moments (GMM) 
and a feasible generalized least squares estimator (FGLSE) framework. Further, differential analysis 
of government and corporate bond markets are carried out, given their different investment horizons 
and issuance. The results suggest that from a macroeconomic perspective, inflation, central 
government debt, GDP, external debt, GDP per capita and fiscal balance are important drivers of 
local currency bond market development in African economies. Moreover, political unrest, 
governance, religion, former colonial ties and culture are institutional factors that exert statistically 
significant effects on local currency bond market performance in Africa.  From a demand viewpoint, 
the study finds that firm level factors that influence bond market performance are firm risk, size, 
profitability and age. The results from this study are of importance to capital market participants, 
investors, regulators and policy makers who seek to address the perennial constraints to 
development occasioned by lack of capital. A number of policy measures for boosting bond market 
performance such as stable macroeconomic environments, reform of capital market rules and cross 
listing are discussed in the final chapter.  
 
 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: International Economics; Financial Economics; Economic Development; 
Innovation; Technological Change; and Growth. 
KEYWORDS: Africa; Emerging economy; Bond market; Institutions; Local Currency Bond Market; 
Performance; Development. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Section 1:  Background of the Study 
1.0 Introduction 
Domestic bond markets should, in theory, offer a means for African countries to acquire 
long-term debt in their local currency to finance developmental requirements (Ndi, 2010). 
Saidi, Scacciavillani, Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2009), identify domestic debt markets 
as ‘cornerstones for development strategy’ and affirm the numerous benefits that 
accompany these markets. The long-term debt accessed through domestic bond markets is 
of utmost importance as economies that are unable to access international capital markets, 
inevitably, will receive less aid from foreign parties, particularly in light of the 2008 sub-
prime crisis as industrialized countries grapple to deal with the aftershocks (Gozzi, Levine, 
Peria and Schmukler, 2012).  Besides addressing the burden of ‘original sin’ by narrowing 
the mismatch between domestic and foreign currency debt held by a country, thus easing 
the ability to roll over short-term debt, domestic bond markets lessen global bank 
uncertainties in countries (Kim, 2000; Maana, Owino and Mutai, 2008).  Domestic bond 
markets are also a good conduit to link capital fund providers (savers) and those in need of 
capital funds (International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2013).  
 
The ability of bond markets to impact economic growth in Africa is, arguably, greater than 
that of stock markets because fixed securities are issued  by corporations and governments 
whereas stocks are issued only by corporations. Thus, the audience of bond markets may be 
greater than that of stock markets. Furthermore, traditionally, bond markets tend to supply 
longer term and less volatile funds than stock markets which is crucial for Africa to meet its 
long term financing needs (Harvey, 1989). Furthermore, bond markets foster transparency 
which is more favourable for the development of African economies in comparison to  the 
rent-seeking activities typically exercised by banks (Bokpin and Isshaq, 2008).   
 
Africa’s need for long-term capital to finance its development is a common theme in the 
literature; however, regardless of the continent’s pressing need for money, Africa is a net 
capital exporter (Lanchovichina and Gable, 2012).  Capital savers and capital users are linked 
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by bond markets but the reason for Africa’s net exportation of capital is the lack of valuable 
and efficient intermediary networks and vehicles to absorb this capital (Mu, Phelps and 
Stotsky, 2013).  Domestic bond markets can assist in increasing the depth and breadth of 
Africa’s financial system (Pillay and Ojah, 2009).  In this way, the inclusion of bond markets 
in the financial system offers a wider and more useful set of tools for monetary and fiscal 
policy (Mu et al, 2013).  Bokpin and Isshaq (2008) are in agreement with Pillay and Ojah 
(2009) and strongly endorse bond market development because of the reduced funding cost 
it offers entrepreneurs relative to traditional loans from banks. Bokpin and Isshaq (2008) 
and Pillay and Ojah (2009) concur also on the value of information disclosure regarding the 
firm and how this affords issuers access to public funds.  Further, an efficient bond market 
may bring about a more proficient economy that is  less vulnerable to financial contagion 
(Bokpin and Isshaq, 2008; Eichengreen, 2010).                              
 
The Asian financial crisis and 2008-subprime crisis have increased policy-makers’ 
understanding of the need for alternative forms of funding and how bond markets can fulfil 
such a role (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009). Apart from providing an alternative source 
of finance for governments, domestic bond markets improve capital allocation by 
channelling savings towards economic activities with the highest relative returns, enhance 
financial stability and facilitate risk management by spreading risk over many actors (Dahou 
Omar, Pfister, 2009; Nhamo, 2011; Goswami and Sharma, 2011). More specifically, a better 
developed corporate bond market can relieve a credit crunch during episodes of financial 
distress in the banking sector such as the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis (Turner, 2003). 
African countries can share these benefits of efficient domestic bond markets; however, 
most of their markets are in their infancy and there is, therefore, a pressing need to foster 
their development (Mu et al, 2013; IMF, 2013). 
 
Development of African emerging capital markets has appeared promising in the last 
decade, particularly since the recent upsurge in capital inflows to emerging market domestic 
currency bonds (World Bank (WB), 2013).  This rising interest of foreign investors in debt 
products of emerging markets may indicate the scarcity of global safe and/or high return 
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investment assets (Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas, 2008; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2012).  
Notably, since the beginning of the 2008 sub-prime mortgage crisis, there has been a 
correlation in the movements of emerging market domestic government bond returns and 
the returns of safe haven assets.  Simultaneously, global interest rates remain particularly 
subdued in the midst of remarkable transient monetary easing in advanced economies, thus 
making emerging economy assets relatively more attractive (WB, 2013). This presents 
African emerging economies with a real opportunity to raise much needed capital. 
 
Initiatives to raise capital through local bond markets were attempted in North Africa prior 
to the 2010 Arab Spring.  Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are the strongest economies of North 
Africa but their bond markets are characterized by low liquidity, low volumes and a 
tendency to ‘buy’ and ‘hold’ (African Financial Market Initiative (AFMI), 2013).  West African 
Bond markets are slowly gaining traction but remain thin and very illiquid, while the capital 
markets of Central African countries are small and embryonic (AFMI, 2013).  
 
The embryonic and underdeveloped nature of many African bond markets is not entirely 
true for the East African region as it has gained the most traction, in recent years, towards 
the development of its bond market and the issuance of public debt (AFMI, 2013).  While 
the shift toward domestic debt has been favourable for the long-term economic health of 
the region, this process has encountered a significant rise in domestic interest payments, 
which poses a considerable drain on the budget (Maana et al, 2008).  The bond market in 
the southernmost region of the continent, South Africa, has been gaining momentum since 
the political and economic uncertainty surrounding apartheid ended in 1994.  Corporate 
bond market capitalization has increased from 15% of GDP in 1994 to over 31% of GDP in 
2012 (IMF, 2013). Overall, many countries in Africa have nascent bond markets although a 
few are beginning to show some movement towards growth. 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
Three themes form the basis of the problem statement in harmony with the disjuncture 
recognised in the empirical literature: Poor performance of African bond markets; African 
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specific bond performance framework; and factors contributing to and/ or hindering their 
development. Each identified problem is discussed. 
a) Poor performance of African bond markets. As a sizeable potential contributor 
to the economic growth and development of African emerging economies, bond 
market development is critical. Specifically, corporate bonds are an excellent 
source of finance for companies whilst government bonds are pivotal to the 
establishment of a yield curve which African emerging economies need to 
appropriately price securities (International Capital Market Association (ICMA), 
2013; Mizen and Tsoukas, 2013).  Many authors, however, including Pillay and 
Ojah (2009) and Mu et al (2013) observe that bond markets in Africa are at a 
nascent stage of growth.  Contemporary studies confirm that most domestic 
bond markets in Africa are indeed embryonic and hardly contribute to improved 
economic and financial performance in African countries (Maana et al, 2008; 
AFMI, 2013). Studies of bond markets in Africa show that investors of emerging 
market bonds prefer to hold the bonds in the market for relatively brief periods 
(Mezi, 2012).  As a result, many African emerging economies lack an effective 
source of local debt capital.  These market practices may have contributed to the 
current development finance vacuum (Chen and Imam, 2012). This situation has 
wide ranging repercussions for African economies. First, it means that African 
countries have to find other means, other than bonds, of funding government 
deficits (WB, 2006).  In this case, capital that may be better utilised in 
infrastructure and other developmental practices are used to finance 
government deficits. According to the IFC (2011), a major limitation on the 
growth of small and medium businesses in sub-Saharan Africa is the 
development finance void, which extends to constrain economic growth, 
employment and the social progress  of the continent. In the presence of a 
poorly developed corporate bond market, market forces are left unable to assert 
themselves because of the relative lack of funding sources. As a result, systemic 
risk and the likelihood of crisis are increased (Hakansson, 1999).  Lack of 
transparency and inefficient corporate organization is characteristic of such 
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environments (Hakansson, 1999). This thesis addresses the exclusive concerns of 
African  emerging economy bond markets such as the short-lived holding 
patterns of investors and the need for the economies to tackle budget deficits. 
One way of tackling this is through the addition of external debt and other 
variables that designate the deficit tendency. 
 
b) African specific bond market performance framework:  Bond markets in Africa 
are subject to appraisal, review and approval criteria akin to those used in 
developed economies (Burger, Warnock and Warnock, 2012). This occurs despite 
remarkable differences between the African environment and that of developed 
countries in such areas as corporate governance practices, investor protection 
and legal rights of investors, and other institutional and regulatory 
considerations (Mezi, 2012). These differences, frequently, are not attended to 
by authorities of African countries from local governments to higher tiers of 
governments. Thus, the unique character of African markets, that take into 
account its institutions and culture among other factors are lost (Nunn, 2009; 
Welter, 2011). Consequently, these differences are not acknowledged by 
international financial institutions and similar parties dealing with African 
countries (Bank of International Settlements (BIS), 2007; Baliño and 
Sundararajan, 2008). The application of  standard  bond market frameworks from 
developed economies to emerging economies is, therefore, a serious misfit 
(Baliño and Sundararajan, 2008).  
 
Developed markets are usually more liquid and efficient relative to emerging 
markets (Andjelic, Djcikovic and Radisic, 2010). Further, in comparison to 
developed markets, emerging markets are known to adopt financial market 
reforms, experience recurrent external and internal financial shocks, make 
frequent credit rating changes, face high levels of country risk, engage in an 
increased incidence of insider trading and suffer fluctuations of foreign currency 
exchange rate (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997). As a result, domestic bond markets in 
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African emerging economies have been denied the development attention they 
deserve and many countries remain burdened with unsustainable debt and 
surging capital needs as they struggle to raise capital required for development 
(Davies, 2012).  This thesis attempts to address the conventional ‘cookie cutter’ 
approach to bond market framework construction by  systematically appraising 
the relevant literature to establish variables most applicable to bond markets in 
African emerging economies. Methodologies that take into account the 
idiosyncrasies of the African context are selected to test the selected variables 
for their relevance. 
  
c) Factors that contribute to and/ or hinder bond market development in Africa:  
Fiscal balance, interest rate spread, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, 
volatility of exchange rate and banking sector concentration are all macro-
economic variables that are found to be negative and significant determinants of 
government bond market performance (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 
2004; Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler, 2007; Bhattacharyay, 2013).  On the 
other hand, an open capital account, a positive investment profile, GDP at 
purchasing power parity, distance from the equator, exports, English origin and 
banking sector concentration are found to be positive and significant for 
government bonds (Essers, Blommestein, Cassimon and Flores, 2014).  
 
Rent seeking activity, a typical characteristic of banks, is notorious in developing 
countries and  limits growth of African bond markets (Pillay and Ojah, 2009; Iqbal 
and Daly, 2014). According to North (1990) institutional framework is crucial and 
often delivers an environment conducive to rent seeking behaviour particularly 
in developing countries with weak institutions. Thus, for rent seeking activity to 
be minimized in a market, laws and regulations must be implemented and 
enforced. Stix (2013) suggests weak institutions and poor legal enforcement as 
viable deterrents, for households in developing and transition economies, from 
engaging with bond markets. The elimination of such obstacles, therefore, would 
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benefit intermediation levels in developing and transition economies and 
facilitate bond market development (Zhang, Lin and Li, 2012; Giofre, 2013).  
 
Formal, well considered contracts and agreements foster good governance, and 
are valuable tools for reducing inefficiencies  and  promoting quality institutions, 
including bond markets (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Mu et al 2013). The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014), for example, recommends collective 
action clauses for smoother management of bond contracts. Furthermore, under 
this frame of reason, political leaders mould the quality of governments in 
harmony with a society’s constitutional rule (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Parrenas and Waller (2006)  advise that the development of bond markets need 
proficient direction from government agencies first and foremost, and then 
public-private sector partnerships.  Thus, the audience for this thesis  is not 
merely investors, academics or those in positions to issue bonds, but also policy 
makers positioned in the leadership of an economy. This thesis explicitly conveys 
practices and strategies that inform government agencies about the need to 
consolidate institutional quality and the resulting bond market performance 
outcomes.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
The following are specific relevant questions that emanate from the above articulated 
problems about bond markets in African countries. 
i) To what extent do bond markets in African emerging countries supply much 
needed funds to their economies particularly in comparison with other emerging 
and developed countries?  
ii) What framework would be more appropriate in reflecting the unique 
characteristics of African emerging economies in order to increase the breadth 
and depth of domestic bond markets?  
iii) What factors hinder and/ or boost bond market development and performance 
in African emerging economies?  
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1.3 Objectives of the research 
Given that the contexts of bond markets in developed and emerging countries are 
remarkably different, the determinants of their performance are unlikely to be the same. 
Given also the need to promote the development of local currency bond markets in Africa in 
order to maximize their contribution to economic growth and development, the objectives 
of the study are the following: 
i. To examine the factors underlying the development of bond markets in Africa 
and identify the characteristics of their capital markets and those of other 
developing and emerging regions. This comparison sets a point of reference for 
assessing  the relative performance of each African bond market.  
ii. To analyse the underlying factors behind the development of these markets and 
examine the link between those factors in relation to bond market performance 
and each other. This holds merit for the thesis, in deciphering which factors, and 
interactions, to include in the subsequent framework. 
iii. To assess the identified characteristics of African bond markets and examine 
their interaction with the identified underlying factors behind bond market 
development in the region and base the impending framework on it. There is 
great pertinence in this step as emanating from the relationships identified; a 
concise framework is thereby developed.  
 
1.4  Justification for, and significance of the study 
Domestic bond market development positively contributes to the breadth, depth and 
ultimately the growth of a country’s financial sector. Thus, development of financial markets 
positively influences the level and intensity of Africa’s per capita income growth 
(Schumpeter, 1911; King and Levine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This is significant since 
average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates in Africa continue to fall short of 
the 6–7 % mark which is usually needed to reduce poverty (Cilliers and Shünemann, 2013). 
 
This study stands out from previous work on bond markets in many ways. First, the stance 
of Estrada (2002, 2007) is taken by adopting a measure of risk by the semi variance of 
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returns as opposed to the variance of returns. This generates a new downside beta, which is 
applied to the standard Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) baseline econometric 
model. The outcome is an econometric model that is clearly tailored to the emerging market 
situation.  
 
Unlike previous studies that use relatively rigid diagnostic frameworks, this thesis 
establishes key issues and elements unique to African emerging economies, that, when 
combined with existing bond market frameworks improve the process of bond market 
development. The role of history, as far back as the sixteenth century, in influencing African 
emerging economies and thus bond market performance in the countries are also 
acknowledged. A new and more suitable methodology for measuring bond market 
performance that considers systemic volatility in emerging markets is introduced. It is an 
extension of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Estrada (2007).   
 
The study assists existing and future domestic bond market investors to understand better 
the dynamics of the bond markets in African emerging economies by offering a framework 
to form their investment strategies. This is particularly critical since African bond markets 
are becoming a popular source of diversification for foreign investors (Mminele, 2013). 
Furthermore, the study assists entrepreneurs to appreciate the value of their debt financing 
decisions and enlighten them about the value of investing in domestic debt as opposed to 
other sources.  
 
Bond market determinant studies in the past have focused on unilevel modelling- where 
only macroeconomic variables are explored. Explanatory variables, in this study, are viewed 
from several levels, with emphasis on situations where first level units are intertwined with 
those of the second level (Coldwell and Herbst, 2004). Further, multilevel analysis used in 
this study encourages theorizing beyond the typical framework to arrive at robust and 
creative recommendations (Coldwell and Herbst, 2004). Finally, the study contributes to the 
literature on bond markets in Africa because the lack of investigation of domestic bond 
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market performance criteria in African emerging economies presents a notable void in the 
debt market literature. 
 
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
The remaining thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter Two: A thematic overview of the bond market literature is reflected here. Key 
theoretical underpinnings of factors relating to bond market performance and development 
including African financial systems and components of financial systems is discussed in the 
chapter. Theories such as the Adaptive Market Hypothesis, Theory of Rent Seeking, theories 
behind banks and bond markets, the Yield Curve and other concepts concerning the 
intricate nature of bond market strategy and operations are examined. Bond market 
performance studies and their findings are also examined in the chapter. The  inclusion of 
colonialism in bond market determinant studies is suggested, previous initiatives are 
appraised together with their implications for the African situation.  
 
Chapter three: This chapter presents a  synopsis of African financial systems between 2005 
and 2013 particularly, in comparison with selected emerging and developed countries  to 
provide a barometer of the continent’s standing among global markets. The microstructure 
of bond markets is the concluding part of this chapter.   
 
Chapter four: Objectives of the thesis and the key research questions are addressed from a 
methodological stance with regard to the applicable data. Econometric models that answer 
the research questions posed are developed with close attention to validity and reliability of 
the estimation tests and techniques used.  
 
Chapter five: Analysis of the empirical findings of the previous chapter is covered here. 
Findings are weighed against expectations and reasons for the outcomes explored. 
Particularly, the chapter analyses how and why the macroeconomic, historical, institutional, 
structural and firm level variables impact the development of bond markets. 
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Chapter six: Interpretation of the results from the empirical analysis of the data is given.  
Implications from the interpretations and the resulting recommendations from the findings 
are explained in the sixth chapter.   
 
Chapter seven:  Conclusions of the research are summarised. The thesis closes with a 
conclusion derived from previous empirical literature, theory, and findings of the current 
thesis. Policy recommendations based on theory and empirics derived from the study are 
specified and new research agendas that have developed as a result of this study are 
outlined.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Section 1: Concepts and theories 
“...I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the President or the 
Pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can 
intimidate everyone...”  
 
James Carville (Campaign advisor to President Clinton, Wall Street Journal, February 25, 
1993, p. 1). 
2.0  Introduction 
The comprehension of bond market theories is a critical foundation for empirical tests of 
bond market performance determinants of African emerging economies. As Mu et al (2013) 
highlights “…bond markets in these countries are at a nascent stage of development and 
there is a strong need to promote their development….” Given that the aim of this research 
is to study the performance determinants of bond markets, it is crucial that relevant 
theories are reviewed to form the basis of the proposition of the study (Aguinis and 
Edwards, 2014).  
 
The complexity encompassing bond markets, bond market performance measures, bond 
markets in Africa and bond markets in African emerging economies is evident in the desire 
to investigate this topic. Such intricacy cannot be explained from a sequential review of 
theoretical literature surrounding bond market performance themes. Instead, this beckons 
an analytical way of thinking that accounts for several variables and externalities that do not 
clash but rather complement each other, to form a web of theories that can be applied to 
empirics and used to explain phenomena (Nhamo, 2011). Thus, this study does not 
subscribe to a particular theory but, rather scrutinizes the theories with no predisposition 
toward a cluster of theories either completely or in part (Nhamo, 2011). An approach such 
as this is helpful for the study because it permits the researcher methods and processes to 
analyse, explain and critique data and develop grounded policy recommendations and 
suggestions (Nhamo, 2011). 
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 Section 1 probes financial market theory, the theoretical and empirical literature on African 
emerging economy bond performance and surrounding themes. Concepts and theories that 
enrich one’s understanding of bond markets are discussed. The study delves into 
macroeconomic factors and theories of bond market development in African emerging 
economies. Matters relating to the enhancement of savings intermediation such as 
domestic savings, adverse selection and rent-seeking behaviour, among other factors 
comprise part of the section. The efficient market hypothesis and its applicability to bond 
markets is also examined  
 
An evaluation of the dynamic link between the bond and stock markets forms part of the 
first section of this chapter. The section further examines the role of institutions and the key 
notions of corruption, governance, transparency, legal framework and culture within the 
context of financial and economic development in Africa. In addition, the section explores 
the concept of colonialism and its importance in assessing financial market development. 
Key studies on the determinants of bond market performance, taking into account the 
merits and weaknesses of bond debt against other types of debt are analysed in Section 2.  
The concluding section (3) evaluates past bond market development initiatives, and 
critiques their applicability to the African context. 
 
2.1 Financial systems 
Financial systems comprise of institutional units and markets that interact, usually in an 
intricate manner, with the intention of mobilizing funds for investment and making facilities 
available, including payment systems, to finance commercial activity (IMF, 2006). Thus, 
financial systems are the larger system, including financial markets. These two terms are 
examined separately in this thesis, never referring to them with analogous explanation.  
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Figure 2.1: Typical financial system structure 
 
Source: Mishkin, (2012) 
 
Capital markets, the banking system and non-bank financial institutions comprise the 
financial system (Ncube, 2009; Vinals, Fiechter, Pazarbasioglu, Kodres, Narain and Moretti, 
2010).   The financial system pools together capital from smaller savers, allots capital to the 
most appropriate users and oversees the capital to ensure its proper use (Vinals et al 2010).  
In tandem, the financial system decreases risk, boosts liquidity and reveals relevant 
information to the public (Stiglitz, 1998; Aggarwal and Goodwell, 2014). According to 
Hawkins (2005), financial systems are made up of closely interrelated components.  A 
disturbance in any of its components can negatively affect the stability of the whole system 
(Hawkins, 2005).  Crockett (2011) explains that the financial system is more than merely a 
consortium of institutions that expedite payments and extend credit.  Rather, Crockett 
(2011) prefers financial systems to be viewed as embodying all the activities that direct real 
resources to their most beneficial ends.  Beck, Colciago and Pfajfar (2014) find; however, 
that increased financial system development may not always be desired.  Built on a sample 
of seventy-seven countries over seventeen years, the authors suggest that financial sector 
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growth, other than through intermediary development, has no long-run effect on the 
economic outcomes of the real sector (Beck et al 2014).  Financial system development is 
also found to increase volatility, albeit in higher-income countries, which typically does not 
describe Africa (Adrianaivo and Yartey, 2010; Beck et al 2014).  Such a proposition is an 
antithesis of major theoretical and empirical evidence about the growth-finance-innovation 
nexus including seminal works by Robinson (1952), Schumpeter (1911) and more recently 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Beck et al (2014). According to Hartzenberg (2011) the 
African paradigm, which observes the requirements of linear integration of financial systems 
where successive and advancing integration of goods, labour and capital markets occur and 
eventually fiscal and monetary integration, is deficient. The deficiency stems from largely 
neglected supply side constraints such as competition policy, investment and services. 
Mckinnon and Pill (1999), Collins and Biekpe (2003),Das (2003), Andersen and Moreno 
(2005), Irving (2005), Lugangwa (2006), Hartzenburg (2011) and  Odera (2012)  highlight the 
problems involved in integration of financial systems such as increased vulnerability to 
global risk, while authors including De Bondt (2000), Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 
(2002),  Okhealaham (2005) and Buchanan (2011) affirm the value of integration and formal 
synchronization of African emerging market financial systems as a means to prevail over its  
shortcomings and develop into a stable, fit system.  
 
Schumpeter (1911) in a seminal contribution sets the groundwork for the finance-led 
growth hypothesis. According to Schumpeter (1911), a well-functioning financial system 
builds efficient resource allocation from unproductive to productive sectors, thus 
stimulating technological innovations.  There appears a consensus favouring innovation in a 
financial system (Bravo-Biosca, 2007; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2011; 
Nanda and Nicholas, 2011; Po-Hsuan, Xuan and Yan, 2013).  Logical reasoning would suggest 
that bond markets strengthen African financial systems, at least in part, by spurring 
innovation.  In concurrence with Schumpeter (1911), bond markets in Africa spur innovation 
by virtue of their novelty and the new ways of doing things that need to be developed for 
their existence (Levine, 1997; Coccia, 2014).  Furthermore, as an added source of finance, 
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bond markets support financial systems by increasing the array of financial instruments 
available to governments and corporations (Bae, 2012; Mu et al 2013). 
 
The widely used  ‘bigger is better’ view of financial systems has been reviewed in light of the 
2008 sub-prime crisis (Gertler and Kiyotoki, 2010; Beck et al, 2014). Turner (2010) and 
Trichet (2010) attribute this renewed interest to severe declines in output produced by the 
crisis.  Cahuc and Challe (2012) speculate that an outsized financial sector may lead to a 
misallocation of resources and financial instability.  Therefore, it is imperative that financial 
systems are meticulously managed and regulated particularly in highly indebted countries 
where large amounts of debt are often serviced. Thumrongvit, Kim and Pyun (2013) suggest 
a reinforcement of intermediation as a means to  economic growth and aiding debt service. 
A critical element of a strong, vigorous and dynamic financial system is precise and timely 
reporting and public disclosure (Viñals et al 2010).  It must be transparent to rely on the 
accurate pricing of risk, particularly systemic risk because most of the evidence required for 
identifying the accumulation of systemic risk is inaccessible to those who manage financial 
stability (Viñals et al 2010; Bouvard, Chaigneau and de Motta, 2012).   
 
2.2 Financial markets 
Financial markets are described in distinct ways by varying disciplines.  Some authors 
including Jollah (2009) portray markets as systems where buyers and sellers exchange goods 
and services using a commonly accepted exchange medium. According to Kizito (2012), 
financial markets are specialized markets that control the direction of financial resources 
form surplus units to deficit units to perform some form of economic activity. Di Giorgio, Di 
Noia and Piatti (2000) similarly, refer to financial markets as economic spaces where various 
types of operators offer financial securities and services.  The reference to a financial market 
as a tangible tacit space of convergence is also suggested by Chami, Fullenkamp and Sharma 
(2010) by portraying markets as an ‘arena’ where potential borrowers and lenders converge 
and reach consensus about the terms of respective contracts. Gambarcorta, Yang and 
Tsatsaronis (2014) also recognize financial markets as forums thus suggesting the notion of 
place as many authors have done (Giorgio et al 2000; Chami et al 2010).  However, the 
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authors contend that savers and investors are kept apart by markets as opposed to being 
joined.  This relatively neutral conceptualisation of financial markets is not the view of all 
parties. 
 
Literature about financial markets suggests that one of their most essential functions is to 
surpass adverse selection and moral hazard problems, thus decreasing a firm’s cost of 
external capital (Po-Hsuan et al, 2013).  According to Dahou et al (2009), channelling existing 
resources to appropriate sectors will spur productivity and generate employment. Chami et 
al (2010) add that when developed financial markets function correctly, they facilitate the 
transfer of resources from savers to investors thus, contributing to the robustness of the 
economy by stifling possible shocks through enabling appropriate allocation of risks. 
Seminal work by Allen and Gale (2000) supports the view that influences of financial market 
activities become more pertinent with the growth of an economy whereas that of banks 
become less important.  
 
A series of negative fluctuations in a financial market may lead to disturbance in the 
financial system and potentially, a financial crisis (Gharsellaoui, 2013).  Further evidence 
suggests that financial market development positively contributes to the most under-
privileged members of a community because it reduces inequality of incomes (Chami et al, 
2010).  Similarly,  Beck and Levine (2004) and Honohan (2004) suggest a negative correlation 
between financial market deepening and poverty. According to Panchenko and Wu (2009) 
and Underwood (2009), several trading strategies assign assets to equity and riskless bond 
market securities. Thus, a financial system that contains both stocks and bonds 
accommodates more investors than without.  Financial markets offer policy makers and 
broader stakeholders the ability to obtain important information about investors, investor 
beliefs and risk preferences (Underwood, 2009; Chami et al, 2010; Christophera, Kimb and 
Wuc, 2012). 
 
Some authors argue that the market is a tool employed by influential economic agents to 
acquire monopoly rents (Casson and Lee, 2011).  According to this view, the powerful agents 
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may be substantial corporations or dominant trade unions that negotiate for a portion of 
business proceeds for their members (Casson and Lee, 2011). Such typologies suggest that 
the link between finance and politics involves wider national economic systems (Davis, 
2011).  The broader influence of politics on financial markets is recognized by several 
authors including Classens, Djankov and Lang (2000), Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000),Barca and 
Becht (2001), Faccio and Lang (2002), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Morck and Yeung (2004) 
and Zussman, Zussman and Orregaard-Nielse (2008). 
 
Keynes (1963), in a metaphor, describes markets as a ‘beauty contest’, and adds that traders 
frequently conduct themselves in a comparable manner.  Most remarkably, Shiller (1984) 
considers market speculation as a social activity, as investors occupy a large portion of their 
leisure time reviewing and debating about investments.  Therefore, market prices are often 
driven by rumours, speculation and investors’ expectation rather than facts and 
fundamentals (Fenzl, Brudermann, Malik and Pelzmann, 2013).  According to Shiller (2014), 
such speculative markets are prone to strange types of trends or social epidemics termed 
speculative bubbles.  The author attributes social psychology, flawed news and inefficient 
information paths to speculative bubbles.   
 
2.2.1 Building blocks of financial markets  
Two components separate financial markets namely, the money market and the capital 
market (Kizito, 2012). The distinction between money markets and capital markets lies in 
the extent of liquidity of their instruments (Kizito, 2012). While the money market operates 
with short-term funds, the capital market manages extended term funds (Kizito, 2012).  
Dodd (2008) classifies four main elements of capital markets namely securities markets, 
where bonds and equity shares are traded, the banking industry where loans are issued and 
settlement and payment services are provided, institutional investors such as insurance and 
pension funds as they deliver future income and collateral for lending, and derivatives 
markets offering risk management and price discovery.  Thus, both money and capital 
markets are opportunities for households, firms and the government to mobilize financial 
resources through buying and selling financial securities (Kizito 2012; Andriansyah and 
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Messinis, 2014).  The capital market may be separated into the primary market and the 
secondary market (Arvai and Heenan, 2008).  
 
Figure 2.2: Typical financial market structure 
 
Adapted from: Arvai and Heenan, (2008) 
 
Initial securities offered to investors by a firm, Initial Public Offering (IPO), are sold on the 
primary market whilst securities already owned by the public are traded on the secondary 
market (Kizito 2012; Andriansyah and Messinis, 2014).  Whereas the issuing house for 
primary markets are typically brokerage firms, investment bankers and underwriters and 
stock exchanges are usually the platform for purchasing and selling secondary market 
securities (Nguimeya, 2014).  The IPO introduces firms’ securities to the public and the funds 
raised are directly allocated to the issuing firm to support its operations (Bateni, Roodposhti 
and Poorzamani, 2014; Nguimeya, 2014).  When a firm’s securities are held by the public, 
liquidity of the financial security may be enhanced through trading in the secondary market.  
Institutional quality, governance and transparency are recurring variables that contribute to 
the functioning of both primary and secondary markets (Ritter, 1987; Beunaventura and 
Ross, 2013).   
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2.3 The coupled dynamic of bond and stock markets  
Recent studies, including those by Gueye and Sy (2010), Du Preez and Mare (2013) and 
Kousmanen and Vataja (2014) simultaneously analyse the forecast ability of stock and bond 
markets; however, a more dated study of Resnick and Shoesmith (2002) forecasts economic 
activity separately. Resnick and Shoesmith (2002) has conducted such an analysis by 
replacing the yield-curve spread of the U.S. as the explanatory variable thus extending the 
probit model that forecasts economic recession.  The yield curve spread as the explanatory 
variable then forecasts bearish stock markets and, based on the model market timing 
strategies are tested (Resnick and Shoesmith, 2002). Subsequent studies also find that bond 
yields possess significant data about the likelihood of a bearish stock market (Kim, 
Moshirian and Wu, 2006; Panchenko and Wu, 2009; VenkateShwarlu and Ramesh, 2011). 
These findings are considered as economically significant (Resnick and Shoesmith, 2002). 
 
The most common theoretical models regarding the stock and bond market nexus suggest 
that stock and bond markets exhibit correlational behaviour because of their shared source 
of financial information (Kim et al 2006). Other models emphasize regional integration and 
financial market liberation as decisive elements that influence the stock-bond market link 
(Panchenko and Wu, 2009).  The basis of such findings stems from earlier stock and bond 
market interrogation and resulting seminal findings of theorists such as Fama and Schwarts 
(1977), Fama and French (1989) and Schwert (1990). Most notable are the seminal findings 
of Harvey (1989) that establish that while both stock and bond markets provide important 
information about GNP growth, bond markets deliver more precise predictions of economic 
growth.   
 
Stock and bond market movements are carefully scrutinized by participants of the financial 
markets (Panchenko and Wu, 2009).  Therefore, it is imperative that the inter-linkages and 
relationship dynamics are understood to equip savers, investors and investors with 
information that positively affects financial markets (Chami et al, 2010; Newberry, 2013).  
Bond markets tend to be less noisy relative to equity markets because of stock markets’ 
exposure to several miss-pricing (Gallegati and Ramsey, 2013).  Christophera, Kimb and   
Wuc (2012) similarly, find that bond market performance better indicates the 
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creditworthiness of regions and of local bond users’ ability and willingness to service debt 
payments. 
 
Figure 2.3: The relationship between Bond and Stock markets- the U.S. example
 
Source: The Future Tense (2013) 
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between stock and bond markets. It also suggests that the 
bond market grew during 20 of the 22 years surveyed. Despite the erratic movement of the 
stock market, it grew at a similar pace as the bond market during the period. This 
demonstrates that information from financial markets can be obtained, among others, from 
bond and stock markets; thus, the markets cannot be viewed in isolation. The yield curve is 
a key source of information conferred by bond markets while equity markets are better 
reflectors of noise in markets. Bond and stock markets are useful tools for economic growth 
and, knowledge about one market may be beneficial in the assessment of another.  
 
2.4 Emerging markets 
Rapid economic growth is often associated with emerging market economies (Henry and 
Kannan, 2008). The concept was first used by Agtmall (1981) of the World Bank in his 
description of fast growing developing countries (Khanna and Palepu, 2011). Descriptions 
and definitions of emerging markets differ and despite the increasing relevance of these 
markets in global finance, there is no prudent interpretation of the constituents of an 
emerging market (Kehl, 2007; Kearney, 2012). Whilst Barry and Lockwood (1995) focus on 
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the volatility characteristics of emerging markets, Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2005) 
emphasize their potential for portfolio diversification. Kearney (2012) however, marginalizes 
volatility as a determinant of an emerging market and suggests properties of financial 
infrastructure and accounting systems as essential in determining if a market is emerging. 
This research adopts the stance of Ojah (2012) in his description of emerging markets as “… 
countries where financial markets are emerging from the dominant role of government in 
funding production…”. The selected definition realizes the intricate role played by banks in 
the development of domestic bond markets in African emerging economies (Bhattacharyay, 
2011; Allen, Otchere and Senbet, 2012).  
 
2.5 Transparency 
Transparency in markets is the ability of market participants to observe information about 
trading processes (Van den Berghe, 2001).  It is the quantity and timeliness of the 
information made available to public investors about market conditions (Bessembinder and 
Maxwell, 2008; Gupta, 2010; Haufler 2010).  Transparency is generally divided into two 
categories in bond markets (Buenaventura and Ross, 2013). Pre-trade transparency 
describes the dissemination of quotations or other signs of trading interest while post-trade 
transparency refers to the dissemination of information, in particular, price and volume, for 
completed trades (Bessembinder and Maxwell, 2008; Buenaventura and Ross, 2013).  The 
primary and secondary markets require pre-trade transparency to notify market participants 
of the supply, demand and price settings of a particular financial instrument (Hanson, 2003; 
Bessembinder and Maxwell, 2008). Furthermore, processes that safeguard transparency 
and sound alignment of shareholder and management interests are crucial considerations in 
the decision to invest in a country (Ladekarl and Zervos, 2004).  Buenaventura and Ross 
(2013) and Asgharian, Liu and Lundtofte (2014) explain that opaque markets typically hurt 
market confidence and, when investors suspect that market conditions are not adequately 
transparent their willingness to participate in the markets may diminish, thus lowering 
investor base and subsequently market liquidity. 
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Analysis of Pagano and Roell (1996) shows that increased transparency lowers the average 
costs of trading for liquidity traders.  Similarly, Aggarwal and Wu (2006) use the OTC market 
in the U.S., to show that less transparent markets are more subject to market manipulation.  
According to Bouvard et al (2012), Asquith et al (2013) and Ellis, Haldane, Moshirian (2014) 
one of the responses to the 2008 sub-prime crisis has been appeals for increased 
transparency of financial institutions.  Moreover, Mohtadi and Ruediger (2012), through 
Monte Carlo simulation of a financial herds model, empirically test a panel of 23 
Organization for Co-operation and Development (OECD) and emerging markets over nine 
years and find an inverted “U” pattern, thus depicting the influence of market transparency 
on volatility.  An increase in financial transparency increases market volatility initially then, 
subsequently decreases it, at higher levels of transparency.  Asquith et al (2013) used the US 
corporate bond market to find that transparency drastically diminished price dispersion for 
all bonds and significantly increased trading activity for some groups of bonds.  Also, post-
trade price and volume transparency are found to precede large drops in trading activity 
and price dispersion (Asquith et al 2013). 
 
Duffie (2012) explains that in a transparent market, dealers have the opportunity to lower 
inventory discrepancies that originate from big trades with less regard to their trade size or 
reservation price.  Duffie (2012) explains that this occurrence, will then be positively used 
toward subsequent counterparties, while Bouvard et al (2011) attribute such findings in 
transparency to the quality of banks in the financial system.  When normal quality is such 
that it is elevated enough for investors to be eager to roll over credits, not disclosing 
information is best, as transparency may expose a run to lower quality banks (Bouvard et al 
2011).  In contrast, when quality is appropriately low, transparency is rather chosen.  If 
investors were aware of the low average quality of transparency but unaware of the specific 
banks with low quality, a run on the entire banking system would occur (Bouvard et al 
2011).  
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2.6 Coasian view (1937) of local currency bond markets 
The Coase theorem (1960) suggests that in the presence of fully allocated property rights, 
regulations need not be assigned as externalities will be corrected by parties who negotiate 
to establish solutions at the lowest cost. Implications of this theory are that markets are 
able to solve externalities except in situations where property rights are incomplete or 
negotiation costs are excessive. In essence, the Coase theorem purports that in the 
presence of unambiguously allocated property rights and likely negotiation, the market has 
the potential to solve externalities. Thus, externalities need not be terminated through 
regulations but rather be subject to property rights or assisted with negotiation and 
consultation so that participants concerned arrive at an economically efficient resolution 
(Autor, 2010). Many caveats of the Coase theorem exist including the challenge of failing 
negotiation in the presence of high transaction costs. Despite such issues, the theorem 
holds some explanatory value in bond markets. 
 
General findings of the bond market literature are harmonious with the Coasian (1937) view 
that local currency bond markets are an alternative source of finance for an economy. For 
instance, Allen et al (2012) propose that environments with weak formal institutions, such 
as those in emerging economies, require additional sources of funding such as domestic 
local currency bond markets. Domestic bond markets as a means to finance budget deficits 
is, according to Turner (2003) the principal reason for their establishment in emerging 
economies. The author explains that during the highly regulated financial regimes that were 
widespread prior to the 1980’s, governments of several emerging economies merely 
coerced central banks to print more money to meet their reserve requirements. 
Governments of many developing countries were, simultaneously, dependent on foreign aid 
to fund their fiscal deficits. According to Baudouin and Arindam (2010) the simplest channel 
for borrowing is the printing of money; however, such a method is highly inflationary and 
thus unsustainable for African emerging economies. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and  
Jeanne and Guscina (2006) have noted that various emerging markets  are increasingly using 
sovereign bonds to finance budget deficits.  
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Garcia-Kilroy and Silva (2011) and Saidi, Scacciavillani and Prasad  et al (2009) support the 
Coasian (1937) view of government bond markets as the cornerstone of financial market 
development as they aid sustainable growth by securing stable government financing 
sources through various economic cycles. However, Qayyum et al (2014) note that funds 
alone are not adequate for an economy to run and develop. Corporate bonds are an 
alternate financing channel for large corporate and financial institutions that are 
transparent and trustworthy enough to entice the public on the market while ensuring their 
ability to pay the debt when due (Milos, 2004). According to Allen and Qian (2010) and Allen 
et al (2012) domestic bond markets do not rely heavily on legal systems and as a result, if 
operated efficiently, they gradually reduce the legal costs. Čihák, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2006) emphasize that the improved efficiency of fund allocation, transparency and 
governance generated by the alternative channel of funding presented by bond markets and  
their further contribution in preventing collected funds from being passed to politically-
connected  and wealthy individuals is a significant contribution of well-managed bond 
markets. Practices such as shifting collected funds to undeserving parties hinder economic 
growth and prevent latent entrepreneurs from realising their economic objectives (Čihák et 
al 2006; Barth et al 2012). Baudouin and Arindam (2010), on the other hand, highlight that 
domestic bond markets are particularly helpful in economies in their early stages of 
development to gain additional finance. However, the authors caution that emerging 
economies tend to experience numerous market distortions that increase the cost and risk 
of government borrowing (Baudouin and Arindam, 2010). Thus, borrowing from other 
means, such as banks, may be seen as a competitive debt option in some cases. 
 
2.7 Rule of law 
Current studies have echoed the proposition of Smith (1937), Okioga (2013) and Hearn 
(2014) that stricter rules and regulations in African financial systems will deepen 
intermediation and encourage economic growth. This is what Smith said: 
 
“Though the principles of the banking trade may appear somewhat abstruse, the practice is 
capable of being reduced to strict rules. To depart upon any occasion from those rules, in 
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consequence of some flattering speculation of extraordinary gain, is almost always 
extremely dangerous, and frequently fatal to the banking company which attempts it.” 
(Smith, 1937 p 3)  
 
Since then, a plethora of academics and policy makers have supported this view in the 
expectation that the dominance of bank-based intermediation in Africa may be lessened by 
diversification of intermediation, strengthening confidence in regulations and supervision 
and implementing frameworks for financial systems in Africa (Goswami and Sharma, 2011). 
 
There appears an irrefutable relationship between intermediation, rent seeking and the 
quality of legal and regulatory frameworks in a market. Dahou et al (2009); and Akitoby and 
Stratmann (2010) explain that quality institutions promote trust and facilitate exchange.  
Furthermore, Bearman (1997) suggests solidarity as a secondary effect in all exchange 
systems, as actors are entrenched by mutual obligation and debt.  Such an engagement 
between agents and intermediaries entails the revelation of sensitive information by the 
borrower that may cause some embarrassment or unease (Chang, 2005).  An ecology of 
weak institutions, poor borrower rights and low transparency may cause borrowers to avoid 
network integration and stifle intermediation.  
 
McDonald and Schumacher (2007) empirically investigated creditor rights and information 
dissemination in Sub-Saharan African countries and found a progression of financial 
intermediation in the territories with sound, robust legal systems.  The same study found 
that the countries with relatively weaker legal institutions remained at low levels of financial 
intermediation (McDonald and Schumacher, 2007).  Thus, while a fundamental role of 
financial intermediaries is to serve as a conduit of funds from risk-averse economic agents 
to entrepreneurs, it is also a basic indicator of a country’s prevailing level of financial 
development and may be stalled by the extent of rent seeking activity in an economy 
(Marcelin and Mathur, 2014). 
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2.8 Institutions 
Institutions are the habitual set of ideas that are usually taken for granted, values and 
activities used within societies (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Jennings, Greenwood, 
Lounsbury and Suddaby, 2013).  According to Bruton, Ahlstrom and Li   (2010) the foremost 
description of an institution is that given by Scott (2000) in the proposition that they are 
‘…social structures that have reached substantial resistance and hold cognitive, normative 
and regulatory components…’ (Jennings et al, 2013).  These fertile links of formal and 
informal intuitions vary tremendously and mould the driving forces of economic actors and 
the manner in which markets function (Henrekson, 2014).  
 
Formal and informal institutions exist in countries and provide participants of economic 
transactions with the “…rules of the game…” which largely dictate whether certain 
behaviour is appropriate and legitimate (North, 1990:3).  Formal institutions are rules and 
processes that are conveyed and imposed through conduits that are generally 
acknowledged as official (Li and Zahra, 2012).  According to North (1990) formal institutions 
are intended to provide rules and control the behaviour of actors.   
 
The quality of formal institutions varies extensively among countries, particularly regarding 
the transparency of legal processes, degree of freedom involved in economic transactions, 
rule of law, political risks and supervision, and enforcement involving the protection of 
property rights (Lewellyn and Bao, 2014).For Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz (2007)  silent 
and unwritten rules of conduct both constrain and motivate the development of formal 
institutions.  These unwritten rules are known by each society and influence behaviour that 
is naturally accepted and even undervalued (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Licht et al 2007).  It 
is within these informal institutions that morals and traditional norms are provoked (Abdi 
and Aulakh, 2012).   
 
Theoretical and empirical evidence highlight the need to focus on institutional development 
due to the critical task of institutions in the development of financial systems (Chea, 2011).  
Amin (2013) simulates a growth accounting model and regressions with dummy variables, 
against panel data of 26 African countries from 1980-2011.  The factors of production 
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(labour, capital, land) and variables such as bureaucratic efficiency, enforcement of property 
rights and law and order are run and institutional quality is found to critically impact a 
country’s growth output.  Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) and Qayyum, Din and Haider 
(2014) have conducted similar studies and found that institutional variations are the most 
valuable elements that generate per capita growth disparity across countries. The role of 
domestic institutions in economic development is vital as proposed in the approach taken 
by New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Desta and Hirsch, 2012; Ang, 2013).  According to the 
NIE approach, the institutional settings in which the indigenous people exist will affect the 
country’s economic behaviour because of the distinguished role of institutions in economic 
outcomes (Desta and Hirsch, 2012; Williamson, 2012; Ang, 2013; Gordon, 2013). 
 
2.8.1  New Institutional Economics (NIE) and development theory 
The NIE is not a substitute for liberal theory but, an extension or slight modification of 
prevailing theory to further clarify the novel set of concepts (Desta and Hirsch, 2012; Leite et 
al 2014).  Institution, information asymmetries and the resulting transaction costs are 
recognized in the NIE approach (Ang, 2013; Kuncic, 2014).  
 
Hodgson (2004) finds the NIE approach individualistic and is in direct opposition of the dual 
effect of Veblen’s (1898) interpretation of neo economics.  Neoclassical economists state 
that the costless stream of factors of production is facilitated by markets and prices then 
passed on to the greatest value possible between rationally thinking people. NIE 
proponents, however, argue that organizations and intermediaries would be unfounded if 
this was the case (Lawson, 2013; Coggan et al 2014).  It appears that NIE analyses Africa’s 
post-colonial situation more effectively than neo-liberal theory because NIE theory observes 
that the main assumptions of neo-liberal theory occur purely in rare cases (Desta and 
Hirsch, 2012; Leite et al 2014).  Mkandawire (2014) suggests that while this novel view of 
economics, unlike neoclassical economic theory, appreciates the strain of market collapse in 
developing countries, it relies excessively on the state.  Thus, critics of the NIE approach 
argue that it erodes the role of power and boosts transaction costs while neglecting 
additional features including geography.  
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Ample theories in development studies that extend over the fields of economics, sociology 
and political science exist (Kang, 2014).  Such theories include Marxist, Keynesian and the 
more topical New Institutional theory (Ang, 2013; Bracarense, 2013; Basirat et al 2014).  
According to Kang (2014) there exists a tendency to consider development as a general and 
linear process of socio-economic growth and wealth.  Such a concept, according to Guillen 
(2001), supports the false perception of a standard solution for all contexts.  Reuschemeyer 
(2009) suggests context specifically as an instrument to acquire a better understanding of 
policies that may positively contribute to development.  Middle-range theory, a term 
initially coined by Merton (1968), identifies the midpoint between grand theories and 
functional hypotheses that continually develop and progress in the course of routine 
research.  Bracarense (2013) suggests that current development theories are inadequate 
and attributes this, partly, to a flawed understanding of historical change.  Present 
development theories do not attend to historical events, which is very important 
particularly in previously colonized countries (Ang, 2013; Bracarense, 2013).  The 
assessment of cultural, religious and moral influences have an enormous bearing on the 
construction of developmental theories and, provide more precise historical insight for 
theory construction than those that omit such factors (Woodberry, 2012).  Therefore, in 
establishing a bond market development model, the approach should be specific to the 
African context rather than that of the west, which has unique context, history and 
experience.  
 
2.9 Theory of rent seeking 
Rent seeking activity, according to Tullock (1967) is the earning of income without being 
productive. Rent seeking activity, portrayed by Fischer (2006) is a typical indication of scarce 
resources to be used to gain falsely conceived rents and transfers that are not part of the 
intended income.  While rent seeking activity is rife in developing countries, banks are 
notorious for such behaviour (Pillay and Ojah, 2009; Iqbal and Daly, 2014).  Such 
manipulation by intermediaries may limit growth in newer emerging economies (Khwaja 
and Mian, 2005).  Stated differently, rent seeking activity may hamper one of the key 
advantages of financial intermediation, deepening growth.  Khanna and Sunder (1999) and 
Zhou and Mei (2003) find a prevalence of rent seeking behaviour within the financial 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 30 
 
systems of China and India respectively.  While equity markets were the setting of the above 
studies, rich insight of intermediary activity in emerging economies can be drawn.  
According to North (1990) institutional framework is crucial and often delivers an 
environment conducive to rent seeking behaviour particularly in developing countries with 
weak institutions. Thus, for rent seeking activity to be minimized in a market, laws and 
regulations must be implemented and enforced. 
 
2.10 Intermediation theory 
Merton and Bodie (1995) and Levin (1997) emphasize the role of financial intermediaries 
including contracts and margins, when evaluating potential investment opportunities and 
exercising corporate control. The same authors also recognize that financial intermediaries 
have a vital function in directing risk management and improving liquidity within a financial 
system.   
 2.10.1 Traditional intermediation theory 
Crockett (2011) identifies an intermediary as a separate, independent component of the 
financial system that is essential for its proper function.  Coggan, Buitelaar, Whitten and 
Bennett (2013) analyse intermediaries against probity hazards, transaction costs and 
imperfect information.  Intermediaries, according to the authors, are  parties in markets that 
cater for specific and strategic information to sellers to assist in their finalization of an 
exchange (Coggan et al 2013).   
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Figure 2.4: Financial intermediaries within sectors of lenders and borrowers 
 
Source: Adapted from Faurie (2014) 
 
Institutional investors and households comprise the primary intermediaries in financial 
systems with households being the ultimate investors (Moody, 2009). Figure 2.4 exhibits the 
various sectors, including households as the borrowers and lenders of funds and their 
interaction with financial intermediaries. Giofre (2013) finds bias towards domestic assets 
on the part of households whilst institutional investors are found to be less biased.  
Households that invest directly in the financial markets are affected to a greater extent by 
information matters than financial institutions (Giofre, 2013). Transparency, as shown in 
Figure 2.4, is present in the interactions between borrowers, lenders and financial 
intermediaries.  Furthermore, the translation of savings from households into investment 
securities encompasses the role of financial intermediaries (Mahran, 2012).   Stix (2013) 
suggests that weak institutions and poor legal enforcement  deter households in developing 
and transition economies from engaging with financial institutions.  Hence, the elimination 
of such obstacles would benefit intermediation in developing and transition economies 
(Zhang et al 2012; Giofre, 2013).  
 
Kuznets (1971) found a considerable increase in intermediaries as per capita income 
increased.  Later, King and Levine (1993) established a positive association between financial 
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intermediary size, stage of investment and velocity of new capita output.  According to 
Kuznets (1971) the task of financial intermediaries increases with the development of an 
economy. Thus, as an economy develops, bond markets will be required since more  
intermediaries will be needed to deal with the expansion. King and Levin (1993) concur  that 
expansion of the financial sector is a response to economic growth caused by increased 
intermediation.  Cole (1995) responds to sceptics of the financial intermediary- growth 
nexus by acknowledging the initial sharp decline in output that follows the larger function of 
financial intermediaries.  The author suggests that the output decline in transitional 
economies, in the short run, may be attributed to a negative productivity shock. Several 
views of financial intermediaries exist, however, a common feature  among them is the 
cultural or geographical context  in the formulation of intermediation frameworks (Swamy 
and Tulasimala, 2011; Lidia, 2014).  
 
The traditional Arrow-Debreu (1954) model of resource allocation proposes that firms and 
households interact by means of markets without the necessity for financial 
intermediarieries (Gersbach, Halle and Konishi, 2013; Bierbrauer and Boyer, 2014). Another 
view, Pareto efficiency, is a condition where a market is complete and perfect, thus, there is 
no opportunity for financial intermediaries to improve the state of financial markets (Allen 
and Santomero, 1997). Still, the Modigliani-Miller theorem affirms the triviality of the 
structure of financial markets in value creation. According to the theorem, intermediation is 
not value creating because households are able to assemble portfolios that counterbalance 
any stance of an intermediary (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Dow and Han, 2014). 
 
More traditional views of financial intermediaries argue that low levels of intermediation, 
financial disintermediation, lack of enforcement of legislation and poor institutions may 
increase the likelihood of bank runs by household savers should they encounter further 
liquidity problems or any threat to the recovery of their investments (Ladekarl and Zervos, 
2004; Marcelin and Mathur, 2014). Thus, it is imperative that a more diverse range of 
intermediation is available to African emerging economies.  
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 2.10.2 Contemporary intermediation theory 
A novel approach to intermediation is that of Deng, Xin and Wei (2014) who views it as an 
entrepreneurial role that is crucial for entrepreneurial opportunities to be created.  While 
Zhang et al (2012) acknowledge the above views of  intermediaries, it is argued that 
informal intermediaries, in the form of network contracts, local money lenders, and even 
relatives, provide timely financial support to local residents on more flexible terms.  Formal 
intermediaries can be cumbersome as  they frequently require proof of ability to repay and 
collateral (Zhang et al 2012). However, informal intermediaries may extract rents from 
borrowers, with the knowledge that the borrowers have no other source to consult (Iqbal 
and Daly, 2014).   
 
It is argued that poor or relatively modest entrepreneurs and families are less likely to 
obtain loans from formal intermediaries because they do not have the collateral or 
documentation required (Zhang et al 2012).  Moreover, many formal intermediaries are 
seldom able to reach marginal communities because the costs associated with issuing a loan 
or granting a deposit  outweigh the expected return (Zhang et al 2012; Gwatidzo and Ojah, 
2014).  The entrepreneurial approach of Deng et al (2014) is, arguably, consistent with the 
informal intermediary view. Both of the above studies are based on the premise of 
accessing untapped markets to serve the role of intermediary. The findings converge with 
the economic growth outcome of the intermediation type.  Intuitive introspection deduces 
that new, unfamiliar means of intermediation may hold insight into economic growth.  Such 
an inference is in harmony with Goldsmith (1969) but  in sharp contrast to Robinson’s 
(1952) proposal that the financial system does not stimulate economic growth. 
 
Beck et al (2014) evaluate the relationship between the ‘extent of intermediation’ and 
‘financial system size’.  Value added portion of GDP and GDP per capita growth are variables 
used to establish an association.  A two-step methodology of implementing OLS, and 
regressing the two explanatory variables against growth and volatility was employed.  Based  
on a sample of 77 emerging and developed countries over the 1980-2007 period, Beck et al 
(2014) observe that intensified intermediation activities increase growth and ease volatility.  
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However, in the shorter run increased intermediation increases volatility in high income 
countries.  
 
Bijlsma and Dubovik (2014) explain that higher income countries have already reaped the 
benefits of easily attainable growth. Also, in larger financial sectors, such as those of higher 
income countries, added financial intermediaries may increase the risk of macroeconomic 
volatility or a banking crisis (Bijlsma and Dubovik, 2014). Low income countries, similarly 
experience volatility; however, volatility occurs in the medium run as opposed to the short 
run for high income countries (Beck et al 2014).  This finding suggests a lag in responses and 
reactions in low income countries relative to high income countries.  Further, it suggests 
that fundamental differences in the financial markets of high and low income countries exist 
(Bijlsma and Dubovik, 2014).  These observations  are valuable for a country’s expectation of 
intermediation effects on financial volatility and cautions countries to make strategic plans 
for intermediation to coincide with their growth objectives as much as possible (Beck et al 
2014). 
 
A major benefit of current financial intermediary theory is the huge risk management value 
it proposes; however, Scholtens and Wensveen (2003) argue that traditional intermediation 
theory barely offers any explanation of the reason for such an occurrence. Scholtens and 
Wensveen (2003) also maintain that the reduction of participation costs brought about by 
financial intermediaries, removes the costs of learning about efficiently participating and 
using markets daily. This loss, according to the authors,  will ultimately be costly to an 
economy.  
 
Despite the divergent opinions and interpretations about the role of financial 
intermediation in economic growth, there appears to be general consensus around its 
critical role in the diversification of investment risk and the mobilization of savings 
(Thumrongvit, 2013).  The resulting high savings trigger a high degree of financial 
intermediation by banks (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 2009).  Therefore, it is critical that 
African countries have relatively high savings levels to reap the benefits of intermediation.   
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2.11 Domestic savings 
The theoretical position of Aghion, Bacchetta, Rancière and Rogoff (2009) on the role of 
domestic savings in enhancing investment and economic growth emphasizes the benefits of 
matching domestic savings with foreign capital.  Domestic savings within this framework is 
handled as collateral to attract growth-enhancing foreign capital particularly in low-middle 
income countries.  Furthermore, Ganioglu and Yalcin (2013) suggest that domestic savings 
and investment have a positive relationship in low-middle income countries despite recent 
empirical studies that refute this claim. 
 
Figure 2.5: Increased domestic savings in low-middle income countries increases growth 
rate (2012). 
 
 
 
 
Source: Data from World Development Indicators (WDI) Database (2014) 
 
Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2007) and Prasad et al (2007) agree that low-middle income 
countries that have higher domestic savings rates tend to grow faster than those with lower 
domestic savings. Thus according to Felman, Gray, Goswami, Jobst, Pradhan, Peiris and 
Seneviratne (2011) this is because the government bond market probably contributes most 
to the transformation of savings, dissemination of information and management of risk. A 
well-functioning financial system delivers and facilitates provision of savings, payments, 
credit and risk management products to those with diverse needs (Demirguc –Kant and 
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Klapper, 2012). Figure 2.5 shows the movement of real GDP growth and gross domestic 
savings of selected African countries and corroborates the above arguments. GDP growth 
and investment savings are closely linked in the diagram. The diagram shows further that in 
2012, as the savings decreased so too did investment. Lesotho, for instance, experienced a 
drop in gross domestic savings as real GDP growth fell. 
 
2.12 Banks and bond markets- friends or foes? 
Fama (1980) explained the role of banks as twofold. First, banks provide accounting and 
transaction services, and second, they provide portfolio management services. According to 
Ncube (2009) African banks face competition while fulfilling the second function described 
by Fama (1980). One may deduce that the development and inclusion of domestic debt in 
African financial markets will greatly assist the continent’s banks to pursue portfolio 
management services. This occurs because portfolio management services involve money 
market funds and mutual investment funds such as unit trusts, which open up opportunities 
for investment, increase the capacity of banks in Africa to diversify their portfolios and 
perhaps improve their efficiency (ACCA, 2012).  Also, banks as the primary means of funding 
alter the strategic decisions of firms (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2009).   
 
A widely used simile by Greenspan (2000) is that bond markets behave ‘like a spare tire,’ 
replacing bank lending as a source of corporate funding when banks’ balance sheets are 
fragile and when they are restricting credit.   Hawkins (2005) suggests such a case in the US 
during the early 1900s and again in Hong Kong during the late 1990s when local banks 
assumed a conservative position to lending in the midst of a collapse of U.S. property prices. 
However, Braun and Briones (2006a) and Mu et al (2013) disagree with Greenspan (2000) 
and suggest a complementary association between banks and the bond markets.  
Furthermore, empirical investigation by Jiang, Tang and Law (2001) establish a positive 
correlation between bond issuance and bank lending in both developed and emerging 
economies.  
 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 37 
 
Many benefits exist in using banks as a source of finance such as the ability of firms to 
negotiate debt roll-over during tough times; however, there are a number of factors that 
can dissuade the use of bank debt over non-bank debt (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014). Banks are 
able to expropriate rents from firms’ investments since they possess information about the 
firm that other lenders are probably unable to access. Further, the banks are aware that 
firms may not be able to access other debts at favourable terms and within good time. Thus, 
the firm bears a hold-up cost in the process. Therefore, in the absence of a corporate debt 
market, a firm with a potentially lucrative investment is more than likely to rely on other 
private lenders for financing, which may be less costly than banks (Ojah and Manrique, 
2005). Non-bank private lenders, to a large extent, perform functions similar to banks and 
thus are also able to expropriate rents from a firm’s investments (Ojah and Manrique, 
2005). 
 
Turner (2003) argues that the notion that increased bond market development and bond 
issuance robs banks of profitable business is oversimplified at best. The author explains that 
banks may lose good business if their regulatory framework is not enhanced and 
consequently cause good business to migrate to other sources of funds if banks are 
compelled to hold a lot of capital against loans to low-risk borrowers. A migration of sound 
borrowers from banks to bond markets may occur and give rise to systemic hazard because 
of the concentration of poorer risks on banks.   
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Figure 2.6: The complementary nature of bond and bank funds- A European case. 
 
Source: Claeys (2014) 
 
A good example of the typically complementary relationship between bond market debt 
and bank debt is revealed in Figure 2.6. Capital seekers may prefer bank debt over debt 
market funding for a number of reasons. Firms in most African countries are not able to 
issue corporate bonds on security exchanges as the majority of them are not listed, thus 
finding themselves in challenging circumstances in the pursuit of external finance, 
(Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014). Banks may also be a more attractive option for some firms 
because of the positive signals they send to other potential lenders about a firm’s ability to 
lend from a bank as opposed to other lenders (Gwatidzo and Ojah,2014).  The comparative 
advantage and sufficient resources of banks enable them to assess borrowers; thus, 
borrowers granted bank loans are viewed as relatively credible (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014).  
However, bonds may also be viewed as a more attractive debt choice for a variety of 
reasons.  Larger firms may prefer bond markets due to their lower  costs of borrowing 
compared to interest rate premiums demanded by banks (Pessarossi and Weill, 2013; 
Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014).  The initial floating costs associated with listing a corporate bond 
may be relatively high; however, over the long run, the transaction costs associated with 
bond markets are less than those of bank loans (Pessarossi and Weill, 2013).    
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Turner (2003) explains that in a situation where bond markets are small or non-existent, 
firms may be forced to secure long- term assets through short-term debt. Thus, their 
investment policies may favour a short-term project which invariably detracts their 
entrepreneurial expression. If firms decide to compensate for the lack of a domestic bond 
market at the expense of banks by borrowing from international bond markets, they may 
subject themselves to high foreign exchange risk.   
 
2.13 Theories of economic growth  
Economic growth, according to Lipsey (1986) is the positive trend of an economy’s total 
output over a protracted time period. Early studies including Schumpeter (1911) and 
Robinson (1952) attempt  to identify a link between economic growth and financial systems.  
Further, numerous studies, including Herring and Chtusripitak (2000), Braun and Briones 
(2006a), Fink, Haiss, Kirchner and Moser (2006) and Thumrongvit et al (2013) assess the link 
between bond markets and economic growth and find a positive relationship between the 
two variables. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) and Jappelli and Pogano (1994) also establish a 
positive relationship; however, it is only in terms of the quantity of savings offered to 
financial investments, whereas Greenwood and Javanovic (1990) find that financial markets 
are relevant only with respect to investment productivity increases.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (2003), Ergungor (2008), Shin and Oh (2008) and Jalil, Feridun and Ma 
(2010) refute the idea of a positive relationship between financial market development and 
economic growth. According to this view an association between financial development and 
economic growth may be due to omitted variables challenges. Guevara and Maudos (2011) 
suggest that financial development is reliant on a country’s ability to save, and according to 
key theories of growth, a primary determinant of economic growth is the saving rate. 
Therefore, the apparent positive link between economic growth and financial development, 
observed in time series for a single economy or cross-country regressions may be a 
manifestation of the savings rate and not a growth-financial development relation.   While 
Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) accede to the presence of a relationship between economic 
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growth and financial markets, their advice about the neoclassical view of the economy’s real 
sector being more important than financial markets, is feeble. This view has been largely 
superseded by general consensus in the literature that financial markets promote economic 
growth. Such a market-based view implicitly highlights the positive growth effects of 
government bond markets on economic growth (Levine, 2002). Findings of  Baudouin and 
Arindam (2010) are consistent with proponents of the market-based view. However, this 
research adopts the stance of Ojah and Pillay (2009) who urge emerging market 
policymakers to recognise that deepening their debt markets may be a productive feature of 
their financial market development strategy.   
 
Figure 2.7: Foreign direct investment flows into developing countries  spur economic 
growth. 
 
Source: Kumar (2007) 
NOTE: Shaded area represents 95% confidence band 
 
Figure 2.7 supports the theory that financial markets spur economic growth. A percentage 
increase in the FDI/ GDP ratio affects the performance of emerging economies as seen in 
the diagram. Figure 2.7 shows also, that though FDI may not increase economic growth 
immediately, beneficial effects are delivered by it in subsequent years. The response of GDP 
growth, in the diagram, began to decline after one lagged year of FDI; however, the 
cumulative response reached a peak after two years and continued to have a cumulative 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 41 
 
growth effect on the economy. The cumulative effect of FDI is positive in the long run, even 
when the growth effect has dampened. 
 
2.14 Theory of ‘Original Sin’ 
Hausmann and Panizza (2010) explain ‘original sin’ as the result of severe currency 
mismatch. According to the authors ,original sin occurs when a country suffers from an 
inability to borrow abroad in its local currency and has serious implications for financial and 
economic stability.  When the inability to borrow abroad in its local currency persists, a 
mismatch on the balance sheet occurs due to an accumulation of foreign currency 
denominated net debt to foreigners (Baek, 2013).  A further dimension of currency 
mismatch is the maturity mismatch problem that occurs when short-term local currency 
instruments are used to fund long term investments (BIS, 2007; Thumrongvit et al 2013). 
Baek (2013) recognizes the divergent views on this subject in the literature.  One view 
attributes currency mismatches to international factors such as transaction costs and 
network externalities whilst the other blames domestic factors, such as institutions, on 
currency mismatch. According to the Eichengreen (2003, 2005) school of thought, a close 
relation exists between currency-mismatch burdens and international influences, such as 
global market imperfections and transactions costs.  The contrasting view of Goldstein and 
Turner (2004) argues that the primary causes of currency mismatches are domestic factors 
such as previous and current weaknesses in economic policies and institutional conditions. 
 
The gravity of currency and maturity mismatch in emerging markets’ debt structure is a 
conversation that cannot be taken lightly (Koeniger, Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2004).  Such 
mismatches are important because they have the potential to magnify the effects of 
exogenous shocks, amplify the severity of crisis and stall the course of recovery subsequent 
to a crisis (Goldstein and Turner, 2004).  Jeanneau and Tovar (2008) add that currency and 
maturity mismatches can cause the fear of floating hypothesis to occur by restricting the 
degree of exchange rate movements that the central government is prepared to accept.  
Seminal literature of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) conceives the term ‘fear of floating’ and 
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explains it as a situation where a country avoids swings in exchange rate in favour of a 
smarter exchange rate. 
 
Large currency and maturity mismatches, also known as the ‘twin peaks’ or double 
mismatch problem were key contributors to the damaging financial crises in Mexico (1994), 
Asia (1997) and Thailand (2002) (Koenige et al 2004).  According to Felman et al (2011) and 
Burger et al (2012) the failure of emerging economies to attract local currency bond market 
investment was pivotal to the currency mismatches and related currency crises.  Local bond 
markets were severely underdeveloped in many emerging economies during the 1990s 
(Bae, 2012; Burger et al 2012).  According to Caballero et al (2008) the underdevelopment 
of local debt markets, most probably, was related to the currency and maturity mismatch, 
which aggravated the emerging market crisis during the 1990s. Brazil, in the 1970s and 
1980s, experienced a similar problem due to a relatively stunted maturity of public debt and 
its expansion (de Mendonca and Duarte Nunes 2011). Jefferis (2009) found that 
underdeveloped bond markets encourage governments and corporates to pursue reduced 
borrowing costs in foreign currency securities.  Exchange rate changes and currency 
depreciation are likely to cause foreign currency repayments to be too high for borrowing 
governments and corporates, thus rendering them bankrupt (Global Financial Development 
Report, 2014).  According to Maiyajima, Mohanty and Chan (2012) such movements in 
exchange rate operate in a non-linear style, suggesting a vulnerability to increased solvency 
risks for borrowers.  
 
 2.14.1 ‘Original sin’ effects on financial and economic stability 
Well-managed domestic and foreign currency bond markets reduce a financial system’s 
susceptibility to ‘original sin’, ‘twin peaks’ and financial instability (Ncube, 2009; IMF, 2013). 
This is done primarily by increasing opportunities to utilize domestic savings and decreasing 
negative spill overs from banking sector deficiencies, which is wide-spread in Africa (Ncube, 
2009). These developments enable the absorption of hefty and volatile capital flows thus 
supporting local and global financial stability (Ncube, 2009; IMF, 2013).  
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Jeanneau and Tovar (2008) and Bhattacharyay (2011) find that Latin American economies 
that have taken decisive steps to develop bond markets have reduced economic instability 
and currency mismatches.  Consequently, several bond market development initiatives have 
been established by organizations and regional blocks on the premise of the stabilizing 
effects of domestic debt market development (Disley, Rubin, Scraggs, Burrowes and Culley, 
2011).  
 
Patel (2008), through a risk based approach, analyse government bond market development 
in Mexico and finds that macro-economic and financial stability rise with bond market 
development.  Furthermore as stability increases, associated risk decreases (Patel, 2008).  
The findings are relevant particularly because Mexico is an emerging economy and 
possesses characteristics very similar to African emerging economies (Patel, 2008; 
Andrianaivo and Yartey 2010).  However, institutions and legal rights in Mexico vary greatly 
from those in African emerging economies.  Moreover, as was the case of Botswana, the 
relative lack of institutions in African emerging economies in comparison with Mexico may 
adversely affect macro-economic and fiscal development and emerge as a threat to stability 
(Jefferis, 2009). 
 
Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes (2013) find that uncertainty shocks and economic volatility 
affect the well-being of emerging economies more severely and more persistently than  
developed economies.  Economic stability and a decline in investment and private 
consumption are, according to the authors, decisive factors that contribute most to the 
decline of economic well-being of emerging economies (Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes, 
2013). For example, a currency mismatch may occur when a country issues foreign currency 
denominated debt to fund local investments that generate local currency returns  
(Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai and 2004; Bhattacharyay, 2011). Unfavourable 
movements of the exchange rate may also exasperate the problem and severely affect a 
country’s ability to make payments to the lender, thus distressing creditworthiness and 
undermining public confidence (Hawkins, 2005; Jeanneau and Tovar, 2007). 
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Economic and financial stability is important because it reduces a country’s dependence on 
the banking industry (ICMA, 2013).  Such a reduction is significant particularly since the sub-
prime crisis of 2008 was triggered primarily by countries’ over-reliance on the banking 
sector (Nunn and Trefler, 2013). Well developed and diligently implemented economic and 
financial policies, to a large extent, decrease a market’s vulnerability to crisis and promote 
sustained growth (Ahmad, Sehgal and Bhanumurthy, 2013; IMF 2013).  Massa and te Velde 
(2008) examine the effect of the 2008 sub-prime crisis on the financial markets of eight 
African emerging economies.  The authors conclude that the extent of financial and 
economic turmoil effects was dependent on the economic and financial policies of each 
country and the manner in which the policies influence economic and financial stability of a 
country, suggesting a causal relationship between bond market development and economic 
and financial stability in an emerging economy (Massa and te Velde, 2008). Local currency 
bond markets contribute to financial stability by lowering currency mismatches and 
extending debt duration thus, decreasing solvency risk (ICMA, 2013).  While solvency issues 
have received a lot of attention recently, governance issues have received the least scrutiny 
(Ellis et al (2014).    
 
Collier (2014) and Ellis et al (2014) find that poor regulations and accounting systems may 
discourage foreign investors from purchasing domestic bonds.  Baek (2013), in a study of 97 
developing and emerging economies, ran unbalanced panel regressions for a data set 
spanning 1990-2004 and finds that improved institutional quality impairs the range of 
currency mismatching and thus, macro-economic and financial instability. A better strategy 
would be for the authors to use different weights of factors contribution to currency 
mismatch in the regression equations used.  Such an approach would cater for the 
differences among countries with varying levels of debt sustainability (Arnott and Chaves, 
2012).  Furthermore, factor analysis would have been useful when selecting explanatory 
variables to insert into the regression equation (Wagenvoort, Ebner and Borys, 2011; 
Mwebi, 2013). The authors suggest that this finding is due to the deterioration of the net 
foreign-asset situation since markets with high institutional quality attract foreign capital 
(Baek, 2013).  However, African countries, by virtue of their debt burdens, encourage the 
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inflow of foreign capital as a means to service their foreign loans.  Ghana, for example, in 
2014, actively prevented the outflow of United State dollars as a means to service the 
country’s foreign debts, termed Brandy Bonds (Bax and Dontoh, 2014).   
  
 2.14.2 The yield curve 
A yield curve is a measure of the return on fixed income securities and the performance of 
the secondary bond market (Nwiado and Deekor, 2013). It is a line graph that starts at the 
shortest rate to maturity-spot interest rate, and plots the relationship between yields to 
maturity and time to maturity for bonds of corresponding credit characters and asset classes 
(Millington, 2014). Furthermore, it is an essential yardstick that is used by financial 
institutions to make investment decisions and control interest rate risk (Chakroun and Abid, 
2013).  Du Preez and Marre (2013) describe yield curves as a plot portraying the spot rate of 
interest for a continuum of maturities, in certain time periods. A flat curve signals weak 
growth while, a steep curve suggests strong growth.  The larger the difference between long 
and short term yields the steeper the yield curve (Millington, 2014). 
 
Figure 2.8: Typical and inverted yield curve 
 
Source: Oppenheimer and Hollingsworth, 2013 
 
Investors typically require higher yields for binding their money for an extended period of 
time than they would for bonds with shorter maturities. Figure 2.8 shows the association 
between bond maturities and bond yields in a normal yield curve. Further, in Figure 2.8, the 
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5 year bonds in the typical yield curve have a 2% yield whereas those with maturities up to 
30 years have yields of 7%. The diagram also shows what occurs when a yield curve is 
inverted. It suggests that the rates for long term treasury bonds, in the case of inverted yield 
curves, fall below those of short term treasury bonds, thus signaling a change in long term 
expectations (Oppenheimer and Hollingsworth, 2013). Therefore, the establishment of a 
yield curve is a noteworthy benefit to the economic and financial stability of a country 
(Mehl, 2006).  According to Chakroun and Abid (2013) yield curves are exceptionally 
valuable in the processes involved in pricing all fixed income securities.  Sovereign yield 
curves can assist debit managers to gauge the risks and benefits of various sovereign 
borrowing strategies and are also very useful to corporations in approximating their cost of 
debt.  Furthermore, the cost of capital markets can be bench-marked against other funding 
sources, such as non-concessional financing (Gueye and Sy, 2010).  The yield curve 
possesses predictive power in the future behaviour of interest rates and inflation 
(Castellanos, 1998; Gueye and Sy, 2010).  The U.S., as the most liquid and developed fixed 
income market is a fitting example of the predictive power of the yield curve.  
 
Figure 2.9: U.S. Yield curve prior to, during and after the 2008 sub-prime crisis (monthly 
average percent) 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 15 October 2014 
 
Figure 2.9 depicts the average monthly percentage of spread between 10 year bonds and 
three- month bills in the U.S. According to Haubrich and Millington (2014) the last seven 
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recessions were preceded by yield curve inversions, including the recent 2008 sub-prime 
crisis. The shaded area in Figure 2.9 to the far right shows the inversion of the U.S. yield 
curve immediately prior to the 2008 sub-prime crisis. A recession typically occurs a year 
after the inversion of a yield curve, as can be seen in the inversion of the yield curve in 
August 2006 and the start of the recession in December 2007 (Sangvinatsos, 2010; Haubrich 
and Millington, 2014). Thus, the ability to find the respective yield curves can signal a 
market’s financial and economic stance and indicate  potential spill overs (Mehl, 2006; 
Gueye and Sy 2010).  
 
The rich value of yield curves, and their estimation in finance and economics, has been 
documented extensively by several authors including Angeletos (2002), Nazir, Alam and 
Nawaz (2010), Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2010), Goswami and Sharma (2011) and Nwiado 
and Deekor (2013). The authors, however, caution that while yield curve estimation is 
beneficial, it can never take the place of an actual curve.  While Endo (2013) acknowledges 
the value of domestic government bonds in price discovery and bench-marking a country’s 
yield curve, the authors observe that this is not the case in most emerging markets because 
of their illiquidity.  
 
Nwiado and Deekor (2013) have tested the theory that the mix of domestic and foreign 
participation in domestic debt markets generates liquidity and decreases the national yield 
curve.  An auto vector regressive (AVR) model, among other tests, was applied to data from 
the Central Bank of Nigeria. The study found that contrary to the theory, foreign domestic 
bond market participation did not  affect the national yield curve (Nwiado and Deekor, 
2013).  The authors however, caution, the results citing possible corruption of data.  
Furthermore, at the time of the study, Nigeria had instilled policies that prevented foreign 
investors from trading debt for a year after acquiring the instrument.  The policy dictating 
such a stall, the Certificate of Capital Importation (CCI), has since been lifted. 
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 2.15  Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Deliberation regarding the character of market prices interested Fama (1970) throughout 
the infancy of his career.  Under the supervision of Miller (1958) and Merton (1973) of the 
Modigliani-Miller Theorem and Black-Scholes-Merton model, Fama (1970) discovered that 
stock prices were not especially forecastable.  Less than a decade later Fama (1970) 
propelled by his prior work, formalized the phenomenon by developing the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) (Sewelll, 2011; Kamal, 2014; Shiller, 2014). The assumption behind the 
EMH is that security markets reflect information about stocks in an efficient manner 
(Ayentimi, Mensah and Naa-Idar, 2013).  According to Fama (1970) an efficient market is 
one in which prices, at any time, ‘fully reflect all available information’ (Fama, 1970, p 383).  
All the information accessible to investors is reflected by markets and market price 
fluctuations are not predictable (Zeren and Konuk, 2013).  Further, in an efficient market, all 
investors have access to information at equal costs whilst operating costs are minimal to 
none (Alagidede and Panagiotidis, 2009; Sarac, 2013). 
 
Bonjean and Simonet (2014) applied the Markov switching ADF unit route test and the 
recursive unit root test to 24 millet markets in Niger and observed speculative bubbles, 
albeit slight,  in the data set. An absence of unit root in the Egyptian equity markets during 
the period immediately prior to and after the 25th January Revolution in 2011 is established 
by Kamal (2014).  Kamal (2014) and Bonjean and Simonet (2014) also found evidence 
against the unit root hypothesis in Egyptian markets. Both studies, however, sample 
emerging economies and ample evidence supports the difference between the innate 
structure of frontier emerging and developed markets (Claessens et al, 1993; Karamera, 
Ojah and Cole, 1999; Kodongo and Ojah, 2011).   
 
Harvey (1994) established, however, that emerging market returns are highly predictable 
and concluded that these markets are not efficient according to the EMH theory.  
Developed markets, conversely, have been largely found to reflect at least a weak form of 
the EMH (Klock and Bacon, 2014; Konak and Seker, 2014). One may infer, therefore, that the 
information asymmetry apparent in many emerging market economies is imbedded in the 
lack of unit roots within these economies since the EMH is about the quality and speed of 
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information in a financial market. Several recent findings also indicate anomalies in 
developed countries thus rejecting the EMH and raising the probability of a random walk 
(Schwert, 2003; Oran 2008).  Zunino, Bariviera, Guercio and Martinez (2012) observe an 
absence of fixed income efficiency studies and attribute this disinterest to the typically 
larger trading figures of stock markets relative to bond markets.  Notwithstanding these and 
other anomalies  , the EMH is still the dominant paradigm regarding the rules of the market 
(Yalçın, 2010). 
 
Anomalies, such as the January Effect, are documented in both stock and bond markets and 
are among many irregularities that give rise to doubts concerning the EMH (Schwert, 2003; 
Yalcin, 2010; Klock and Bacon, 2014).  The turn of the month effect, turn of the year effect 
and the weekend effect are further observed deviations that have contributed to review of 
the EMH (Yalçın, 2010, Caporale, Gil-Alana, Plastun and Makarenko, 2014; Konak and Seker, 
2014).  Oran (2008) suggests the existence of other anomalies associated with human 
emotional state and geographic upsurge. Further controversies that have weakened the 
EMH range from simple enquiry about the validity of the hypothesis to the relevance of the 
proposition to contemporary financial markets (Lim and Brooks, 2011; Shiller, 2014).  The 
EMHs proposition of a steady sate of market efficiency appears to be slowly evolving into a 
new paradigm of Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) (Mobareka and Fioranteba, 2014).  
 
2.15.1 Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH) 
Lo (2004, 2005) formulated the adaptive markets hypothesis (AMH) under the assumption 
that the efficiency of the market may fluctuate from time to time due to altering market 
conditions. According to the novel hypothesis, efficiency is an attribute that continuously 
changes throughout markets and time rather than remaining static (Lim and Brooks, 2011).  
Indeed, it is very plausible that since the conception of the EMH in the 70s, financial markets 
and the world have greatly altered (Tapia, 2012).  Many African countries were under 
colonial rule, globalization was not yet in motion and markets were not nearly as liberalized 
as they are today (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2014). Additionally, the phrase ‘emerging 
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markets’ had not been coined yet and the intricacies of these unique markets were not fully 
appreciated (Khannan and Palepu, 2011).  
 
A market’s acceptance or rejection of EMH will guide the analysis applied to the market and 
the investment strategies used by its investors (Elze, 2010).  Markets found to be efficient, 
in theory will have no arbitrage opportunities for investors and the more inefficient a 
market is seen to be, the more arbitrage opportunities are probable to investors 
(Bhattacharyay and O’Brien, 2014). For example, if the EMH were to hold true, the role of 
financial intermediaries would be negligible and markets would be self-supporting 
(Karemera et al (1999). According to Woolley (2010), the EMH does not attribute investor 
delegation to intermediaries with varying incentives and degrees of competence that cause 
mispricing and volatility.  Fama (1970) accepts such variability in returns as rational, while 
Woolley (2010) and other behaviourists view them as irrational.  Whether rational or 
irrational, the return variability is important as it affects all components of the financial 
market (ECB, 2014). Different modes of measurement may yield divergent results from the 
return variability of financial asset; it is therefore, imperative that the scale of measurement 
is appropriately selected for the attribute measured.  
 
2.16  Term structure of interest rates 
Dynamic term structure models (DTSMs), explain how yields of different maturities move 
over time, and the manner in which they relate to each other (Yung, 2014). A fundamental 
factor in delineating variances of interest rates on different securities in a market, according 
to economic theory, is the differences in their terms (Russell, 1992). Thus, differences in 
time till maturity are suggested as key to understanding why interest rates of various 
securities differ. No arbitrage opportunity is the main assumption of term interest rate 
models. Thus, investors are expected to receive the equivalent risk-adjusted compensation 
for bonds at varying maturities (Yung, 2014). The Pure Expectations Theory, Preferred 
Habitat Theory and Liquidity Preference Theory are three of the many theories of term 
structure. 
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Pure Expectations Theory maintains that the slope of the yield curve is indicative only of the 
short-term interest rate expectations of investors. The upward slope of the typical yield 
curve is the outcome of investors’ expectation of increased future interest rates (Irturk, 
2006). A variation of the Pure Expectations Theory, the Preferred Habitat Theory, suggests 
unique investment horizons of investors as an added determinant of the yield curve slope 
(Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014). According to the theory, investors require compensation 
for purchasing bonds that are outside their distinct favoured maturity or habitat. Advocates 
of the Preferred Habitat Theory attribute higher long-term interest rates compared to short 
term interest rates to the greater predominance of short-term investors in bond markets 
(Greenwood and Vayanos, 2014; Wang, 2014). Longer term bonds thus, need to offer a 
higher premium to investors since it is outside the preferred habitat of  prevalent short term 
investments. Liquidity Preference Theory, another derivative of Pure Expectations Theory, is 
similar to Pure Expectations Theory as it suggests the reflection of investor expectations 
from the yield curve. Much like the Preferred Habitat theory, Liquidity Preference Theory 
includes a term premium for investors of long-term bonds; however, the compensation is 
due to the risks attached to holding a security for an extended period of time. Similar to the 
Preferred Habitat Theory, this theory suggests that long term bonds have higher risk and 
higher premium than short term bond yields (Wang, 2014).  
 
2.17 Pecking order theory 
Modern capital structure theory commenced with the well-known Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) proposition of capital structure irrelevance. Subsequently, numerous theories 
explaining factors that drive the capital structure decisions of firms have emerged. The 
two most discussed are the Pecking Order theory and Trade-Off model.  The underlying 
principle of the Trade-off model is that firms balance tax savings from debt against 
burdensome bankruptcy costs (Meyers, 1984). The Pecking Order theory explains a 
broader set of influencers of a firm’s capital structure that other theories, including the 
Trade- off theory ignore.  This model recognises reported and observed managerial 
decisions and describes the dynamics between market reactions to firm leverage which is 
lacking in the Trade-off theory. 
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The Pecking order theory sheds considerable light on the processes of making decisions 
about sources of finance (Meyers and Majluf, 1984). The theory postulates that a 
corporation will follow the path of least resistance when making capital funding decision. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), in the presence of information asymmetry investors 
will prefer to acquire funding through debt cause of the relatively lesser premium 
associated with debt financing.  Thus, other funding sources available in Africa such as 
banks, are able to expropriate rents from fund seekers because of their knowledge that the 
seeker will not find substitute funding in a timely manner and terms (Ojah and Manrique, 
2003; Ojah and Pillay, 2009).  The fund seeker, usually a corporation bears a hold-up cost in 
the process (Ojah and Pillay, 2009).   
 
Figure 2.10: Schematic view of payoff when firms issue debt. 
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The firm level benefits of bond markets are expressed in Figure 2.10. It indicates that, in the 
presence of an additional source of debt, such as bond markets, more opportunities may 
arise to increase the value of firms than would be in the absence of debt. Logical application 
of the theory explains that more domestic bond markets offer more cost effective funding 
to more fund seekers and firms (Ebeke and Lu, 2014).  Congruently, in the presence of bond 
markets, fund seekers are subject to less hold-up costs and rent seeking behaviour (Ojah 
and Manrique, 2005; Ojah and Pillay, 2009).  This refines the allocation of resources mainly 
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by decreasing adverse selection and moral hazard (Ojah and Pillay, 2009).  Prior to the 
execution of a loan, adverse selection occurs as the potential borrower holds superior 
information than the potential lender about the risks and expected returns of a venture 
(Chari, Shourideh, A. and Zetlin-Jones, 2013).  Subsequent to a loan being taken, moral 
hazard may ensue should the interests of lenders and borrowers diverge (Crocket, 2011). 
However, Andrianova, Baltagi, Demetriades and Fielding (2011) argue that theoretically, the 
two terms are nearly identical and can be used to describe the same actions. A common 
denominator in the discussion about adverse selection and moral hazard is information and 
the reservation of information about one’s actions, intent or knowledge thus fuelling 
information asymmetry (Fulghieri, Garcia, D. & Hackbarth, 2013).  
 
Bharath et al (2009) present evidence on the relationship between debt preference and 
information asymmetry.  Firms in the US are analysed over a 29 year period to establish 
support of the Pecking Order theory (Bharath et al 2009).  The authors find, among other 
indications that in environments with informational asymmetry investors of bonds aimed to 
secure funds through debt.  However, when information asymmetry reaches a certain 
threshold investors are forced to acquire funds through private means, which is more costly 
(Bharath et al 2009).  Despite the developed market setting of the above mentioned study, 
one may deduce that a need exists for the development of domestic bond markets in 
African emerging economies, particularly since information asymmetry is rife in such 
settings (Bharath et al 2009; Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014).  The findings concur with those of 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) in their proposition that domestic investors, able to access 
public debt, generally benefit from better debt capabilities than those who do not.  
 
Opponents of the Pecking Order theory such as Frank and Goya (2003) and Fama and French 
(2005) find that small, fast growing firms rely on equity rather than debt.  Leary and Roberts 
(2010) dismiss evidence of the Pecking Order theory as inconclusive. Fulghieri et al (2013) 
and Strebulaev, Zhuz and Zryumovx (2014) attribute, respectively, the maturity of a firm and 
the possibility of new growth opportunities for a firm on the choice in debt structure.  While 
the findings above regarding debt and the Pecking Order theory are contradictory and stem 
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from western settings, many lessons can be learnt and applied to the African situation 
(Meyers 1984; Meyers and Majluf, 1984).  Since institutions influence the capital structure 
of a firm, the large discrepancies of African institutions to those of the developed world will 
warrant caution to be practised (North, 1991).  While the Pecking Order theory fails to 
explain the effects of agency costs, tax, and financial disturbances it is useful in explaining 
the link between firm level capital structure decisions and behaviour of the wider capital 
market, more specifically, bond market. The 2008 sub-prime crisis demonstrates the link 
between capital structure theories and bond market development. Information asymmetry 
and agency problems stemming from managerial choice of capital structure permeated into 
the larger financial system resulting in financial crisis.  
2.19 Crowding-out theory 
The capital structure decisions of firms have influential and far dated consequences for 
African financial systems.  Domestic debt markets provide a further supply of capital that 
presents broader terms than those of non-bank private debt in comparison to bank debt 
(Ojah and Manrique, 2005; Ojah and Pillay, 2009). Domestic bond markets, by expanding 
investor prospects to use domestic savings and complementing bank financing, can 
decrease adverse consequences from vulnerabilities in the banking sector and the diffusion 
of global financial stress (IMF, 2013). However, according to Ismihan and Ozkan (2012), 
there is a high probability that, in countries where governments are the primary 
beneficiaries of bank loans, public debt may harm financial development.  The possibility 
exists that the authority of government in an economy may crowd out private financial 
exchanges (Akitoby and Stratmann, 2008; Chami et al 2010; Miletkov and Wintoki, 2012) 
and also inhibit private market development.  
 
2.20 Good governance: rule of law, accountability and transparency 
Good governance is contingent on the basic values of transparency, accountability, fairness, 
equity and legal framework (Givens, 2013; Gilbert and Allen, 2014).  However, Fayissa and 
Nsiah (2013) suggest that since the concept of good governance is evolving with time there 
is needed to constantly redefine its components. According to Rajan and Zingales 
(1998:498) governance is “… the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post 
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bargaining over the quasi rents generated by the firm…”.   The United Nations 
Developments Program (UNDP) (2002), from a more positive perspective, views good 
governance as an enduring attribute for accountability, efficiency, equity, the rule of law 
and strategic vision in transparency while maintaining strategic, economic and 
administrative authority. Most of the importance of good governance lies in the increase of 
information afforded by transparency (Kosack and Fung, 2013). For example, countries with 
high transparency have information available to the public. The increase in information 
gives the public more knowledge about laws and procedures of a country and to engage in 
or shun institutions with less information and lower transparency.  
 
Schnackenberg (2010) and Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2014) recognize the argument 
that transparency is dynamically created between institutions and individuals through the 
exchange of constructed information and interpretation. Thus, transparency is viewed as 
enacted and perceived institutional communications.  
 
The converse view of Licht et al (2007) uses the phrase ‘norms of governance’ to explain 
democratic accountability, controlling corruption and the rule of law, and refers to them as 
pieces of a larger group of social norms.  The apex of the governance and transparency 
relationship is institutions and these two concepts are very important in the analysis of 
markets and economic growth (Licht et al 2007).  Law and Azman-Saini (2012) examined the 
task of governance and institutions in influencing financial development throughout 
developed and developing countries.  Empirical results indicate that banking sector 
development is notably improved by institutions and governance.  However, stock market 
development is found to have a “U” shaped relationship against institutional quality thus 
suggesting financial markets’ varying responses to institutions and governance (Law and 
Axman-Saini, 2012).  This suggests that while financial transparency has its advantages, 
costs may also accompany it.   
 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2010), Ojah (2013) and Quayyum et al (2014) and similar authors 
suggest that good governance is not only beneficial for financial stability but, is a primary 
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factor contributing to the prosperity of a country.  According to them, good governance acts 
as a conduit for economic and financial factors for a society’s attainment of economic well-
being (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010; Kalj, 2013; Quayyum et al 2014).  In fact, Tsamenyi, 
Enninful-Adu and Onumah (2007) suggest that increasing concerns about the corporate 
governance environment in Ghana may be linked to that country’s poor economic 
performance. 
 
Assorted definitions of transparency exist, as shown above; however, they all include the 
function of information accessibility (Albalate, 2012). Transparency is a necessary condition 
for accountability at all times, given that access to information establishes the initial stage in 
the accountability process (Baudouin and Arindam, 2010; Kosack and Fung, 2013; Truman, 
2014). It is also a vital part of good governance and quality institutions, which in turn, 
enhance public welfare and benefit economic growth (Khalid and Rajaguru, 2010; IMF, 
2013).  
 
An intricate network of linkages among transparency, accountability, rule of law and 
economic growth exists, with an increase of the three variables supporting the growth of an 
economy (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012; IMF, 2014). Thus, as developed countries have 
demonstrated, it is essential for cost escalating behaviours to be limited. This includes the 
construction of explicit and enforceable property rights that delineate duties, obligations 
and privileges of individuals  with respect to assets (Libecap, 1989).These comprise 
enforceable agreements, bonding of participants, brand names, formal contracts, 
guarantees and monitoring systems (North, 1987). Thus, formal, well-considered contracts 
and agreements foster good governance and are valuable tools to reduce inefficiencies of 
countries and the promotion of quality institutions (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012).Good 
governance and quality institutions are also associated with bond market development  and 
economic growth (Mu et al 2013; IMF, 2014; Meyerson, 2014) .  
 
A sound business environment spurred by good policies, policy implementation and 
accountability promotes a higher investment and growth. The IMF (2004), for example, 
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recommends collective action clauses for smoother management of bond contracts. 
Furthermore, under this frame of reason, political leaders mould the quality of government 
in harmony with a society’s constitutional rule (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012). Parrenas and 
Waller (2004)  advise that the development of bond markets need proficient direction from 
government agencies first and foremost, and then public-private sector partnerships. 
Therefore, political leaders with poor repute will have, by virtue of the intimate positive 
relationship between government quality and political stance, a negative influence on a 
government and its constitutional rule.  According to Akitoby and Stratmann (2010) a 
situation like this will impede economic growth and hinder economic development. The 
weak transparency resulting from politicians of weak standing may obstruct economic 
activity within a country and parties opting to do business in the country thus rendering it 
not investable (Ladekarl and Zervos, 2004).  Reform and review of the rule of law may assist 
in curtailing negative outcomes of weak transparency, lack of accountability, poor corporate 
governance and unguarded rules of law. The IFRS, for example, may reduce information 
asymmetry by making firms more transparent (Leung and Ilsever, 2013). The obligations 
invoked by the IFRS require stringent procedures that increase information dissemination 
and contribute to transparency and good governance, which are attractive attributes for 
investors. 
 
Countries with relatively higher protection for creditors and investors will attract more 
domestic and foreign investors than those with weaker creditor rights (Ladekarl and Zervos, 
2004; Leung and Ilsever, 2013). Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012) acknowledge that although 
one framework of governance cannot be applied to the contexts of emerging and developed 
countries, many aspects of governance apply to both types of economies. A country like 
Angola, for instance, has a codified legal system that guarantees uniform treatment of 
foreign and Angolan persons, adopts an arbitration law that is largely akin to that of the 
United  
 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) model and enforces intellectual 
property laws according to the WIPO (FBL Advogados, 2014). On the other hand, the legal 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 58 
 
system in Egypt is based on a civil law system and Islamic Sharia centered on the French 
codified system (Nadoury and Nahas Law, 2014). One may therefore consider the Egyptian 
system as more friendly and accessible to investors who are familiar with Islamic Sharia and 
civil law system. Corruption is another hindrance to creditors and investors of a country 
partly because it ignores rules of law , rejects accountability and transparency and promotes 
personal gain and economic decay (Giapponi and Scheraga, 2008).  
 
2.21 Corruption 
Several authors including Lindstedt and Naurin (2010); Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) and 
Mensah (2014) have suggested an increase in transparency as a means to decrease 
corruption.  Moreover, corrupted institutions and those with weak property rights have 
been found to retard economic growth which invariably also stunts the development  of 
bond markets (Akitoby and Stratmann, 2010). Corruption, according to Licht et al (2007), is a 
social norm that agrees to the use of authority for a personal profit, in spite of any law or 
regulations. It is a disease of public power and reflects bad governance (Kostas, Salvati, 
Sioussiouras and Vavouras, 2013). Giapponi and Scheraga (2008) agree, suggesting that 
corrupt behaviour may not be inevitably viewed as problematic or morally incorrect in 
certain cultures.  In fact, corrupt activities may be tolerated as a part of life in many societies 
(Licht et al 2007; Braguinsky and Mityakov, 2012).  However, a more constructive view 
suggests that corruption may be valuable to economic growth by evading unnecessary 
bureaucratic procedures and more efficiently allocating resources (Looney, 2006; Batabyal 
and Yoo, 2007; Kutan, Douglas and Judge, 2009).  The real cost of corruption, according to 
Nunn and Trefler (2013), is trust, as the pursuit of individual gain generates adverse 
selection and moral hazard and erodes transparency and ultimately trust.   Mauro (1996) 
finds that corruption lowers public investment thus retarding economic growth whilst Ugur 
and Dasgupta (2011) express it as a symptom of institutional deficiency. According to Luna 
(2006) it is one of the greatest obstacles to prosperity, economic development, 
competitiveness, and political and social stability of countries.  
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Figure 2.11: The relationship between corruption and Real GDP growth in African 
countries 
 
Data source: Worldwide Governance Indicators Database and World Development Database (2014) 
 
Teorell and Hadenius (2006) and Mensah (2014) find a close relationship between poor 
governance and high corruption levels. The findings are supported by previous studies 
suggesting that a lower probability of corruption, driven by transparency, provides 
enhanced institutional frameworks for economic growth than would otherwise be the case 
(Albalate, 2012; Autore, Boulton, Smart and Zutter, 2014). The quality of institutions plays a 
big role in the outcomes of capital market activities (Autore et al 2014; Narayan, 2014).  
According to Akitoby and Stratmann (2010), default risk is decreased as institutions 
improve, inferring that culture has a large influence on corporate risk taking and managerial 
risk attitudes globally. Thus, sound or improved institutions promote trust primarily through 
reassuring that investors’ rights exist and are enforced (Laederkral and Zervos, 2004; Autore 
et al 2014; Lewellyn and Bao, 2014).  Law and Finance theory, such as the Coasian view, 
explains this in the conjecture that in countries with institutions where legal systems are 
enforced, private property and investors’ legal rights are implemented and protected, 
investors are keen to invest and economic growth, including bond market development is 
likely to follow. Conversely, in countries with institutions that do not support private 
property and investors’ legal rights, financial development, more particularly bond market 
development,  is stunted (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 1998, 2000). 
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Akitoby and Stratmann (2010) use panel data fixed effects regressions to find that political 
institutions are relevant to financial markets.  A similar finding in favour of institutions in 
financial markets and therefore bond markets, is that of Miletkov and Wintoki (2012) who 
employ panel regressions with dummy variables and vector auto regression models for 129 
countries and establish a positive causal relationship between financial development level 
and the ensuing quality of property rights in institutions.  Ogola (2012) approaches 
institutional responsibility and influences from a social responsibility stance.  Unlike 
Miletkov and Wintok (2012), Ogola (2012) use sub-Saharan developing countries in the 
sample and identify seven social responsibilities of financial institutions.  The study heavily 
relies on Sen’s (2000) theory of development.  While Akitoby and Stratmann (2010) 
repeatedly use GDP as a variable in equations, Ogola (2012) explicitly rejects any 
performance indicators in the framework construction.  Moreover, although Miletkov and 
Wintoki (2012) focus the study on legal institutions, Ogola (2012) does not include legal 
compliance in the framework because, under socially responsible institutions, the study 
postulates that the equal distribution of wealth and legal issues are superfluous. 
Institutional theory posits that institutions that facilitate the efficient operation of economic 
activity can dissolve any doubt related to asymmetric information and the probability of 
opportunistic behaviour of transactions thus demonstrating the critical role of institutions, 
both formal and informal (North, 1990).  
Figure 2.12: The various paths in the development of corruption (a-e). 
 
(a)   (b) 
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 Threats                       Embezzlement 
 Money      Material benefits 
 
 
Manipulation (e) 
Material benefits 
 
Source: Sz´ant´o, T´oth and Varga. 2012. The social and institutional structure of corruption: some typical network configurations of 
corruption transactions in Hungary. 
 
Figure 2.12 shows the development paths of typical types of corruption, according to  
Sz´ant´o (2012). Figure 2.12 (a) in the diagram shows the principal-agent-client relationship 
where the opportunity for moral hazard exists. Moral hazard can occur as one party, the 
agent, acts on behalf of the other, the principal. Agents tend to be more informed of their 
own attitudes, attributes, intentions and actions given that the principal can never know the 
full scope of their abilities. The result is the opportunity for an agent to behave in a manner 
that is contrary to the principal’s interest. This is when corruption occurs (Sz´ant´o, 2012). 
Bribery, a form of corruption, is illustrated in figure (b). It occurs when the client acts as a 
briber and gives the agent payment in exchange for a service or contract to which he is not 
entitled. When the agent uses his power or coercion to extract payment from the client, 
extortion, as seen in figure (c) has taken place (Sz´ant´o, 2012). Figures 2.12 (d) and (e) show 
how embezzlement and fraud occur when threats and material benefits are exchanged by 
the principal, agent or client for material gains that are not otherwise owed to the party 
(Sz´ant´o, 2012). 
 
One may consider the bond market as an institution, like any other, that intermediates the 
surplus and deficit units within the capital markets. As reflected above, an institutional 
environment may be deemed poor for many reasons, including poorly defined property 
rights, inefficient legal systems and high corruption. When a poor institutional environment 
is present the flow of funds from surplus to deficit units hampered. For example, in the 
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presence of an inefficient and corrupt legal system a borrower may deliberately fail to 
honour their debt obligations. This results in investor reluctance to relinquish the control of 
their surplus funds due to concerns about losing it. Thus, even when there is a demand for 
funds and surplus units have resources, surplus funds may still be unsuccessful in shifting to 
deficit units.  The development of any intermediary, particularly bond markets,  is hindered 
in such a setting. Furthermore, surplus units are then compelled to rely on their own 
resources, such as retained earnings. 
  
 2.22 Culture  
Hofstede (1984, 2001), in a seminal contribution, depicts culture as “…the collective 
programing of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another…”  (Hofstede, 2001, p 25).  Much like Hofstede (2001), Purnell and Paulanka (2003), 
House, Hanges, Mansour, Dorfman and Gupta (2004) and Hall (2005) suggest behavioural 
patterns and the dissemination of customs, beliefs and norms occurring through culture. 
Various cultural and economic features exist among developing countries with very different 
levels of corruption prevalent among the countries (Kutan et al 2009, Fayissa and Nsiah, 
2013).  Hearn (2014) observes a distinct difference in the institutional context among civil 
code and common law countries and between countries in general. Research finds that 
country level informal institutions induce communal, intellectual and customary contexts for 
economic agents, thus revealing the huge role of culture in financial markets (Abdi and 
Aulakh, 2012; Lewellyn and Boa, 2014).  Lewellyn and Boa (2014) suggest that institutions 
develop as individuals, reason and draw conclusions and interact with other. The culturally 
instilled individuals through their beliefs, motives and preferences express their cultural 
influences into institutions (Cieslewicz, 2013).  Thus, through the individuals who preserve 
and nurture them, institutions are influenced by culture (Cieslewicz, 2013; Claessens and 
Yurtogly, 2013; Miletkov and Wintoki, 2012). La Porta et al (1997, 1998) validate the above 
propositions and suggest the spread of legal traditions through colonization and imitation 
and explain the cross cultural variations in legal institutions and property rights around the 
world. Miletkov and Wintoki (2012) propose that a country’s distance from the equator and 
residing continent explain its property rights quality. Sowell (2008) and Nunn (2009) use 
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geography to explain variations in institutional quality. Furthermore, Stulz and Williamson 
(2003) and Mensah (2014) establish that religion and corruption respectively have a gradual 
escalating relation to perceived corruption and relatively increased hostility to private 
property. 
 
Bhaird and Lucey (2014) view culture as an essential variable in cross-country variations.  In 
agreement with Mensah (2014), Stulz and Williamson (2003) and Coccia (2014) suggest 
religion as very significant in institutional development.  Beracha et al (2014) find evidence 
of culture as an important determinant of trade frequency suggesting institutional 
differences as significant because of its causal relationship with culture. Similarly, Li, Griffin, 
Yue and Zhao (2013) employ a hierarchical linear modelling technique and data from 35 
countries to conclude that culture has a significant influence on corporate risk-taking. 
 
Tabellini (2010) suggests that institutional quality typically is determined by inherent 
cultural values and proposes national culture as the yoke connecting economic and political 
history to the present character of institutions, since institutions are intricate alterations of 
historical responses to interactions between individuals and objects (Fear and Azambuja, 
2014).  Williamson (2012) emphasizes the importance of interaction for cultural 
progression.  Peaceful, voluntary interactions including economic exchange and involuntary 
exchanges through colonization and conquests contribute to the cultural development of 
societies (Williamson, 2012).   
 
2.23 Colonialism 
Colonialism, according to Dippel (2014) is a historical phenomenon of immense depth, thus 
any effort to compress it into a single definition will immediately incite resistance.  This idea 
is important to understanding economic patterns and bond markets in Africa. Acemoglu et 
al (2005) explain colonization as the imposition of foreign institutions on the local 
population’s prior structures, which comprised mostly local informal institutions.  According 
to Gould (2007) colonialism is the deliberate and consistent invasion of, not only a territory 
but, culture and people.   
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Zolfagharkhani and Shadpour (2013) explain how colonizers branded African views and 
customs as barbaric, consequently demolishing African culture and supplanting it with their 
own foreign culture.  The gravity of loss of culture of a nation is immense and has been well 
documented, among others, by Cesaire (2010) Nunn and Trefler (2013), Zolfagharkhani and 
Shadpour (2013). Cesaire (2010) recognize the elimination of traditional culture as one of 
the worst offences of colonialism primarily because there is no alignment between the 
foreign culture that is imposed and the traditional culture that is uprooted. Consequently, 
Dimico (2014) suggests that colonization is detrimental to economic development.  
 
The widely vetted theory about culture by Hofstede (1984), later House et al (2004) and 
more recently Peterson and Wood (2008), is that it has persistent effects on a person and is 
a primary mechanism that directed the behaviour among locals prior to colonialism 
(Zolfagharkhani and Shadpour, 2013).  The imbued, programmed culture of respective 
indigenous people would be highly persuasive in shaping the pre-colonial culture (Hofstede, 
1980).  It follows that colonized countries would experience a cultural and institutional 
disjuncture caused by their peoples’ separation from familiar tradition and religion and the 
imposition of unusual living principles.  The resulting confused, ill fitted culture would have 
seeped into domestic institutions, as suggested by Hofstede (1984), Licht et al (2007) and 
Cieslewicz, (2013).   
 
2.25 The theoretical flaw in current bond market theory 
Many theories used in African policymaking are based on neoclassical concepts (Booth, 
2003).  Post-colonial plans for Africa including structural adjustment were grounded in 
meta-theories and many authors have argued that such theories are embedded in the 
colonial era policies, which were devised by former colonizers and thus may be a 
continuation of the colonizer and colonized relationship prevalent in Africa during 
colonialism (Ayittey, 1991; Walwema, 2013; Kang, 2014).  According to Carmody (1998), 
structural adjustment in Africa is rooted in neo-classical economics drawn from 
industrialization experiences in the U.S. and Britain.  Thus, when colonization concluded and 
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African countries won independence, albeit under the close guidance of former colonizers, 
neoliberal and development theories founded on European and U.S. experience were used 
as a solution to African underdevelopment (Mokube, 2011; Mkandawire, 2014). Thus, a 
normative and epistemological obstacle may arise as African leaders and policy makers seek 
to establish suitable theory, without falling prey to repetition of the type of colonial 
authority that Africa seeks to evade (Ayittey, 1991; Mercer, Mohan and Power, 2003). 
 
Andreasson (2010) summarizes the findings above perfectly by proposing the dismal failure 
of orthodox socio economic development strategies in Southern Africa. Nelson (2008), 
Alemazung (2010), Mokube (2011), Walwema (2013) and Mkandawire (2014) suggest that 
neither developmental nor neo-liberal policies appear to have rid Africa of her persistent 
socio-economic ills. Andreasson (2010) argues that the apparent failure of most 
development theories necessitates the development of strategies that combine theory and 
African development empirical studies to establish policies for sustainable development.  
Therefore, initiatives such as this study, that support growth and development, must 
understand and appreciate the constraints in Africa such as, high indebtedness (Aryeetey, 
1991; Muhanji et al, 2013).  
 
Transparency, accountability, rule of law and good governance are key constructs in the 
conversation about institutions, markets and economic growth. Information made available 
to the public has positive effects on transparency and ultimately economic growth. This is in 
part due the ability of the public and investors to make informed decisions from the 
information made available to them.  Arguably, corruption, which varies across cultures and 
countries, stifles economic growth; however, it can be reduced by increasing good 
governance and adopting and enforcing rule of law.  The African situation is unique because 
of the role of colonialism in shaping its present state. Colonialism is a key occurrence in the 
existence of Africa and a standardised approach is not suitable in an analysis of the 
continent. Opponents of theories such as the New Institutional Economics approach 
corroborate the uniqueness of the African situation in  proposing that a one size fits all 
approach cannot be applied to Africa .  
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Section 2: Work on determinants of bond market performance 
The work of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) is one of the most important  
investigations into bond market performance determinants. Inspired by the 1997 Asian 
crisis and the dismal feat of Asian economies, they used panel data on a set of socio-
economic and institutional factors for empirical estimation. A sample of data from 41 
developing and developed countries, with a focus on Asia, from the year 1990 to 2001 was 
employed in the study. Many measures of domestic currency public bond markets were 
regressed against various explanatory variables and, whilst correcting for autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity, the authors applied GLS. Fiscal balance, interest rate spread, GDP 
per capita at purchasing power parity, quality of bureaucracy, volatility of exchange rate, 
and banking sector concentration were all found to be negative and significant 
determinants of government bond market performance.  On the other hand, an open 
capital account, a positive investment profile, GDP at purchasing power parity, distance 
from the equator, exports, English origin and banking sector concentration were found to be 
positive and significant for government bonds. 
 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) observed that for the private bond market 
accounting standards, domestic credit, corruption, and distance from the equator, GDP at 
purchasing power parity, exports, the dummy for Asia and the quality of bureaucracy were 
positive and significant determinants. The interest rate spread, English origin and exchange 
rate volatility were negative and significant determinants. The authors concluded that 
transparency, proxied by corruption, minimal bureaucratic quality and poor accounting 
standards hinder development.  Consistent with the public bond market analysis, market 
size was established as a positive determinant of bond market performance. Thus, 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) concluded that size is a major determinant of 
bond market performance. The larger the debt market, the better the performance tends to 
be. Capital controls dissuade bond market development ;thus, trade openness would be a 
positive determinant of bond market development (Mu et al, 2013). An extension of the 
above analysis is carried out by Eichengreen, Panizza and Borensztein (2008); however the 
study is focused on the Latin American context.   
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Eichengreen (2008) is similar to Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) as both 
employed panel data on developed and developing countries. Both studies also investigated 
government and private bonds; however, the later study added financial bonds to the 
analysis. Country size was found to be positive and significant in the two studies whilst trade 
openness was a positive a and significant variable for bond market development. Countries 
with higher creditor rights tended to have smaller private bond markets. This conclusion is 
contrary to other studies of bond markets and particularly counter-intuitive. (Mu et al 
2013).  
 
Interest rates are positive and significant determinants for Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Eichengreen et al (2008); however, the latter study only 
found interest rates in private bond markets to be significant. Akin to Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai (2004), legal origin influenced bond market performance. The Latin 
American dummy variables in the above study were negative and significant.  Eichengreen 
and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) conclude that critical determinants for bond market 
development are: country size, development of the financial system, geographical factors 
and historical elements, while only minor explanatory power exists in pension privatization, 
investor protection, transaction costs, openness and such policy component as 
macroeconomic stability. 
 
Claessens et al (2007) examined macroeconomic and institutional variables and the role 
they play in the development of government bond markets for domestic and foreign bonds. 
Panel data for 36 countries over the period 1993-2000, were used. The authors observed 
that better fundamentals positively influenced the size of the government bond. Further, 
the foreign currency stock debt was more sensitive to these fundamentals than the stock of 
domestic currency debt.   Inflation, fiscal burden, capital account openness and legal origin 
were also relevant variables of the study.  
 
Khalid and Rajaguru (2010) focus on the influence of socio-economic and institutional 
variables on the development of a country’s bond market. The model, an extension   of 
Claessens et al (2007), was estimated over the years 1998- 2007 across a sample of 47 
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countries. A two least square technique was employed to estimate the model and GMM to 
confirm robustness of the empirical tests. The study, in concurrence with Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Claessens et al (2007) Eichengreen et al (2008), Bae (2012) and 
Mu et al (2013) found that macroeconomic variables such as the size of the economy were 
decisive determinants of domestic bond market size particularly in emerging economies. 
The authors observed also that institutional factors were valuable determinants of bond 
market performance; however, as the sample switched from developed to emerging 
economies the importance changed. Institutional quality became more important as the 
sample tended toward emerging and developing economies. Conversely, as the sample 
switched from emerging economies to developed economies the significance of institutional 
quality waned. 
 
Bae (2012) examined which variables – capital controls, institutional characteristics or 
macroeconomic variables – best explain country variances in bond market development. 
Cross country panel regressions were estimated to establish if contrasts in bond market 
development could be attributed to variations in capital control variables, institutional 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Much like Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Eichengreen et al (2008) public and private bond markets 
were examined separately by Bae (2012). The analysis extended from 1990- 2009  for 
developed and developing countries.  Similar to Eichengreen et al (2008), Bae (2012) found 
that institutional quality had no value in determining bond market performance.  Bae (2012) 
found that larger private bond markets occur with bigger public bond markets. The only 
significant variable applicable to financial bonds was GDP per capita. Further, the study 
found a bigger, more concentrated banking sector to be conducive to market development. 
A concern of the study was the validity of the data used.  
 
Burger and Warnock (2006) examined the development of domestic debt markets across 49 
countries. Much like Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Eichengreen et al (2008), 
Khalid and Rajaguru (2010), Bae (2012) and Mu et al (2013) public and private bonds were 
analysed separately. Multivariate tests, including OLS regressions were applied to the cross 
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section of the sample. The authors found that countries with more resilient rule of law and 
sound inflation had larger corporate and sovereign bond markets. Fiscal policy was the 
primary distinction between corporate and sovereign bond markets. Inflation, according to 
Burger and Warnock (2006) is a vital determinant of bond market performance particularly 
because of the effect it has on a country’s need to borrow from abroad and possibility of the 
‘original sin’ phenomenon occurring. The only studies of bond market performance 
determinants that mention ‘original sin’ and the benefits of reducing foreign debt issuance 
in favour of local currency debt markets are Burger and Warnock (2006) and Khalid and 
Rajaguru (2010). 
 
Mu et al (2013) concentrated on bond markets in sub-Saharan Africa, developing a baseline 
econometric model in harmony with Claessens et al (2007), Eichengreen et al (2008) and the 
original model presented by Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004). Data for 36 
countries across the years 1980 -2010 were used. Mu et al (2013) established that 
government bond market capitalization was related to interest rate volatility, improved 
institutions, and was inversely associated to fiscal balance, exchange rate volatility, current 
and capital account openness and higher interest rate spreads. Size, economic and financial 
market development, interest rate volatility and improved instruments were considered 
corporate bond market capitalization determinants. Inversely associated variables were 
current account openness and increased interest rate spreads. Parallel with Burger and 
Warnock (2006), Mu et al (2013) identified interest rate volatility as a key determinant of 
bond market performance. 
 
Bhattacharyay (2011) also established interest rate spreads as a key determinant of bond 
market development in China.  Simple OLS, multivariate OLS, fixed effects, random effects 
and GLS models were applied to time series and cross section panel data for the years 1998-
2008. While controlling for heteroskedasticity and panel specific autocorrelation, economy 
size was found to have a positive, significant relationship with public and corporate bond 
market development. Economy size appears to be a recurring determinant among the 
studies reviewed so far, presumably because larger economies are likely to have increased 
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accessibility to financial instruments, reduced transaction costs and increased liquidity 
(Sibanda and Dubihlela, 2013). Bhattacharyay (2011) observes that a decrease in exchange 
rate volatility improves bond market performance. Furthermore, banking system 
development and the stage of development are positively linked to development of bond 
markets while the study detects a negative relationship between corporate bond market 
development and banking system development. Trade openness is a significant, positive 
performance determinant for the corporate bond market. While common variables and 
policy implications exist across all the studies examined, some findings and conclusions 
contradict each other.        
  
Vast arrays of variables determine the performance and size of bond markets, as 
demonstrated in studies examined in this chapter. These studies show that not all 
determinants are applicable in all contexts.  For instance, Bae’s (2012) investigation of bond 
markets in China concludes that institutional quality has no value in determining bond 
market performance. However, Khalid and Rajaguru (2010), in their analysis of developed 
and developing markets observe that institutional factors are valuable determinants of bond 
market performance whilst Mu et al (2013), in their study of sub-Saharan African bond 
markets find that government bond market capitalization is related to institutions. One may 
argue therefore, that the varying time frames, analytical techniques used as well as study 
areas explored may have contributed to these differences. As a further illustration, Khalid 
and Rajaguru (2010) used data from 1998-2007 while Mu et al (2013) employed data from 
the year 1980 -2010. The expanded time frame of Mu et al (2013) may have captured 
events between 1980 - 1998 and 2007 – 2010 that reject the significance of institutional 
quality. It appears also that while the Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) 
econometric framework has been relied on heavily by authors of bond market 
development, they have ignored the propositions of Eichengreen (1998).   
 
The wider social context in which daily financial transactions are embedded, according to 
Eichengreen (1998), is made up by culture, in the sense of shared values, social norms and 
interpersonal interactions. The author urges researchers to include cultural and financial 
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history in their analysis because this is the only means to conduct rigorous theorizing, 
transparent model building and robust hypothesis testing.  
 
The only study that finds historical variables as relevant determinants of bond market 
development is Eichengreen et al (2008);  the variables were pertinent only to corporate 
bond markets. This suggests a potentially rich enquiry that has not been fully addressed.   
 
Section 3: Lessons learnt from bond market development initiatives  
Initiatives for bond market development are implemented as governments, regions and IFIs 
recognize and appreciate the many benefits of bond market development (Suk and Hong 
Bam, 2008; Blommestien, 2009; Garcia-Kilroy and Silva, 2011; IMF, 2013). The most 
prominent initiatives, arguably, are the Asian bond market development initiatives, the 
African bond market initiatives and the initiatives spurred and managed by international 
financial institutions (IMF, 2013; IMF and World Bank 2013).  All initiatives aim to advance 
bond market development; however, it is noteworthy to understand the reasons behind 
them and their methodological underpinnings (Pelizzon, Subrahmanyam, Tomio, 2013). 
Such an understanding enables one to appreciate the factors contributing to the outcomes 
of the initiatives.  
 
Initiatives such as the G-20 Bond Market Development Plan and Action Plan intervene and 
assist developing and emerging economies to develop domestic bond markets; however, 
one should appreciate the private interests of the G20 and G8 groups (BIS, 2007; IMF, 2013).  
According to BIS (2007) a key objective of international financial institutions’ (IFI) issuance of 
emerging market currencies is typically to exploit the cost effectiveness involved. A major 
factor is that the AAA rating of IFI’S permits the arbitrage of returns in several markets 
including swap markets (BIS, 2007; Christensen, 2014).  BIS (2007) adds that the relatively 
small amounts of international financial institution local currency bonds issues that are 
launched with the intention of domestic bond market development have a very discerning 
impact on the development of bond markets. 
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A practicable example is that the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the OECD - all international financial 
institutions – were commissioned by the G20, to “…draw on their experience ….” to develop 
a diagnostic framework to detect overall preconditions, key factors and limitations for 
effective local currency bond markets (Balino and Sundararajan, 2008; IMF, 2013, p1).   
Balino and Sundararajan (2008) acknowledge the unquestionable assistance and expertise 
emerging and low income countries can offer developed countries. They assert that a broad 
view is not appropriate for the public debt market scenario because countries at varying 
stages of bond market development may have to alter the framework considerably (Balino 
and Sundararajan, 2008; IMF, 2013).  To improve the framework, generalization may be 
detrimental to the country on the receiving end particularly considering the vast 
inconsistencies in the socio-economic realities of Africa and Western nations (Ehrenberg, 
1995; Xiaoyun, Gubo, Lixia, Lixia, Leshan, Zhanfeng and Jin, 2012).  Given the large 
differences in frontier, emerging and developing markets such an approach may be complex 
(Nellor, 2008; ACCA, 2012).   According to Kovala (2014) these differences cannot be 
disregarded even through different conceptualizations.  Similarly, Welter (2012) highlights 
the wealth of information in appreciating context, while analysing a position.   
 
Kovala (2014) indicates that contexts are the basis and conclusion of analysis in unison, 
while Welter (2012) views contexts as powerful lenses and not merely variables in analysis.  
The essential dimensions of context frame ones experience of a situation (Welter, 2012; 
Kang, 2014; Kovala, 2014).  Welter (2012) considers contexts to impact bond market 
development but bond market development unable to influence contexts.  He suggests that 
the socio-spacio context of bond market development, where the culture-based rules of a 
setting reside can cultivate the eruption of norms. It may be argued, therefore, that it is 
essentially impractical for the international institutions commissioned by the G20 Action 
Plan to create a diagnostic plan of action, based on elicited experiences from their more 
developed locations. To address the matter of context, the time, history and location 
variances of IFI experience and that of the African situation are worthy of a brief 
assessment. 
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The Bretton Woods (1994) conference  gave birth to the major IFIs such as the IMF, the WB 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs on Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (Hope, 2011). Contrary to common belief, the vast majority of IFI’s were not primed 
to assist developing countries (Easterly, 2002; Hope, 2011; IFC, 2011). The IMF was given the 
duty to monitor and supervise the implementation of the rules set forth to the member 
states at Bretton Woods (Arestis and Singh, 2010; Hope, 2011; Martin, 2013). 
 
Two main proposals were considered in the monetary system design, one prepared by 
Britain’s John Maynard Keynes (Keynes Plan) and the other by Harry Dexter White of the 
U.S.  Both planners of the monetary system arrived at the process with predisposed 
Western experiences and distinctively Western approaches to development (Hope, 2011; 
Tilly, 2013; Kovala, 2014).  For example, Harry Dexter White was a contentious US 
economist with a background in the U.S. Treasury, while Keynes, arguably the most 
influential economist of the 21st century, presented theory that focuses on demand side 
economics thus, largely disregarding Africa’s needs for both demand and supply side 
variables to achieve optimal sustainable growth on the continent (Boughton, 2000; EDAR, 
2014).    The international economic system postured by Bretton Woods was generally 
productive for fostering sustained global economic growth and development through 
market-based, open trade systems (Eichengreen,1993; Martin, 2013).  During most of this 
time African countries were under colonialism or recently out of colonialism and thus 
experiencing completely different contexts of specific dimensions from those of Bretton 
Wood countries (Arestis and Singh, 2010; Heldring and Robinson, 2012). The key argument 
is that, the vastly divergent contexts and experiences will significantly reduce the ability of 
IFI’s to be conscious of ,and understand the African environments enough to form 
sustainable developmental bond market development policies. 
 
The aggregate Asian bond market is negligible particularly when compared to the number of 
outstanding bonds in the US (Mizen and Tsoukas, 2013).  However, the vast efforts of Asian 
governments have caused Asian bond markets to improve remarkably since the start of  
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their bond development initiatives.  According to Gyntelberg, Ma and Remolona (2005) 
subsequent to the Asian crisis the development of deep, liquid regional bond markets 
became a priority for Asian governments.  Bond markets have not yet met a critical mass, 
and trading volumes continue to be relatively subdued (Eichengreen et al 2006).  However, 
the Asian Bond Market Development Initiative may be viewed as a success because it 
achieved the greater aims of bond market development- financial stability, socio-economic  
development and remarkably decreased  risk for currency miss-match (Parrenas and Waller, 
2006; Yoshitani, 2011).   
 
Mexico also found success in its bond market reform initiatives after the bitter outcomes of 
the 1982 Latin American debt crisis and the 1994 Tequila crisis (Suma, 2007; Bekaert and 
Harvey, 2003).  The Mexican government produced negative fortunes but, launched a 
remarkable turnaround strategy in 2006 by issuing a 30 year fixed-rate peso-determined 
bond, thus attracting investor confidence and achieving a complete Peso yield curve (Patel, 
2008).  Mexico, by learning from past experiences and contexts have become prominent 
among other bond markets in Latin America (Burger, Warnock and Warnock, 2008; Patel, 
2008). 
 
Other success cases are Chile and Singapore (Braun and Briones, 2006b; Sin, 2005).  The 
Chilean state imposed stern interventionist economic policies that eventually resulted in 
financial market decline in the 1930s (Braun and Briones, 2006b).  Subsequent to the 
financial and political crises including the military coup of 1973, Chile swiftly progressed 
toward market-centered policies (Cifuentes, Desormeaux and Gonzalez, 2002; Claro and 
Soto, 2014).  The Chilean government was able to use the experience learnt from previous 
financial market and political failure to create a sizeable impact in its corporate bond 
market, even during a downward economic cycle (Kovala, 2014; Claro & Soto, 2014).  For 
example, from the period 1980-2004 the corporate bond market grew by about 150% of 
GDP, while from 1995-2004 Singaporean corporate debt market, new issuance and 
outstanding increased only by approximately 15  % of GDP (Truman, 2014). 
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The Singapore Monetary Authority has arguably, presented the most worthy example of a 
successful bond market development initiative (Braun and Briones, 2006a; Claro and Soto, 
2014).  Subsequent, to 1998 the country had a small and underdeveloped bond market with 
bonds mostly issued to meet the statutory requirements of banks’ demand for liquid assets 
(Sin, 2005).  Furthermore, a liquid yield curve was created thus lessoning the heavy reliance 
firms had on banks (Gambacarta et al 2014).   
 
A common theme in successful bond market initiatives is the involvement of the 
government particularly, the benefits of good management of the government securities 
market (Balino and Sundararajan, 2008).  However, the authors caution about the obstacles 
in crafting a sound government securities market framework consistent with a country’s 
level of development (Balino and Sundararajan, 2008). 
 
African governments are fiercely attempting to reform their bond market initiatives. 
Evidence suggests that they usually experience limited success and, invariably request the 
services of IFI’s (AFMI, 2013).  The government of Ghana, for example, experienced such 
difficulty maintaining economic stability, and in August 2014, the country requested the IMF 
assistance (Sy and Deressa, 2014).  The economic problems in Ghana stem, partly, from the 
badly managed government securities market and over reliance on international bond 
issuance to the neglect of the local currency bond market (Bax and Dontoh, 2014). However, 
the efficiency of bond market development initiatives vary (AFMI, 2014; Mu et al 2013).  
According to AFMI (2013) while there are very scant collaboration efforts more inclusive 
partnerships on current and future initiatives are required to maximize collaborations and 
facilitate success. 
 
President Mahama of Ghana, prior to requesting assistance from the IMF, on 13 May, 2014, 
advised that the country was in search of a home-grown strategy to resolve its economic ills 
(Bax and Dontoh, 2014). This suggests that while some countries would like to develop bond 
markets without the intervention of IFI’s, some African countries do not have the capacity to 
execute such initiatives.  According to the AFMI (2013) the fragmentation of many African 
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markets is partly the result of excessive amounts of bonds issued in the absence of a 
benchmark yield curve.  Other countries, such as Botswana, struggle with very few 
governments bond issues because the government tends to run budget surpluses and 
relatively cost effective concessional loans from donors (AFMI, 2013; Bank of Botswana, 
2014). 
 
An outcome of the G20-endorsed action plan is a diagnostic framework that includes 
microeconomic policy framework, primary and secondary market structures, investor base, 
legal and regulatory frameworks and market base, among others (IMF, 2013, 2014).  It 
appears to be quite comprehensive, and highlights the difficulty of using such a framework 
in the African context.  For instance, the framework repeatedly mentions the importance of 
transparency, particularly for the development of the short end of the yield curve (IMF, 
2013).  However, transparency is very low in Africa thus, interpretation of such a framework 
may be challenging for policymakers.  Furthermore, foreign debt burden in developing 
countries can influence interest rates and the overall effect of bond markets (Misia, Kegode, 
Mwaka and Wambua, 2013; Fayisssa and Nsiah 2013).  The framework briefly makes 
references to foreign debt payment but, fails to mention the burden of such payments on 
monetary and fiscal policy (Balino and Sundararajan, 2008).  A disregard of the influence of 
foreign debt in the analysis of bond markets and economic growth in Africa has broad 
implications for the validity of such inquiry particularly because of the heavy foreign debt 
obligations of many African emerging economies (Nhamo, 2011).  
 
3.0 Conclusion 
The literature presented identifies bond markets as a viable component of African financial 
markets. It shows that although the current state of an economy is important when 
addressing bond market development, historical context is  even more important in the 
examination of bond market determinants in Africa. Consequently, studies that ignore this 
dimension disregard a rich aspect of analysis, thus rendering such analysis incomplete and 
insufficient. This insight is shared by Harris-White (2004), Kumar and Francisco (2005), 
Claessens (2006)  and Johnson and Nino-Zarazua (2011) who support the suggestion that 
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more socio-economic, demographic and contextual determinants of bond market 
development be analysed to better learn, understand and implement its development in the 
unique contexts of African emerging economies. The literature shows also that good 
governance is a critical element for financial market functioning and must be developed to 
reap the rewards of financial market deepening, such as bond market development. The 
benefits of bond markets in Africa are recognized by many governments and IFI’s; however, 
caution must be exercised when considering the motives of institutions from outside of a 
country.   Many plans and legislations that apply to Africa were conceived by parties who 
had little or no comprehension of the African experience. The relative lack of understanding 
of Africa and the African experience and culture, to a large extent, undermines the  
relevance and efficacy of  policies originating from such plans. Many developmental theories 
may need to be rejected as one may argue that they lack applicability to the African context. 
Bond market development and operations must be particularly fitted to the African 
contexts, and governments should be involved in their expansion with knowledge sharing 
among IFI’s and governments with bond market expertise. 
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CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN FINANCIAL AND BOND MARKETS 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Failed systems, swelling debts and economic crisis spurred African governments to turn to 
international financial institutions (IFI’s) for assistance at the beginning of the 1980’s. 
Policies such as structural adjustment and financial sector reforms were implemented to 
help Africa attain economic growth. Financial systems in Africa were fragile generally, banks 
were nationalized and credit backed funds were utilized inefficiently (Beck, Fuchs and Uy, 
2009). Political leaders, such as Mobutu Sese Seko, obtained loans through corrupt means, 
and generally non-transparent financial systems with weak institutions dominated Africa 
(Moyo,2009;Kelly, 2014). The result of this was all time low African savings and investment 
rates leading to interest rate manipulation by governments (Kelly, 2014). Capital market 
development, including the promotion of stock exchanges formed part of the financial 
sector reforms proposed by IFI’s. Steady developmental progress, since then, has been 
made to financial systems in Africa, although, many damaging characteristics remain. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the characteristic and features of the African 
financial system between 2005 and 2013. An overview of the financial systems prior to the 
discussion on bond markets in Africa will give a broad sketch of where the bond markets are 
positioned in Africa. Comparison between the market components of various African 
countries and emerging and developed counterparts provides a barometer of the 
continent’s standing among global markets. The microstructure of bond markets is the 
concluding part of this chapter. 
 
3.1  Liquid liabilities (M3) As % of GDP 
King and Levine (1993) suggest measurements of financial depth by the ratio of liquid 
liabilities of financial intermediaries to GDP; that is, the M3 money supply divided by GDP is 
a proxy for the holistic size of financial markets. The rationale behind the ratio is that it is a 
suitable gauge of an economy's financial system due to the positive correlation of financial 
system size with its ability to accommodate the needs of financial services (King and Levine, 
1993). An alternative indicator of liquid liabilities is M3, which represents the aggregate of 
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currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), electronic currency and transferable 
deposits (M1), certificates of deposit, foreign currency, transferable deposits including 
savings and time deposits, repurchase agreements of securities (M2); commercial paper, 
foreign currency time deposits, travellers’ checks and shares of mutual or market funds 
possessed by residents are included in the summation of M3. 
 
Table 3.1: Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP 
Country  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 *Average 
Algeria 39.1 41.9 48.4 46.7 51.8 46.7 43.9 43.0 43.5 45.0 
Benin 26.8 29.5 32.9 37.0 38.2 39.2 40.0 38.0 41.8 35.9 
Burkina Faso 19.4 20.2 23.6 22.9 26.6 27.4 29.0 30.3 32.2 25.7 
Burundi 17.5 21.1 19.0 19.5 20.8 22.3 19.8 19.1 18.0 19.7 
Comoros 16.5 18.4 20.8 21.2 24.8 25.3 .. .. .. 21.2 
Cote d'Ivoire 24.1 25.3 29.9 28.6 32.3 36.6 40.5 39.0 35.8 32.4 
Ethiopia 45.2 43.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44.5 
Guinea-Bissau 17.3 18.2 20.8 23.6 24.2 28.6 40.5 38.8 44.1 28.5 
Kenya 40.3 41.3 43.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.6 
Malawi 20.9 18.6 21.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 20.4 
Mali 30.0 28.4 28.9 25.5 27.0 27.5 29.6 32.4 33.6 29.2 
Niger 13.8 15.1 17.3 16.5 18.5 20.3 20.1 23.1 24.2 18.8 
Senegal 34.0 35.7 36.4 33.5 36.9 39.7 39.8 40.4 41.8 37.6 
Seychelles 80.5 76.0 59.7 62.2 52.1 58.3 54.7 48.8 56.8 61.0 
South Africa 42.9 44.1 46.5 47.3 45.0 41.6 42.8 43.0 42.9 44.0 
Tanzania 24.9 26.2 28.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 26.4 
Togo 28.1 33.4 37.2 37.5 41.3 45.6 46.8 45.2 45.2 40.0 
Tunisia 55.0 56.0 57.8 59.9 63.7 66.4 70.7 69.8 68.9 63.1 
Japan 188.3 186.0 184.6 190.6 207.0 206.3 217.0 220.8 226.6 .. 
United States 60.2 62.3 65.3 67.8 71.2 67.8 70.1 70.9 71.5 .. 
Brazil 53.8 57.9 60.9 62.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
*Arithmetic average 
Data from database: World Development Indicators 
Last Updated: 11/06/2014 
 
Table 3.1 shows the M3 ratio of countries such as Algeria and Tunisia have ratios similar to 
that of the developed U.S. and emerging market of Brazil. A largely steady ratio occurs in 
most countries with the exception of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Seychelles and 
Togo. The ratio may give the indication that retraction of the financial sector occurred in 
Seychelles and South Africa between 2005 and 2013 with Algeria and Niger experiencing 
huge expansion in their financial sectors. However, Africa’s history of printing money to 
service deficits may have caused fluctuations in M3 reading and may distort the 
interpretation of the results above. Thus, the use of yet an alternative indicator is 
warranted. This is private credit to GDP. 
 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 80 
 
3.2 Private credit to GDP 
The ratio of private credit to GDP is a popular indicator of financial development. Arcand, 
Berkes and Panizza (2011) and Becero, Cavallo and Scartascini (2012) employ this ratio in 
assessing weather finance in selected markets is excessive or scanty. This reveals the size of 
the loan book of a bank in relation to economic output; however, little is suggested about 
the position of financial sector components other than banks. It concerns financial resources 
supplied to the private sector by financial corporations (WB, 2014).  
 
Table 3.2: Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 *Average 
Algeria 12 12 13 13 17 16 14 15 17 14 
Angola 6 8 11 13 21 20 20 22 24 16 
Benin 16 17 20 21 22 23 25 24 25 21 
Botswana 20 20 23 25 29 25 28 32 32 26 
Burkina Faso 16 18 17 18 17 17 19 22 26 19 
Burundi 16 17 17 15 17 19 21 19 18 18 
Cabo Verde 39 45 46 52 58 62 66 64 63 55 
Cameroon 10 9 10 11 12 13 15 14 15 12 
Central African Republic 7 7 7 7 7 9 10 12 15 9 
Chad 3 2 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 4 
Comoros 10 9 10 11 16 19 18 21 22 15 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 2 3 5 5 4 4 5 6 4 
Congo, Rep. 2 2 2 3 5 7 8 10 11 6 
Cote d'Ivoire 14 14 16 16 17 18 18 18 19 17 
Djibouti 20 20 23 24 26 33 31 29 31 26 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 51 49 46 43 36 33 31 29 28 38 
Equatorial Guinea 3 3 4 5 9 9 10 7 11 7 
Eritrea 28 26 21 22 17 16 14 .. .. 20 
Ethiopia 23 24 19 18 .. .. .. .. .. 21 
Gabon 9 10 11 9 10 8 9 11 14 10 
Gambia, The 10 12 12 14 15 15 16 16 15 14 
Ghana 16 11 14 16 16 15 15 16 17 15 
Guinea 6 7 5 5 4 6 9 .. .. 6 
Guinea-Bissau 1 2 3 5 6 6 12 15 16 7 
Kenya 26 26 27 30 30 34 37 37 40 32 
Lesotho 9 9 11 11 13 14 15 20 21 14 
Liberia 7 9 10 12 12 15 17 16 20 13 
Libya 8 7 6 7 11 9 20 11 14 10 
Madagascar 10 10 10 11 12 12 11 11 12 11 
Malawi 8 9 10 11 13 18 20 21 19 14 
Mali 17 18 18 17 17 18 21 21 23 19 
Mauritania 25 19 21 26 31 29 27 31 .. 26 
Mauritius 75 72 75 85 83 88 91 101 108 86 
Morocco 46 49 58 63 65 69 72 73 70 63 
Mozambique 12 13 14 18 25 27 24 26 29 21 
Namibia 52 49 48 47 49 50 49 47 49 49 
Niger 7 8 9 11 12 12 13 14 14 11 
Nigeria 13 13 25 34 38 15 12 12 .. 20 
Senegal 23 23 23 24 25 26 29 30 32 26 
Seychelles 31 28 29 31 23 28 26 25 25 27 
Sierra Leone 3 3 4 6 8 8 8 6 5 6 
South Africa 144 163 168 147 152 153 144 152 156 153 
Sudan 10 14 13 11 13 12 11 12 10 12 
Swaziland 21 21 24 22 23 22 26 23 25 23 
Tanzania 10 13 15 16 15 16 18 18 17 15 
Togo 18 17 21 17 20 23 29 30 32 23 
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Tunisia 58 57 58 60 62 69 76 76 76 66 
Uganda 9 10 10 14 13 16 19 16 16 14 
Zambia 8 10 12 15 12 12 12 15 15 12 
Brazil 31.4 40.3 47.9 53.1 48.9 54.4 61.3 68.5 70.7 52.9 
China 113.3 110.7 107.5 103.7 127.2 129.9 127.0 133.7 140.0 121.4 
Japan 194.2 190.5 181.3 175.6 184.9 176.4 175.3 179.0 189.0 182.9 
United States 187.8 197.7 206.3 188.0 196.5 191.7 182.7 185.6 198.0 192.7 
*Arithmetic average 
Source: World Development Indicators Database     
Last Updated: 11/06/2014     
 
Private credit ratios for most African economies, seen in Table 3.2, are below that of 
emerging Brazil and far below the figures for the  more developed countries of Japan, China 
and the United States. South Africa, Mauritius and Tunisia, to an extent, are the only 
exceptions in the sample. Private credit provision and more investment act as a key 
indicator of excessive credit required which may signal financial instability (Kelly, McQuinn 
and Stuart, 2013). Table 3.2 shows also the huge disparity in credit available to the private 
sector and the uneven nature of financial systems in Africa. The lowest average ratio is Chad 
with 4% and highest average South Africa at 153%. New reforms and capital adequacy 
regulations, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in the aftermath of the 
2008 sub-prime crisis may have contributed to the decrease in credit to the private sector in 
Egypt, Namibia, Seychelles and Japan. 
 
3.3 Banking sectors in Africa 
Huge variances among banks in Africa exist. World class banking services may be attainable 
in economies such as South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya while in countries like Chad and Sierra 
Leone banking systems struggle to penetrate the market. 
 
State-owned banks and occasionally large foreign banks dominate the African banking 
sector, causing difficulties for small businesses to access credit (Ncube, 2009). Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2 show that in comparison with more developed countries, there is a dismal reach 
of banks to adults in Africa. Information in Table 3.2 translates to approximately less than 
20% of adults in Africa with access to banks, in contrast with between 30% and 50% of 
adults in more developed countries. The excessive costs associated with banking in Africa, 
low penetration of banks (as indicated in Table 3.2) and immense documentation needed to 
open an account are key contributors of the high interest rate spreads (MFWA, 2014).  
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 82 
 
 
Typical of Africa’s banking system is the disproportionately large investments in government 
securities, mostly treasury bills, as opposed to investments in government and corporate 
securities of varying maturities (Allen et al, 2012). This practice signals an impaired banking 
intermediation that avoids private credit provision in preference of more secure 
government securities (Allen et al 2012),and contributes  to the low and shallow financial 
development in Africa (Allen et al 2012; European Investment Bank (EIB), 2013).  
 
Table 3.3 indicates the extent of disparity between bank presence in African countries and 
other countries of the world. The low number of commercial banking institutions in African 
countries leads to a lack of competition thus enabling them to keep interest rate spreads 
relatively high. 
 
Table 3.3: The number of commercial bank institutions in selected African and global 
financial systems 
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 *Average 
Angola  11 12 14 17 19 19 22 22 22 18 
Botswana 5 5 6 6 7 8 9 9 9 7 
Burundi 9 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Cameroon 10 10 11 12 12 13 13 13 13 12 
Cape Verde 4 4 4 4 5 5 8 8 8 6 
CAR 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Chad 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 7 
Congo  4 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 7 6 
DRC 10 10 10 11 14 17 20 20 20 15 
Equatorial Guinea 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ethiopia 8 9 10 10 12 14 15 16 16 12 
Gabon 6 6 6 7 7 7 9 9 9 7 
Gambia 6 7 8 9 11 13 14 13 13 10 
Ghana 20 21 24 24 26 27 26 28 28 25 
Kenya 44 41 41 42 43 44 43 43 43 43 
Lesotho 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 
Liberia 4 5 5 5 6 7 7 8 8 6 
Madagascar 7 7 7 8 8 9 10 5 5 7 
Malawi – – – – – – – 13 13 13 
Mauritius 20 19 19 19 18 18 19 20 20 19 
Mozambique 11 12 12 12 14 14 16 18 18 14 
Namibia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Nigeria 89 25 25 24 24 24 24 20 20 31 
Rwanda 6 6 6 6 8 8 8 9 9 7 
Seychelles 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Sierra Leone 7 7 8 10 13 14 13 13 13 11 
South Africa 37 36 35 35 34 32 32 30 30 33 
Tanzania 25 26 26 27 29 31 28 31 31 28 
Togo 7 8 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 10 
Uganda 15 15 15 16 20 21 22 23 23 19 
Zambia 13 13 13 13 18 18 18 19 19 16 
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Zimbabwe 11 13 14 14 14 16 16 16 16 14 
Brazil 139 135 133 125 127 123 125 127 127 129 
Germany 252 252 256 260 273 278 280 284 284 269 
Japan 132 130 127 126 125 124 121 120 120 125 
UK 346 335 335 335 338 336 332 327 327 335 
*Arithmetic average 
 Source: Ecobank Middle Africa Guidebook 2013: Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (2013)  
 
 
3.3.1 Interest rate spreads 
A primary obstacle to African financial systems are banking sectors that do not implement 
intermediation as a result of excessive interest rates triggered by high-priced credit and 
inadequately remunerated deposits (Dahou et al, 2009). Further, banks may have become 
complacent in the event of high-yielding debt (Hauner, 2006).  According to Abbas and 
Christensen (2007), a poor credit environment often reduces banks’ incentive to provide 
credit to the private sector.   
 
Table 1.4: Interest rate spread of selected African and more developed markets. 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 *Average 
Algeria 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Djibouti 10.3 .. 8.1 9.4 9.7 9.3 9.1 .. 9.3 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.9 6.6 6.4 5.7 5.5 4.8 4.3 4.4 5.5 
Libya 4 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 
Morocco 8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.0 
Canada 3.6 4 4 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 3.1 
Angola 54.3 15 10.9 6 8.1 9.8 12.4 13.1 16.2 
Botswana 6.5 7.6 7.6 7.9 6.3 5.9 5.9 7.4 6.9 
Cabo Verde 8.9 5.4 7.3 6.2 8.1 7.9 6.5 6.1 7.1 
Cameroon 12.8 11 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 
Central African Republic 12.8 11 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 
Chad 12.8 11 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 
Comoros 8 8 8 8 8.6 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. .. .. 32.6 35.4 49.3 39.7 30.4 20.7 34.7 
Congo, Rep. 12.8 11 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 
Equatorial Guinea 12.8 11 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 
Gabon 12.8 11 10.8 .. .. .. .. .. 11.5 
Gambia, The 17.6 17.1 15 14.1 11.5 12.4 16.3 16.5 15.1 
Kenya 7.8 8.5 8.2 8.7 8.8 9.8 9.4 8.2 8.7 
Lesotho 7.8 7.6 7.7 8.5 8.2 7.5 7.7 7.3 7.8 
Liberia 13.6 12.1 11.3 10.4 10.1 10.7 10.7 10 11.1 
Madagascar 8.3 7.2 28.5 33.5 33.5 38.5 41.9 49.5 30.1 
Malawi 22.2 21.3 21.7 21.8 21.8 21 19.6 21.3 21.3 
Mauritania 15.1 16 15.5 12.3 11.5 9 9 11.2 12.5 
Mauritius 13.8 11.5 10.1 1.4 0.8 0.5 1.8 2.4 5.3 
Mozambique 11.7 8.2 7.7 7.3 6.2 6.6 6.1 5.4 7.4 
Namibia 4.4 4.9 5.3 5.4 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.4 4.8 
Nigeria 7.4 7.2 6.7 3.5 5.1 11.1 10.3 8.4 7.5 
Rwanda 8.1 7.8 9.3 9.8 .. 9.6 .. .. 8.9 
Sao Tome and Principe 19 18.6 19.7 19.7 19.2 17.8 14.6 13.3 17.7 
Seychelles 6 7.6 7.8 7.8 5.6 9.8 9.1 8.9 7.8 
Sierra Leone 12.8 12.9 14.2 13.9 12.4 11.8 10.7 10.6 12.4 
South Africa 4.6 4 4 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.7 
Swaziland 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.7 6 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.3 
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Tanzania 10.5 8.9 7.4 6.7 7.1 8 8.2 5.9 7.8 
Uganda 10.9 9.6 9.8 9.8 11.2 12.5 8.8 10.1 10.3 
Zambia 17 12.8 9.7 12.5 15 13.5 11.8 5.1 12.2 
Brazil 37.8 36.9 33.1 35.6 35.4 31.1 32.9 28.7 33.9 
Canada 3.6 4.0 4.0 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 3.1 
Japan 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 
*Arithmetic average 
Source: World Development Indicators Database     
Last Updated: 11/06/2014 
 
 
The interest rate spread between emerging and developed countries varies greatly. The 
more mature markets of Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria have average spreads of 5.5, 3.7 
and 7.5 respectively while, Canada, the most developed country in the sample has an 
interest rate spread of 3.1. Brazil has a spread similar, only, to Madagascar. Libya, South 
Africa and Namibia have the lowest average spreads in the sample and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Madagascar and Malawi the highest. The relatively lower ratios of liquid 
liabilities to GDP and private credit to GDP suggest that African banks are considerably 
smaller to those in many other countries. Thus, the banks may not be able to benefit from 
economies of scale thereby increasing costs associated with banking. The low level of 
intermediation delineated by the ratios in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 may be attributed to the 
challenges in enforcing creditor rights and evaluating creditworthiness (MFWA, 2014). 
 
3.4 Stock markets in Africa 
Stock markets on the continent have developed very fast in a short  period. Large growth in 
the number of stock exchanges has  occurred from five stock exchanges two decades ago to 
approximately 24 stock exchanges including two regional exchanges currently operating in 
Africa (Nkontchou, 2010; Allen et al 2012). These key mechanisms of exchanges are 
beneficial for growth as they provide a channel for domestic savings.  
 
Table 3.5: Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 *Average 
Botswana 24.5 39.0 53.8 32.0 42.3 29.7 26.9 31.6 35.0 
Cote d'Ivoire 14.2 23.9 42.2 30.2 26.7 31.0 26.1 31.7 28.3 
Egypt 88.8 87.0 106.8 52.8 47.6 37.7 20.6 22.1 57.9 
Ghana 15.5 15.8 9.6 11.9 9.7 11.0 7.8 8.3 11.2 
Kenya 34.1 50.6 49.2 35.8 35.0 44.6 29.7 36.7 39.5 
Malawi 8.4 18.8 .. 41.4 27.5 25.3 24.6 17.8 23.4 
Mauritius 41.7 53.5 72.7 35.7 53.7 76.6 68.1 62.0 58.0 
Morocco 45.7 75.2 100.4 74.0 69.2 76.2 60.6 54.8 69.5 
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*Arithmetic average 
Data from database: World Development Indicators Database 
Last Updated: 11/06/2014 
 
Figure 3.1:  Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators Database 
Last Updated: 11/06/2014 
 
 
Known as market value, the market capitalization indicator is the share price multiplied by 
the amount of shares outstanding of domestically incorporated firms on a country’s stock 
exchange at the end of the year (WB, 2014). It provides an idea of the size of the stock 
market. 
 
Africa has had a steady growth in the size of equity markets over the last two decades. 
Figure 3.1 provides five-year averages for African market capitalization as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) between 2005 and 2012.  There was a noticeable drop on 
capitalization between 2007 and 2008 in all countries in the sample except Tunisia. 
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Namibia 5.7 6.8 7.9 7.3 9.7 10.6 9.3 9.7 8.4 
Nigeria 17.2 22.6 51.9 23.9 19.7 13.8 9.5 12.2 21.4 
South Africa 228.9 274.0 291.3 179.9 248.0 174.0 129.5 160.2 210.7 
Tanzania 4.2 3.8 .. 6.2 .. 5.5 6.5 6.4 5.4 
Tunisia 8.9 12.9 13.8 14.2 21.0 24.3 21.0 19.6 17.0 
Uganda 1.1 1.2 .. 21.6 25.3 11.2 49.9 36.4 20.9 
Zambia 13.8 11.1 20.3 .. 21.9 17.4 20.9 14.6 17.1 
Zimbabwe 41.7 487.8 100.8 .. 47.0 121.4 99.5 94.7 141.8 
Canada 127.2 129.7 150.0 65.0 122.6 133.8 107.2 110.7 118.3 
United States 129.6 140.2 137.8 79.7 104.6 114.6 100.7 114.9 115.3 
Brazil 53.8 65.3 100.3 35.6 72.0 72.1 49.6 54.7 62.9 
Japan 103.6 108.5 102.2 66.4 67.1 74.6 60.0 62.0 80.6 
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Botswana, Mauritius and South Africa gained traction and increase in market capitalization 
following the 2008 drop. This trend  parallels that of United States, Japan and Brazil. 
 
South Africa leads in market capitalization in Africa and even surpasses the capitalization of 
developed markets in the sample. Morocco and Egypt appear to be growing their stock 
markets at the fastest rate, the greatest capitalization occurring at the end of 2007. With 
the exception of South Africa, capitalization of African equity is below that of the more 
developed countries in the world.  
 
Table 3.6: Turnover ratio of selected African and global stock markets 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 *Average 
Botswana 1.8 2.3 2.2 3.1 2.6 3.4 3.6 2.6 2.7 
Cote d'Ivoire 1.4 3.3 2.5 4.1 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.3 2.4 
Ghana 3.2 2.1 3.9 5.2 2.0 3.4 4.1 1.6 3.2 
Kenya 9.8 14.6 10.6 11.8 4.6 8.6 7.1 8.1 9.4 
Malawi 4.1 3.5 .. .. 1.2 1.5 3.9 1.5 2.6 
Mauritius 6.0 4.4 8.0 8.9 8.1 5.9 6.9 4.0 6.5 
Namibia 1.5 3.8 3.7 2.8 3.0 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.4 
Nigeria 11.5 13.6 28.2 29.3 11.0 12.5 9.2 8.8 15.5 
South Africa 39.3 48.8 55.0 60.6 57.3 50.7 64.3 54.9 53.9 
Tanzania 2.3 2.1 .. .. .. .. 2.5 1.6 2.1 
Uganda 3.0 5.5 .. .. 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 1.6 
Zambia 2.0 2.1 4.1 .. .. 4.3 2.9 5.6 3.5 
Zimbabwe 15.3 6.2 5.1 .. .. 15.0 16.3 14.2 12.0 
Tunisia 16.5 14.3 13.3 25.5 16.2 17.2 11.0 13.5 15.9 
Brazil 38.3 42.9 56.2 74.3 73.9 66.4 69.3 67.9 61.2 
United States 129.2 182.8 216.5 404.1 348.6 189.1 187.6 124.6 222.8 
Canada 63.6 81.1 84.7 111.1 92.4 71.1 74.8 61.6 80.0 
United Kingdom 141.9 123.8 269.8 227.2 146.4 101.9 98.9 84.0 149.2 
Japan 118.8 132.1 141.6 153.2 127.1 114.5 108.9 99.8 124.5 
*Arithmetic average 
Source: World Development Indicators Database 
Last Updated: 11/06/2014 
 
Senbet and Otchere (2008) observe illiquid and thin equity markets in Africa, with the 
exception of Egypt and South Africa, despite the expansion of African stock markets. The 
low turnover ratios in Africa in relation to the other countries indicates a low number of 
stocks traded, and according to Piesse and Hearn (2005) and Andrianaivo and Yartey (2010), 
these stocks usually comprise a significant portion of the aggregate market capitalization. 
Low turnover ratios are also associated with informational deficiency, which obstructs 
institutions and governments from developing and implementing adequate strategies 
(Nkontchou, 2010).  
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 87 
 
3.5 Bond markets in Africa 
Financial instruments emulating bonds have an extensive history (Homer, 1975). Prior to the 
Reformation Circa in 1550, the issuance of credit was generally viewed as illegal by 
European governments. However, bankers issued copious amounts of credit in a clandestine 
manner (Homer, 1975). According to Homer, bankers who offered the dissident credit 
facilities were ashamed about their profession and would seek to secure absolution by 
financing cathedrals and various types of infrastructure for their governments. Compared to 
other forms of financing such as those from royals, this illicit credit from bankers was more 
efficient and effective (Homer, 1975). The Reformation in 1550 changed the scene of credit 
for the era. Reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin favoured credit, at a minimal 
rate of interest, and government’s inclination for finance increased (Homer, 1975; 
Freudenberg, 2009). 
 
The desire for finance and credit extended to other parts of Europe during the 14th century, 
the Denizens of Venice issued bonds, as they are presently known, to fund a war with the 
then Constantinople – capital city of the Byzantine empire (Levinson, 2009). Governments’ 
appetite for finance continued to increase and bankers found difficulty in keeping up with 
money demanded by clients. Later in 1751, Britain created consols, which are still in use 
today (Stockman, 2013). Bonds presented a means for governments to access money from 
numerous people as opposed to accessing it from a few bankers and lenders. Participants 
appreciated the spread of risks provided by bonds (Levinson, 2009). The pivotal role of 
sovereign domestic debt in pooling funds from the public has been recognized by 
governments, policy makers and academia as far back as the 14th century (Holmer, 1975; 
Levinson, 2009; Mezi, 2012). More recently, the 2008 sub-prime financial crisis has renewed 
interest from governments, policy makers and academia in the influence of domestic debt 
on stabilizing monetary and fiscal variables and fostering financial growth of economies 
(Schumpeter, 1911; Angeletos, 2002; Faraglia, Marcet and Scott, 2010; Ismihan and Ozkan, 
2012; Afonso and Jalles, 2014).  
 
Africa, in this study, is represented by a sample of twenty-six countries, four in the North 
(Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), five in the West (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Cote 
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d’lvoire and Burkina Faso), five in the East (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and 
Seychelles), five located in Central Africa (Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon), and five in Southern Africa (South-Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Angola and 
Mauritius). Sampling is based on the presence of a bond market in each country and the 
vibrancy of the market. Vibrancy is defined as the average weekly volume of trades and 
transactions (Kodongo, 2011). Additionally, the availability of a reasonably long series of 
debt market transactions is considered in bond market selection. On this account, countries 
with absent trade transactions and relatively no bond markets such as Guinea-Bissau and 
Mali are excluded (AFMI, 2014). 
 
Fixed income markets of African emerging economies have developed positively over the 
past decade. Sizes of bond issuance have improved, yield curves have extended from short 
term bonds to medium and long term bonds and reforms have been devised for the clearing 
and settlement systems of many markets. More diversity has been infused into the investor 
base with a decrease in the dominance of commercial banks to more participation of non-
financial institutions Foreign participation in local bond markets have increased as well as 
secondary market liquidity. 
 
Despite the global financial market turbulence in 2008, African local currency debt produced 
positive returns, while other emerging market local currency debt markets endured 
considerable losses. Sharp losses and increased volatility were registered by African hard 
currency debt during the 2008 sub-prime crisis; however, in 2009 high returns counteracted 
the poorer performance of the previous year (AFMI, 2014). 
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Figure 3.2: Depiction of total bonds outstanding as % of GDP for each year over a nine 
year period for selected African countries 
 
Source of data: African Financial Markets Initiative Database (2014) 
 
The GDP and total outstanding amount of domestic debt have increased steadily over the 
past decade as reflected in Figure 3.2 above, particularly since the 2008 sub-prime crisis. 
The more liquid money and interbank markets appear to have attracted more investors thus 
improving the efficiency in pricing and trading long term bonds. 
 
Table 3.7: Total bonds outstanding as % of GDP for selected African countries and Average 
time (in years) to maturity 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Algeria 1.16 2.02 2.78 2.23 3.96 3.98 3.23 3.28 3.41 
 6.58 7.73 7.57 7.7 7.77 7.7 8.26 8.21 8.05 
Angola 0.33 0.5 0.5 0.65 3.41 4.7 3.89 4.26 4.57 
 7.02 7 6.8 5.57 4.11 4.01 4.04 4 3.62 
Benin  -- --  1.71 2.3 3.61 3.37 2.67 2.18 1.62 
  --  -- 10.04 10.03 9.03  -- --  --  --  
Botswana 4.52 2.85 2.66 3.74 4.57 4.9 5.22 5.25 5.21 
 8.59 8.59 8.59 9.42 8.46 8.28 8.85 9.64 10.33 
Burkina Faso 0.82 0.86 2.2 1.05 3.2 3.56 3.87 3.91 3.01 
 4.01 4.01 10.03 10.03 7.37 7.28 6.67 6.47  -- 
Burundi  -- --  0.03 0.79 0.73 1 0.93 0.73 1.36 
  --  -- 2.01 4.93 5.02 3.89 3.89 5.02 1.69 
Cabo Verde 14.59 18.27 17.01 13.92 19.82 22.63 20.23 22.9 26.09 
 6.98 6.56 6.87 7.43 6.83 6.07 6.72 6.76 6.83 
Cameroon  -- --  --  --  --  1.73 1.49 1.14 1.25 
  --  --  --  --  -- 5.02 5.02 5.02 4.7 
Egypt 8.82 9.86 10.19 9.1 13.07 16.68 17.54 20.37 23.92 
 6.82 6.57 6.63 7.04 5.69 5.22 4.96 5.11 5.55 
Cote d'Ivoire 2.1 2.45 2.53 2.58 3.6 3.72 7.07 8.19 9.19 
 3.01 3.01 3.01 3.01 4.74 5.13 4.8 4.61 4.78 
Gabon --  --  1.6 1 1.03 0.56 0.29 0.15 0.4 
  --  -- 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 3.01 
Ghana 2.69 7.65 12.37 8.27 7.82 11.42 13.99 16.15 17.36 
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Source of data: African Financial Markets Initiative Database (2014) 
 
3.6 The microstructures of African bond markets  
 
The level of market development has a bearing on regulations of the market. Less 
developed markets require a delicate balance between regulations and market participation 
so that participation is not suppressed. Equally, more developed markets must possess 
regulations that do not support corrupt activities (AfDB, 2010). This section presents the 
micro structural aspects of bond markets in Africa. Auction systems, clearing and settlement 
systems and trading platforms are emphasised in the bond market setting. 
 
Most fixed income securities are first issued by the government through the central banks of 
each African country. The central banks present tenders to banks, brokerage firms, discount 
houses and sometimes the public who present their applications to a bank. Brokerage 
companies and other financial institutions are appointed as primary dealers according to the 
decision of the banks (Bank of Zambia, 2014; CSD, 2014). The increase of bonds outstanding 
 1.51 1.87 2.37 2.72 2.81 2.36 2.51 2.96 2.84 
Kenya 3.09 5.54 9.16 8.11 14.3 19.74 23.05 22.46 24.74 
 8.18 8.15 8.66 8.72 9.19 9.23 9.69 9.54 10.13 
Malawi 1.17 0.9 1.16 0.67 0.48 0.38 0.17 0.06  
 3.77 3.8 3.73 3.75  -- --  --  --  --  
Mali --  --   -- 0.78 1.3 2.09 1.46 1.2 0.82 
  --  --  -- 10.03 8.11 6.71  -- --  --  
Mauritius 10.54 15.42 25.2 23.66 32.59 34.65 34.19 35.8 33.42 
 8.05 6.77 6.05 6.17 6.16 6.42 6.73 7.04 7.28 
Morocco 34.54 38.35 39.1 28.51 29.38 31.25 36.72 45.95 48.55 
 9.78 10.32 10.67 11.25 11.32 9.8 8.92 8.6 8.58 
Mozambique 3.12 2.76 2.61 2.07 1.97 2.27 2.38 2.58 2.64 
 304.8 304.8 310.75 291.38 292.05 303.21 224.02 163.82 147.22 
Namibia 14.91 12.12 11.63 8 10.2 10.55 7.82 9.55 8.79 
 8.57 9 10.07 10.79 10.74 11.19 10.08 10.13 9.94 
Niger --  --  --  --  0.68 0.6 0.51 0.4 1.12 
  --  --  --  -- 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.02 5.84 
Nigeria 1.6 3.75 5.92 5.98 8.69 9.27 5.64 5.96 5.79 
 2.92 3.97 4.93 5.19 6.5 8.14 7.74 8.21 9.25 
Rwanda --  --   -- 0.66 0.48 0.73 0.52 0.33 0.23 
  --  --  -- 2.35 2.35 3.13 3.46  -- --  
Senegal 0.93 0.97 2.97 2.51 2.95 4.31 5.1 7.64 9.1 
 5.02 5.02 6.9 7.35 7.01 6.33 5.3 5.14 5.43 
South Africa 33.23 30 24.13 21.9 31.34 33.6 29.73 33.08 34.87 
 9.38 11 10.91 11.86 12.78 13.05 14.29 14.92 16.03 
Swaziland --  --  --  --   -- 1.82 2.71 2.66 3.65 
  --  --  --  --  -- 3.95 4.31 4.31 5.18 
Tunisia 12.89 12.96 13.72 11.02 11.58 10.05 9.67 10.95 11.88 
 7.69 7.54 8.28 8.73 8.75 8.93 8.63 8.32 8.21 
Tanzania 2.49 3.31 4.59 3.74 4.27 5.36 5.67 6.4 6.36 
 5.01 4.95 5.28 5.38 6.02 5.77 5.96 6.37 6.4 
Togo  -- 3.28 4.35 2.8 2.39 2.85 5.5 7.55 10.63 
  -- 5.02 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.45 6.05 5.72 5.5 
Uganda 3.81 5.53 6.86 5.32 6.01 5.84 6.91 7.11 9.03 
 2.71 2.87 2.99 3.01 3.41 4.12 3.92 4.05 4.57 
Zambia 4.41 4.15 5.81 4.38 5.86 5.23 5.53 6.08 5.55 
 2.28 3.31 3.89 4.4 4.65 4.84 4.67 4.8 4.98 
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in bond markets signals an increase in the depth and size of transactions thus raising the 
need for anonymity in the market (AfDB, 2010). Licenced interdealer brokers are present in 
South Africa and Kenya where they coordinate bigger transactions among dealers. A further 
strategy to address inefficiencies in the respective markets is the advent of discount houses. 
Such houses purchase securities from willing sellers for their own account and through this, 
benefit from inefficiencies that may be present in the market. 
 
Table 3.8: Bonds traded, trading platforms and mechanism and regulatory agencies of 
selected African emerging markets as of June 2014. 
Country Trading platform Local currency bonds 
traded 
Regulatory supervision 
Government Corporate     
Algeria Algiers Stock Exchange X X Organising Committee and Supervisory and Exchange 
(COSOB) 
Angola Banco Nacional de Angola 
(BNA) 
X  The Central Bank 
Benin BRVM X X The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial 
Markets (CREPMF) 
Botswana Botswana Stock Exchange X X Bond Market Association 
Burkina Faso BRVM X X CREPMF 
Burundi Banque de la République 
du Burundi (BRB) 
X  N/A 
Cameroon Douala stock exchange X  The Commission for the Supervision of Financial Markets in 
Central Africa (CONSUMAF) 
Cape Verde BRVM X X CREPMF 
Central African 
Republic 
Douala stock exchange X  CONSUMAF 
Cote dIvoire BRVM X X CREPMF 
Egypt Egyptian stock exchange X X Capital markets Authority (CMA) 
Gabon Douala stock exchange X  CONSUMAF 
Ghana Ghana stock exchange X  Securities Industry Law, Securities Industry Amendment Act 
  
Kenya Nairobi securities 
exchange  
X X CMA 
Malawi Malawi stock exchange X  CMA 
Mali BRVM X X CREPMF 
Mauritius The stock exchange of 
Mauritius 
X X The Guarantee Fund and Compensation Fund ,the 
International Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
Morocco Casablanca stock exchange 
for corporate bonds,  
X X the CDVM ‘s (Securities Ethics Board) 
Mozambique Mozambique stock 
exchange 
X X The Commercial Code 
Namibia Namibia stock exchange X X The Namibia Financial Sector Strategy 
Niger BRVM X X CREPMF 
Nigeria Nigerian stock exchange X X The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Nigerian 
Securities Exchange (NSE), The Debt Management Office 
(DMO) 
Rwanda Rwanda stock exchange X  CMA 
Senegal BRVM X X CREPMF 
South Africa Johannesburg stock 
exchange 
X X The Financial services board  
Swaziland Swaziland stock exchange, 
government 
X X The Swaziland Investment Promotion Act of 1998,  the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)  
Tanzania Dar es salaam stock 
exchange 
X X Dar Es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) 
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Togo BRVM X X The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial 
Markets (CREPMF) 
Tunisia Bourse se Tunis stock 
exchange 
X X CMA, The Guarantee Market Fund 
Uganda Uganda securities 
exchange 
X X CMA 
Zambia Lusaka stock exchange X  Companies Act, Securities Act, Banking and Financial 
Services Act 
*BRVM = Bourse Regionale Des Valeurs Mobiliers Stock Exchange 
Source: African Fixed Income and Derivatives Handbook (2010), African Securities Exchange Association Yearbook (2012), Ecobank Middle 
Africa Guidebook 2013: Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (2013), African Financial Markets Initiative (2014).  
 
Table 3.8 describes the bond trading procedure of selected African countries and indicates 
those that trade both stocks and bonds. Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, Namibia, South 
Africa, Nigeria trade both government and corporate bonds on their exchanges and are also 
the most capitalised bond markets as shown in Table 3.7 above. Regional stock exchanges 
such as Bourse Regionale Des Valeurs Mobiliers (BRVM) Stock Exchange and Douala Stock 
Exchange (DSE) have equipped countries that otherwise would not have an exchange to 
trade bonds. The BRVM and DSE also allow countries to trade on additional platforms other 
than theirs in order to increase output of bonds. Online and intraday trading are available in 
most of the countries. More developed markets such as Botswana, Nigeria, and South Africa 
have intraday, online and margin trading facilities. This caters for more investors than 
markets with only intraday of margin facilities. Intraday facilities mean trading takes place 
during trading periods on specific days while online trading services allow for broader hours 
of trade. Margin trading facilities suggests derivative trading on the stock exchange meaning 
a further group of investors can interact on the bond market. Securities regulations  show 
that Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Senegal, Togo operate 
under the Regional Council For Public Savings And Financial Markets (CREPMF) as a 
regulatory agency. The Capital Markets Authority (CMA) regulates Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, 
Tunisia and Uganda. 
 
The number of trades per month informs one about the nature of the trading. Thin trades 
would be present when the frequency of monthly trading is low, indicating a buy and hold 
practice of investors in the particular market. Table 3.8 shows that South Africa followed by 
Mauritius has the highest  monthly trading frequency of 8 and 7.7 times respectively. 
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3.6.1 Auction Systems 
A crucial element in many African capital markets is pricing of assets. Factors such as the 
absence of yield curves and poor information symmetry increase the need for effective 
pricing of African securities. Typical methods used are book building or an auction (Chen, 
Morrison, William and Wilhelm, 2014). 
 
 
Table 3.9: Clearing and settlement party, settlement cycle trading portal and type of 
auction in selected African countries 
Country Clearing and 
Settlement  
Settlement 
cycle (T+ S) 
Frequency 
of trading  
 
Clearing and Settlement platform Auction type 
internal vendor Per month 
Algeria Vendor T+ 1 5 Algeries Stock Exchange Dutch  
Angola N/A N/A 5.3 N/A Competitive bid 
Benin Vendor T+ 2 (average) 3.3 Dépositaire Central/Banque de 
Réglement (DC/BR) 
Competitive bid 
Botswana Vendor T+ 3 6 The Central Securities Depository 
Company of Botswana Ltd (CSDB) 
Competitive bid 
Burkina Faso Vendor T+ 2 (average) 3.7 Dépositaire Central/Banque de 
Réglement (DC/BR) 
Competitive bid 
Burundi N/A T+ 6 6.3 Central Bank of Burundi Non-competitive bid 
Cameroon Vendor T+ 3 4.3 CRTC, CAAC, BVMAC Competitive bid 
Cape Verde Vendor T+ 2 (average) 4 BVMC Non-competitive bid 
Central African 
Republic 
Vendor T+ 3 4 CRTC,BVMAC Competitive bid 
Cote dIvoire Vendor T+ 2 (average) 3.3 DC/BR, BVMAC Competitive bid 
Egypt Vendor T+1 (average) 3.7 MCDR Dutch  
Gabon Vendor T+ 3 3.3 CRTC, CAAC Competitive bid 
Ghana Internal T + 1 5 GSE Securities Depository Co. Ltd Competitive and non-
competitive bid 
Kenya Vendor T+ 3 5 CDSC 
CBK 
Competitive and non-
competitive bid 
Malawi Vendor T+ 3 5.3 Lusaka Stock Exchange Competitive bid 
Mali Vendor T+ 2 (average) 3.7 Dépositaire Central/Banque de 
Réglement (DC/BR) 
Competitive bid 
Mauritius Vendor T+ 2 7.7 Central Depository & Settlement Co. Multiple price bid 
Morocco Vendor T + 6 4.7 Casablanca stock exchange Dutch  
Mozambique Vendor T + 3 6 intraday Competitive bid 
Namibia Vendor T+ 1 5.3 There is no CSD in Namibia. Competitive bid 
Niger Vendor T+ 2 (average) 3.7 Dépositaire Central/Banque de 
Réglement (DC/BR) 
Competitive bid 
Nigeria Vendor T+ 2 4 Central Securities Clearing System Ltd Competitive and non-
competitive bid 
Rwanda Vendor T+ 2 6.7 National Bank of Rwanda Competitive and non-
competitive bid 
Senegal Vendor T+ 2 (average) 3.7 Dépositaire Central/Banque de 
Réglement (DC/BR) 
Competitive bid 
South Africa Internally T+3 8 STRATE American-type,  Dutch 
Swaziland Vendor T+2 4.3  Competitive 
Tanzania Internal T + 1 5 Bank of Tanzania (BOT) Competitive 
Togo Vendor T+ 2 (average)  Dépositaire Central/Banque de 
Réglement (DC/BR) 
Competitive bid 
Tunisia Internally T + 3 6 Societe Generale Securities Services 
(SGSS) 
To be determined 
Uganda Internally T + 1 4.7 Bank of Uganda Competitive and non-
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competitive bid 
Zambia internally, vendor T + 3 5.3 Lusaka Stock Exchange, Bank of 
Zambia 
Competitive and non-
competitive bid 
*BRVM = Bourse Regionale Des Valeurs Mobiliers Stock Exchange 
Source: African Fixed Income and Derivatives Handbook (2010), African Securities Exchange Association Yearbook (2012), Ecobank Middle 
Africa Guidebook 2013:Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (2013), African Financial Markets Initiative (2014)  
 
Dutch auction is employed in Egypt, Nigeria and Uganda  while competitive bids are used in 
the remainder of countries that employ auction systems. The auctioneer begins the process 
by requesting a high price and slowly lowers the price up until a bidder declares, or shouts in 
the case of an open outcry auction, for the item. Congruently, in competitive bid auctions, 
bids usually sealed, are given to the auctioneer and the highest bid receives the sell. Dutch 
auctions are beneficial in developed markets as they promote vigorous bidding by market 
participants and reduce the borrowers financing expenses; however, such an auction 
method may not be of benefit for African emerging economies. Thin underdeveloped 
markets may experience greater volatility in price from marginal bids under a Dutch auction. 
Rather, multi-price auctions may be of advantage for the seller as it encapsulates the extra 
revenue relinquished by the seller in a single-price Dutch auction system.  
 
Shorter term treasury bills are typically issued by the Treasury. The securities are sold 
directly to primary dealers in the majority of the countries sampled including Algeria, 
Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Tunisia. Primary dealers are a set of purposefully 
selected institutions, in most cases, financial institutions which aim to enhance market 
liquidity. Primary dealers, instead of investors, bid in the primary market while generating 
liquidity in the secondary market.  Electronic Auction bidding systems receive bids from 
work stations located in different areas of central banks. Auctions are made available to all 
primary dealers for bid input. It is processed electronically by means of a termination rate or 
to the extent that government requires to borrow. The system automatically assigns the 
winning bids and their cost which are accessible to participants (Bank of Zambia, 2014, CSD, 
2014). Countries that do not utilise the primary dealer system, such as Kenya and Zambia, 
increase liquidity by listing government securities on their stock exchange (AfDB, 2010).   
Thus, traditional stock market brokers are acquainted with bond trading in addition to their 
usual trading of stock. 
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3.6.2 Exchange versus OTC system 
The plethora of frameworks range from over-the-counter (OTC) systems and exchange 
systems. An OTC system entails the direct transaction of dealers among themselves, 
uninhibited by involvement of brokers while brokers execute all trades on a stock exchange 
(Duffie, 2013). The vast majority of bond trading in Africa occurs on an exchange platform 
rather than on an OTC system. Namibia and Uganda are exceptions as their debt markets 
are OTC while Tunisia and Zambia trade bonds and bills on OTC and government bonds on 
their respective exchanges. Angola and Burundi, trade bonds through their central banks 
while Swaziland and Zambia trade only corporate bonds on their stock exchanges with the 
government issuing government securities. OTC markets exist in Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritius and more recently Kenya. They are also among 
the more mature markets in Africa.   The difference between OTCs and exchanges extends 
beyond the fact that exchanges are formal and OTCs  less formal trading networks. Markets 
operating OTC have the propensity to be more volatile than exchanges as dealers in the OTC 
setting can retreat from the market at any time (Faurie, 2013). The tendency of OTC 
markets to become abruptly illiquid may be a contributing factor for exchanges being the 
preferred platform for African bonds.  
 
Trades in the exchange are operated on the floor of the exchange, also known as the 
‘trading floor’ (Dodd, 2012). Orders and directions are shouted out to dealers in an open 
outcry system. Many African exchanges including the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
Botswana Stock Exchange, Nigeria Securities Exchange, Nairobi Securities Exchange and 
Casablanca Stock Exchange have phased out of the open outcry system signalling a move 
into the electronic trading systems. However, the Uganda Securities Exchange and the Dar 
es Salaam Stock Exchange conduct trading through a continuous Open Outcry Auction 
Trading System. Broker representatives meet at the trading floor and trade by calling out 
their orders to a board writer who then documents it on the display board. A match 
between a bid and an offer results in a trade (Uganda Securities Exchange, 2014).  
 
Movement from an open outcry system towards the electronic trading system implies that 
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orders submitted to dealers are automatically organised in a chronological order and 
according to the price limit in a market’s order book. Automatic downloads to a market 
information system occurs with electronic trading systems thus reducing the time to 
settlement (T+S) of a transaction. Real time market data are shared with dealers and the 
trading process is much faster when automated in comparison to manual (Mlambo and 
Biekpe, 2007).  Settlement systems for bigger transactions are also converted to electronic 
RTG settlement systems. Nigeria currently employs the NASDAQ OMX-X-Stream Trading 
System which makes the exchange among the fastest and most efficient in Africa. The 
preference for electronic over the open outcry system also stems from the knowledge that 
the ease of collusive schemes is increased in the latter system.  The identification of 
participants’ trades is relatively simple in an Open outcry system thus encouraging 
enforcement of group discipline. Secret bids impair the might of collusive schemes because 
information about other bids are not immediately obvious (Vajs, 2014). 
 
3.6.3 Clearing and settlement 
A vital issue to the operation of interbank, money and capital markets are payment and 
settlement systems to facilitate the transmission of monetary value between groups and 
meeting mutual obligations (WB, 2014). 
 
Effective trading requires efficient clearing and settlement; however, relatively large 
investments need to be made into many African markets to be upgraded to international 
standards.  Clearance and settlement conducted at exchanges would be an ideal situation as 
separate clearing and settlement organisations demand more complex links and operations 
to ensure that information is not lost , distorted or duplicated between activities. A script 
system, typically, is used in nascent markets such as Sierra Leone and Burundi, and entails 
orders on tangible paper that is transferred to a decentralised electronic bookkeeping 
system. Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia manage such activities 
internally while the remainder of the sample use external vendors, mostly from the private 
sector. Table 3.9 suggests that those countries with internal clearing and settlement 
systems, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda, tend to have shorter times till settlement (T + S).  
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The legal and regulatory frameworks in North African countries are among the world’s 
weakest (World Bank, 2014). Close inspection shows that a disjuncture between 
institutional arrangements and payment system regulators exists, causing confusion around 
matters such as settlement finality. Payment is made by cheque even for very large orders. 
Large trades are settled by Real Time Gross settlement systems; however, not all investors 
have access to the system. Besides regulation by the stock exchanges, supervision or 
regulation is not available in Botswana and Malawi. This may obstruct trust among 
participants of the exchange.  
 
3.6.4 Delivery and payment 
Three distinct methods of delivery and payment of securities exist among African emerging 
economies (Nasra, 2012). Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and Tunisia use a settlement system 
that facilitates the transfer of securities on a gross basis. Delivery of securities (transfer of 
bonds from the seller to the buyer) takes place during the course of the processing cycle. 
The transfer of funds from the buyer to the seller, however, occurs with the completion of 
the processing cycle (Nasra, 2012). The sellers encounter extensive principal risk since 
securities are transferred to buyers prior to fund transferal. Mauritius employs a more 
cautious strategy where, between the seller and buyer, funds are transferred through a 
settlement bank. Subsequent to this, the securities account of the seller is debited and the 
buyer’s account is credited with each participant receiving a settlement statement. Markets 
such as Morocco employ one type of settlement system on their OTC and a different type 
on their exchange. Systems that apply transfer guidelines on a trade-by-trade (gross) basis 
are used in Moroccan OTC transactions.  This involves transferring securities to the buyer 
and payment to the seller simultaneously. Money balances are not adjustable during the 
processing cycle since payment occurs on a gross basis rendering such a system vulnerable 
to considerable liquidity risk as large balances of money may be required (Nasra, 2012). 
 
Poor payments and banking systems, ill developed securities lending and repurchase 
markets, badly formed regulatory and legal structures, bulky trade comparison and 
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settlement mechanisms and unstable trade streams are part of the causes of failing 
settlement and clearing frameworks (Stehm, 1996). African emerging markets remain 
fraught with such ills; therefore, concerted efforts must be directed towards developing 
their systems. Their significance stems from the basic function of discharging obligations 
within these systems. Therefore, if inefficiencies are present, transaction costs may rise, 
reinforcing weak financial systems. Credit ratings are one means to gauge, among other 
things, the sovereign position of bond markets.  
  
3.6.5 Credit rating  
Solid credibility will elevate the appetite of investors of hard currency issuances, while 
encouraging domestic savers to lend at extended maturities. This will attract local pension 
funds and contribute to lengthening of the government yield curve. The existence of 
extended maturities will, in turn, enable governments to access funds from long term bonds 
in local currencies (Exchange Data International, 2014).  
 
The main credit rating agencies, S & P, Moody’s and Fitch, determine credit ratings using 
institutional effectiveness and political risk, economic framework and growth forecasts, 
international investment stance and external liquidity, fiscal performance and liquidity 
including contingent liabilities and debt burden as variables in their assessment (S & P, 
2014).  
 
Table 3.10: The evolution of local currency credit ratings in selected African countries from 
March 2010 to January 2014. 
 March 2010 January 2014 
Country S&P  Moody's  Fitch S&P  Moody's  Fitch 
Angola  -- Ba3  BB- BB- 
Benin  B -- B --  B 
Botswana  A A2 -- A2 -- A- 
Burkina Faso B --  --  B 
Cameroon  --  B B  
Cape Verde B+ -- BB-   B+  B+ 
Egypt BBB- Baa1 BBB    
Gabon   BB- -- BB-  BB- BB- 
Ghana  B+ -- B+ B1 B+  B 
Kenya  B -- BB- B1  B+  B+ 
Lesotho  -- BB  BB- -- 
Mauritius  -- Baa2 -- Baa1 -- -- 
Mozambique  B+ -- B+  B B + 
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Namibia  --  BBB Baa3  BBB-  
Nigeria  B+ -- BB Ba3  BB- BB- 
Rwanda  --  B-  B B  
Senegal  B+ -- B+ B1 -- B+ 
Seychelles --  B  B  
South Africa  A+ A3 A Baa1  BBB BBB 
Uganda B+  B  B B + 
Zambia  --   B1  B+  B+ 
* -- indicates that the local currency credit was not rated by the rating agency that particular year. 
Source: African fixed income guidebook (2010), Ecobank (2014) 
 
 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) ascribe a grade to the initial issuance of a country’s debt that 
represents the creditworthiness of the country.  A 16 point scale ranging from AAA (Aaa in 
the case of Moody’s) to C informs investors with an indication of the likelihood that their 
loans in a particular country will be repaid (Beaulieu, Cox and Saiegh, 2012).  A rating at the 
upper 9 points of the 16 point scale is regarded as investment grade while ratings in the 
bottom 7 point span (BB+ (Ba1)-C) are considered speculative or junk. The countries are 
continuously monitored by CRAs and their ratings are adjusted accordingly (Beaulieu et al 
2012). 
 
The development of African markets from being unrated to being rated by CRA’s and 
receiving relatively positive ratings is documented in Table 3.10. Noticeable is Angola, from 
being unrated in 2010, to being rated by the three major CRAs in 2014. Despite the fact that 
Angola was considered more speculative from the ratings, they inform investors about the 
country as a reliable investment destination. Botswana and South Africa are two other 
countries in the sample that possess investment grade ratings; of the two, only Botswana 
has maintained that grade with South Africa dropping from A ratings in 2010 to a modest B 
rating in 2014. 
 
3.6.6 Bond maturity  
The initial years of bond market issuance in the markets surveyed, characterised securities 
with short maturities to finance monetary policy instruments and government expenditure 
(AfDB, 2014). However, Table 3.6 shows that as bond issuance and bond market increase 
and bond development progresses, maturities of bonds have incresed to service the needs 
of governments, parastatals and companies to finance especially infrustructure projects 
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(Faurie, 2013). This development signals the markets’ ability to access funds at each rollover 
of maturity and pay the rate of interest at each rollover period (Faurie, 2013). It is also 
responsible for the slow but steady progression from the dominant commercial bank 
investor base to non-bank financial sectors though commercial banks still hold over 80% of 
government bonds outstanding thus broadening the diversity of security holdings. The 
implications of longer maturities are infrustructure improvements that encourage economic 
development, eventually translating into fiscal revenue that match liabilities and thereby 
reducing the incidence of currency mismatch and original sin. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Bond Price Behaviour as maturity approaches 
 
Source: Mayes (2015) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 suggests that, if one assumes that interest rates remain constant, the longer 
investors are willing to part with their money in a bond, the higher compensation they will 
recieve. Further, the longer investors hold a bond the more the discounted and premuim 
bond will tend towards the same value.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This section has examined African financial systems, of which bond markets are a 
component. Measures such as liquid liabilities to GDP and private credit to GDP have been 
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used to decipher the effectiveness of intermediaries in the various African markets.  The 
results are varied. Markets such as South Africa show liquidity ratios on par with those of 
fellow emerging country Brazil, while Guinea Bissau reflects a yearly decreasing ratio far 
below that of African countries. The banking sector and stock in selected African countries 
have been examined against those of developed and emerging countries with results 
indicating huge variations among African markets.  African bond markets are, however, 
maturing at a promising pace. Deeper inspection of the micro infrastructure elements of 
these markets reveals the growing inclusion of the markets into the global investor arena. 
Furthermore, developments in clearing and settlement, investments into trading systems 
and advancements in settlement times are promising signals for the future developments of 
African bond markets.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.0. Introduction 
Methodological issues that address the objectives of establishing variables that contribute 
to the performance of bond markets in African emerging economies are examined in this 
chapter. 
 
This study extends previous studies of bond market determinants such as Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Burger and Warnock (2006), Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak 
(2009), Bhattacharyay (2013), Mu et al (2013) and Essers et al (2014) by applying stricter 
methodology that takes downside risk into consideration and by employing tighter 
robustness and sensitivity tests such as the GMM. Factors that contribute to corporate bond 
issuance by firms are examined in accordance with studies by de Albornoz and Pope (2004), 
Hale and Santos (2008), Hosono et al (2013), Stewart and Watson (2013) and Mizen and 
Tsoukas (2013). Unlike many studies of bond market performance, this study separates the 
analysis of government and corporate bond markets, citing different underlying reasons for 
investment and issuance of the two classes of bonds. This is considered under the premise 
of Wang and Wu (2015) who suggest that public and corporate bond markets are selected 
by investors for different reasons, the different risk profiles for each class of bonds being 
among the principle reasons.     
 
Three analytical techniques are developed in this chapter. Guided by the literature, the 
primary processes consist of: 1) a model that accounts for downside risk, 2) a model testing 
macro-economic, social, institutional and historical determinants of local currency bond 
market performance, 3) a model establishing the determinants of a firms’ decision to issue 
in the primary corporate bond market or not. 
 
Section 4.1 contains the hypotheses and foundation of the analysis. Section 4.2 conveys the 
first of five models of this study. Section 4.3 comprises a proposed econometric model of 
bond market performance determinants. Factors that influence firms to issue bonds are 
modelled in Section 4.4. The sample selection and estimation techniques employed are 
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discussed in Section 4.5. The dependent and independent variables used in this study are 
examined in Section 4.6  which precedes the conclusion and close of this chapter.  
 
4.1 Hypotheses  
The literature survey demonstrated the diversity of performance and stages of development 
between African markets and the rest of the world. The extent of the disparity and  relative 
levels of performance are of crucial importance not only for academic research but also for 
policy analysis. A systematic approach to addressing this strand of the literature would thus 
help enlarge our understanding of African capital markets. To this end, and based on the 
gaps identified, a number of hypothesis are tested . 
H1: Bond markets in African emerging countries perform at sub optimal levels 
particularly in comparison to other emerging and developed countries.  
H2: The macroeconomic environment and the microstructure of capital markets boost 
bond market development and performance in African markets. 
H3: A model of bond market performance that explicitly includes historical, institutional, 
and social factors can help capture the unique characteristics of the breadth and depth of 
domestic bond markets in Africa. 
 
4.2 Conventional model: Standard bond market determinants model  
The first model examines bond market performance determinants. Knowledge of these 
determinants informs policy initiatives to suit African markets. Previous studies of bond 
market determinants, including Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Burger and 
Warnock (2006), Khalid and Rajaguru (2010) and Bhattacharyay (2013) utilize this standard 
model. This standard multivariate model is specified as follows: 
 
BFit = itXi,ti,t                     (4.1) 
 
where BFit  is the size of the bond market proportional to GDP of country i in year t. A 
constant, which is also the intercept of the regression line is denoted by  The explanatory 
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variables are represented by Xi,t and the normally distributed, zero mean error terms are 
denoted byI,t. Table 4.1 displays the explanatory variables employed in bond market 
determinant studies by Eichengreen  and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Burger and 
Warnock (2006), Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009), Bhattacharyay (2013), Mu et al (2013) 
and Essers et al (2014). Risk is represented by the risk coefficient, Fama, 2004). Rather 
than overall risk,  is a measure of risk of a diversified portfolio (Damodaran, 2012). 
According to Lui and Lui (2012), beta is essentially a measure of risk exposure divided by 
expected excess return and is represented by dividing the covariance between asset i and 
the market portfolio by its variance, establishing the most commonly used measure of risk. 
It is reflected in the equation: 
 
𝛽
𝑖 = 
𝜎𝑖𝑀
𝜎𝑖 ∙  𝜎𝑀
 = 
𝐸[(𝑅𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖) (𝑅𝑀 −𝜇𝑀)]
√𝐸[(𝑅𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖) 
2  ]∙𝐸[(𝑅𝑀 −𝜇𝑀)]
2
                    (4.2) 
 
where is the risk coefficient, iis the covariance risk of asset i in security M assessed in 
relation to the mean covariance risk of securities (Sabal, 2002; Fama, 2004). The expected 
return of the market portfolio and specific security is RM  and Ri respectively, M and i is the 
expected return of the respective securities (Sabal, 2002; Kroll and Ben-Horin, 2014). 
Moreover, 𝜎𝑖  ∙   𝜎𝑀  is proportional to the risk of each dollar invested in asset i and is a 
factor in the market portfolio (Fama, 2004). Beta () derives from an equilibrium wherein 
investors present mean variance behavior (MVB) within the CAPM (Artavanis, Diacogiannis 
and Mylonakis, 2010). Equations such as the CAPM are consistent with standard 
methodologies, such as the bond market determinant model above, applied to advanced 
economies (Jaramillo and Weber, 2013).  
 
4.2.1 Capital asset pricing model and beta () 
Estrada (2002, 2007), Cwynar and Kazmierkiewicz (2010), Yury (2012) and Kroll and Ben-
Horin (2014), among others, question the standard framework of the CAPM and 
consequently beta for emerging economies. Estrada (2007) proposes its replacement with 
an alternative framework based on mean semi-variance behavior (MSD), the downside risk 
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capital asset-pricing model (D-CAPM) and the downside beta. The variance of returns as a 
risk measure is appropriate only when the underlying return distribution is normal and 
symmetric (Malkiel and Xu, 2002; Raei et al, 2011). The traditional CAPM, from which beta is 
derived, is thus a partial portrayal of risk in markets that do not exhibit such distributions 
(Kroll and Horin, 2014). Kambadza and Chinzara (2012) show that the underlying return 
distribution is not normal and symmetric in most African economies, therefore, suggesting 
the inappropriate use of beta as a risk factor in African economies. The result is a model 
with a downside measure that captures the information contained in the skewness and 
variance in a single measure obtained by: 
 
𝛽𝑖
𝐷  =  
∑  𝑖𝑀   
∑  2𝑀
 =  
𝐸 {min[(𝑅𝑖 −𝜇𝑖),0] ∙𝑚𝑖𝑛[(𝑅𝑀− 𝜇𝑀).0]}
 𝐸 {min[(𝑅𝑀 −𝜇𝑀),0]  
2}
                   (4.3) 
 
Here, the risk of asset i, taken individually is measured by the assets’ downside standard 
deviation of returns (i) or semi deviation (Estrada, 2007). Downside covariance (co semi 
variance) (iM) gives the counterpart of asset i’s covariance to the market portfolio, in a 
downside risk framework. The co semi variance, according to Nikoomaram (2010) is scale 
dependent and unbounded thus, it is derived by the markets’ semi variance of returns, 
therefore realizing the downside correlation (
∑  𝑖𝑀 
∑ ∑  𝑀   𝑖 ∙ 
) and downside beta (𝛽𝑖
𝐷) of asset i. 
The downside beta (βi 
D) of asset i, is attained when the co semi variance is divided by the 
semi variance of returns of the market (Fama, 2004). 
 
4.3 Model 1: Proposed bond market performance determinant model  
This study extends the standard Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) model by 
proposing the replacement of the standard beta() with the downside beta ( 𝛽𝑖
𝐷)  to 
account for the unique nature of African emerging markets. Estrada (2007) questions the 
standard framework based on the MVB, CAPM and beta in emerging economies and 
proposes a replacement of it with an alternative framework based on mean semi- variance 
behavior (MSD), the downside risk capital asset-pricing model (D-CAPM) and the downside 
beta. Major reasons for this proposal are that the variance of returns as a measure of risk is 
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appropriate only when the underlying return distribution is normal and symmetric (Estrada, 
2007).  Kambadza and Chinzara (2012) show that the underlying return distribution is not 
normal and symmetric in most African economies ,therefore, suggesting the inappropriate 
use of beta as a risk factor in African economies. Thus, this study alters, slightly, the 
standard Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) model to suit the African condition 
because the beta value in the model (semi-variable) will combine into one measure the 
information contained in two statistics, skewness and variance. The result is a one-factor 
model to estimate required returns. The model for bond market determinants used in this 
study is:  
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛿(𝜇𝑖 +  𝜇𝑡) +  ∑  𝛽𝑘
𝐷 𝑋𝑖,𝑘𝑡−1 
𝐾
𝑘=1 +  ∑  𝛾𝑙  
𝐿
𝑙=1 𝑍𝑖,𝑙𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (4.4) 
 
where Yi,t  is bond market capitalization as a share of GDP (Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak, 
2009; Essers et al 2014). A constant equivalent to the value of the dependent variable when 
the independent variable equals 0, is denoted by The independent variable Xi, is lagged 
by the inclusion of t-1 to its subscript and symbolizes time variant explanatory lagged 
variables that compensate the mismatched starting dates of the dependent and some of the 
explanatory variables thus, increasing the sample size (Essers et al, 2014). A common 
intercept across countries is adopted and asymptotically estimated for the nonlinear 
function of the parameters means of  (Weisberg, 2001). Variables are normalized by  with 
time invariant explanatory variables denoted by Z
i,t 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 
2004; Mu et al, 2013). Country specific and time fixed effect takes the form 
i 
and 
t 
respectively and the error term isI,t  (Essers et al, 2014). Fixed effects, random effects and 
OLS estimators are used in this model. Many advantages exist in each method; however, 
each has disadvantages that researchers must acknowledge (Bhattacharyay, 2013). The FE 
estimator analyses the causes of variations within each country and removes all time 
invariant unobserved heterogeneity among countries.  Efficiency of estimates may be 
decreased in this method (Essers et al, 2014). Several studies on bond market determinants 
rely only on the fixed effects model to consider disparities across countries (Khalid and 
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Rajaguru, 2010; Peristiani and Santos, 2010; Ebeke and Lu, 2014). However, such an 
approach may assume complete disassociation of fixed effects and repressors. A RE 
estimation is presented since the influence of time-invariant variables such as religion and 
former colonial power on bond market capitalization is not detected by the standard fixed 
effects estimator. Rather than carrying out tests to decipher which estimation technique is 
most suited for the situation, the stance of Clarke and Linzer (2012) to abandon 
specification tests such as the Hausman (1978) test which is intended to convey the 
disparities among the parameter estimates of the respective approaches, is taken (Clarke et 
al. 2010; Clarke and Linzer, 2012;). A comparison of the RE, FE and GMM estimator between 
the models are made. Time invariant explanatory variables are denoted byZ
i,t 
 (which is 
legal origin) and a multivariate normally distributed random disturbance is indicated by 
i,t
( 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004; Mu et al, 2013). A novel characteristic of the 
model proposed in this study is the lagged explanatory variable (Xi,t-1).  It  symbolizes time 
variant explanatory lagged variables that are applicable to this model as they compensate 
for the mismatched starting dates of the dependent and some of the explanatory variables 
thus, increasing the sample size (Essers et al. 2014). 
 
4.4 Model 2: Factors that influence firms’ decision to issue bonds  
This subsection determines firm level characteristics that drive a firm to issue bonds. This is 
important because, according to Mizen and Tsoukas (2013), a favourable environment for 
bond issuance on the supply side and investment on the demand side is essential for bond 
markets to develop. Model 1 relates, largely, to the supply of bonds in a market and Model 
2 to the demand side. This section scrutinises firm size, age, risk, profitability, leverage, 
growth and tangibility of assets from the financial reports of selected firms.  
 
The dependent variable is categorical; thus, a probit model is most applicable (Park, 2009). 
This standard cumulative normal distribution probit response function deals with 
unobserved heterogeneity that arises when treating endogenous explanatory variables in 
panel data (Cortei and Farhat, 2011). A combination of techniques employed by Oberhofer 
and Pfaffermayr (2012) and Stewart and Watson (2012) form the basis of this section. 
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Fractional probit analysis finds factors that influence the choice of firms in African emerging 
economies to issue bonds. The analysis is utilized by the following model: 
  
𝐸(𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2,….    𝑥𝑖𝑡)  =  (𝑖𝑡 +  𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽𝑖 +  ?̅? 𝑖 𝑖)                 (4.5) 
 
 
where i indexes companies and t the year, 𝑖𝑡  highlights the distinctive intercepts applied 
for each year. The standard normal cumulative distribution function is  while the scaled 
coefficients are 𝑖𝑡 , 𝛽𝑖 and 𝑖  . Unobserved effects are represented by (𝑖𝑡 + ?̅? 𝑖 𝑖). 
The matrix of independent variables are represented by 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Where: 
 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = [𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖]        (4.6) 
 
 
The assumption of this model is that the amount of resources put into a single debt 
category instrument by a firm, is comparatively independent of the amount used for other 
types of debt. The downside risk measure of the preceding subsection is not applied to this 
model. Rather, the standard beta remains, guided by the postulations of Samuelsson’s 
(1998) theory that efficiency can be divided into micro efficiency and macro efficiency and 
micro level securities are more efficiently priced. This model, according to Samuelsson’s 
(1998) theory does not require application of  a downside beta model because securities of 
micro environments tend to have efficient prices.   
 
Unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into consideration in fractional logit modelling; thus, 
this study follows Papke and Wooldridge (2008), and Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2012), and 
employs a probit response function to deal with a probable bounded effect. This occurs 
when fractional dependent variables restricted between zero and one are predicted to 
cause rounding off of the dependent variable to the nearest number to produce incorrect 
results (Haucap and Muck, 2013). The probit response function takes the form: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡   𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖)  =  (𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝑐𝑡), t = 1, … . T               (4.7) 
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where  is the standard normal distribution function and the unobserved effects 
are 𝑐𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑡 . The components of  𝛽 provide the partial effects direction, since  is firmly 
monotonic. The vector of variable i at time t is shown by 𝑥𝑖𝑡 (Papke and Wooldridge,2008; 
Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr, 2012; Stewart and Watson, 2012). Continuous regressors follow 
the equation: 
 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑡 𝑥𝑡,𝑐
 )  
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡
 =  𝛽𝑗 (𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑐)                  (4.8) 
 
and, discrete explanatory variable modifications require: 
 
(𝑥𝑡
(1)
 𝛽 + 𝑐) − (𝑥𝑡
(0)
 𝛽 + 𝑐)                    (4.9) 
 
Where, 𝑥𝑡
(1)
 and 𝑥𝑡
(0)
 denote the two measures (1 and 0) that the discrete variable may 
assume (Papke and Wooldridge,2008). Unobserved heterogeneity is dealt with by a 
measure that takes into account the value of observed covariates to address unobserved 
heterogeneity of the panel data.  
 
The partial effects, through the distribution of the unobserved effects are averaged, and the 
average partial effects (APE) obtained (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). According to Cotei 
(2010), the APE regarding  𝑥𝑖𝑡, for continuous variables, assessed at 𝑥𝑖 is: 
 
𝐸 ⌊𝛽𝑡𝑗 (𝑥𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑐)⌋  =  𝛽𝑡 𝐸𝑐 [ (𝑥𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑐)]               (4.10) 
  
The above equation suggests that the APE is contingent on 𝑥𝑖, 𝛽, but not on 𝑐. Contrarily, 
the APE for discrete explanatory variable alterations is generated by averaging (𝑥𝑡
(1)
 𝛽 +
𝑐) − (𝑥𝑡
(0) 𝛽 + 𝑐) through the distribution of c (Stewart and Watson, 2012). Two 
assumptions are made for the identification of 𝛽 and the APE. First, the independent 
variables must be truly exogenous depending on the unobserved effects and the effects 
must be conditionally normal (Wooldridge, 2004). 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡  𝑥𝑖,   𝑐𝑖) = 𝐸 (𝑦𝑖𝑡,𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑐𝑖), t = 1, … . T                (4.11) 
 
where 𝑥𝑖    ≡  (𝑥𝑖1, … . 𝑥𝑖T) represents the group of covariates in all periods. 
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The distribution of the unobserved effects, 𝑐𝑖 is restricted in the second assumption by 
means of a conditional normality assumption: 
 
𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖1,𝑥𝑖2,….  𝑥𝑖T )  Normal(  ?̅?𝑖 , 𝜎𝑎
2)               (4.12) 
 
where ?̅?𝑖 ≡  𝑇
−1   ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  is the 1 x K vector of time averages.  
 
4.5 Estimation techniques 
4.5.1 Static panel estimators 
Several forms of functional estimation are employed in this framework including: random 
effects (RE), fixed effects (FE) and pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) models. A further 
estimation stage is presented in Model 2 since the influence of time-invariant variables on 
bond market capitalization may not be detected by the standard fixed effects estimator. The 
estimation takes the shape of a regression of estimated country specific effects ?̂?, on Z
i, t
 
variables: 
 
𝜇?̂? = 𝜃 +  ∑  𝛾𝑙  𝑍𝑖,𝑙𝑡 
𝐿
𝑖=1 + 𝑖,𝑡       (4.13) 

Many advantages exist with the fixed and random effects models respectively; however, 
each has disadvantages that researchers must acknowledge (Bhattacharyay,2013). A 
simulation exercise to compare fixed effects, pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) and the 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) is performed.    
 
4.5.2        Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
One major assumption of OLS regression is that the xi values are uncorrelated with the error 
terms. Endogeneity occurs in a statistical model when there is a correlation between the X 
variable and the error term. Generally, omitted variable bias brings about this issue; 
however, the panels of this study are strongly balanced and therefore no variables are 
omitted. A further source of endogeneity is reverse causality (Rose and Spiegel, 2015). An 
exogenous variable, that is, a variable that is not associated to other variables of the 
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equation, is required for a causal claim about bond market performance determinants to be 
made. An infinite amount of unobserved variables exist in the observation of bond market 
performance data, which can bring about endogeneity. The result of endogeneity is false 
estimations that completely erode the validity of the estimator. Inflation, in this study, is 
endogenous with at least public debt. All else equal, higher inflation rate and negative 
adjustments in GDP growth rates push up yields. This will occur as investors are likely to 
demand greater yields from a country with high inflation rates and low growth projections. 
Inflation is therefore correlated with other variables of the study. Due to endogeinity, the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) technique is employed. The rationale behind it is 
the fulfilment of a set of orthogonality conditions (Lee and Yu, 2014; Sun and Ashley, 2014). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed the technique which, like 
the proposed model, utilizes baseline panel data specification as well as dummy variables 
for time. Theoretically, several variables of this study may influence or depend on each 
other. The endogenous variables are hypothesized as: the dependent variable, fiscal balance 
and inflation. The reduced form equation used in this study takes demand and supply side 
issues into consideration. The first two variables are associated with interest rate, in that 
both the demand and supply for bonds are contingent on existing market interest rates. The 
government, however, also has the ability to impact market rates. Therefore, the supply of 
bonds may push interest rates, implying reverse causality from bonds to variables 
associated with interest rates. Regarding fiscal balance, many governments in Africa have 
limited ability to borrow funds. The size of the fiscal deficit may be propelled by the 
availability of debt finance, which may bring about endogeniety. For all three variables, 
therefore, a GMM is employed to take into account possible endogenous relationships. 
Thus, the parameters of equation 4.2 are estimated by a two-stage, least square method by 
permitting the errors of equation 4.2 to satisfy the orthogonality condition: 
 
𝐸(𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑠 𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 0,𝑠 < 𝑡 − 1.                (4.14) 
 
This occurs to achieve a system of a differenced equation and another in levels (Mu et al, 
2013). Under the serially uncorrelated errors assumption, the condition of orthogonality 
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suggests that the instrumental variables to detect the parameters of equation 4.2 hold the 
structure: 
 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =  [𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡−2, 𝑋 𝑖,𝑡].                  (4.15) 
 
where, variable X is all exploratory variables of equation 4.1, excluding the dependent 
variable, fiscal balance and inflation. Often, efficiency is enhanced through the variables in 
levels in the second equation as they are implemented with their particular first differences. 
The revised model thus, reflects the lagged dependent variable as independent. 
 
If one assumes serially uncorrelated errors, the orthogonality conditions infer that the 
vector of instrumental variables available to recognize the parameter of the above situation 
takes the shape: 
 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =  [𝐿𝑛 (
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡−2
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−2
) , … … 𝐿𝑛 (
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖,1
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,1
)] ;  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2, … … , 𝑋𝑖,1             (4.16) 
 
where, 𝑍𝑖
∗ is a block diagonal matrix with mth block determined by equation 4.16, for 
m=1,….,T-2, the matrix of instrumental variables is Z=(𝑧1
∗,…,𝑧𝑁
∗ ). The one-step GMM 
estimator for the K x 1 coefficient vector in which the lagged dependent variable is 
introduced as an independent variable is presented by: 
 
( ?̂?)  = ( ?̃?∗′ 𝑍𝐴𝑁 𝑍
′ ?̃?∗)−1  ?̃?∗′ 𝑍𝐴𝑁  𝑍
′ 𝐿𝑛  (
Bond𝑖𝑡 
GDP𝑖𝑡
   )
 
             (4.17) 
 
𝐴𝑁  = (
1
𝑁
  ∑ 𝑍𝑖
∗′𝑁
𝑖 𝐻𝑍𝑖
∗ ) −1  , with H a T-2 square matrix including 2’s in the primary 
diagonal,     -1’s in the first sub-diagonal and 0’s in another place, and ?̃?∗ is the 𝑁(𝑇 − 1) ×
𝐾 design matrix stacked by cross-sectional units with conventional row. The asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix of the GMM coefficient vector, is exhibited by: 
 
a var( ?̂?)  = 𝑁( ?̃?∗′ 𝑍𝐴𝑁 𝑍
′ ?̃?∗)−1  ?̃?∗′ 𝑍𝐴𝑁 𝑉𝑁  𝐴𝑁  𝑍
′?̃?∗  (?̃?∗′ 𝑍𝐴𝑁 𝑍
′ ?̃?∗   ),  −1           (4.18) 
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where 𝑉𝑁 = 𝑁
−1  ∑  𝑁𝑖 𝑍𝑖 
, 𝜀𝑖  𝜀𝑖
,  𝑍𝑖  and the I’s are the GMM residuals 
 
A benefit of GMM estimator is that, it assists in reducing complications due to 
multicolinearity between the explanatory variables and endogeneity among dependent and 
explanatory variables (Kumar and Pradhan, 2002; Yao and Wei, 2007). 
 
4.5.3  Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (BQMLE) 
Scaled estimates can be stabilized by using the pooled Bernoulli quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimator (BQMLE), which is achieved by maximizing the pooled probit log-likelihood. An 
initial step in finding estimates of the parameters requires the estimation of the generalized 
linear moment (GLM), such as probit and logistic models. A key assumption of the GLM is its 
creation from a probability distribution in the exponential category, Bernoulli in this 
instance (Kaiser, 2013).  
 
4.6 Data and variables 
4.6.1 Data Sources 
Secondary data on macroeconomic, social, and economic  indicators are taken from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators(WDI) database, the  African Development 
Indicators (ADI) database, African Financial Markets Initiative database, African Securities 
Exchanges 2014 Yearbook, Ecobank 2014 Fixed Income Report and the respective country 
central bank websites. Firm level information comes from Bank Scope, Business Monitor, 
McGregor BFA Domain and published balance sheets and income statements of the 
respective listed firms.  
 
Model 1 utilises monthly data over the period January 2005 and December 2014. A period 
start date earlier than 2005 would yield scarce data as many bond markets in Africa had not 
yet issued bonds prior to 2005.   Yearly data for non-financial firms between January 2009 
and December 2014 are employed in Model 2. Further, firm data used in the model have 
positive long-term debt in the company’s capital structures and consistently reported 
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annual accounts during the analysis interval (Bhaduri and Majumdar, 2005). The data of the 
key variables in this study are presented in varying frequencies; for instance, GDP data are 
presented quarterly and exchange rate at a much higher frequency (Armesto, Engemann 
and Owyang, 2010). Data frequencies have been matched through temporal aggregation 
where higher-frequency data are aggregated to the lowest frequency (Foroni and 
Marcellino, 2013).  There is a slight possibility that a great deal of potentially rich 
information is destroyed and corrupt measurements incorporated into the model when 
data are converted into alternative frequencies. However, under data constraints in Africa’s 
developing bond markets, this seems to be the most plausible way out.  
 
4.6.2 Dependent variables 
i. The Logarithm of Bonds Outstanding as a Percentage of GDP and Total Bonds 
The size and composition of the domestic bond markets are the dependent variables. The 
year-end outstanding local currency marketable central government debt as a ratio of GDP 
measures the size of the domestic government markets (Mu et al 2013). Marketable central 
government local currency debt is used regardless of the residency of the creditors. Essers 
et al (2014) explain that cases where debt settlements occur in foreign currency may be 
included in the dependent variable computation, only if their cash flows are of local 
currency. Macro-economic variables such as fiscal balances in good health are expected to 
be negatively correlated with bonds outstanding as a percentage of GDP and total bonds 
possibly because of the lesser need for governments to issue bonds in the presence of 
improved fiscal balances.  
 
ii Decision to issue corporate bonds 
A firm’s decision to issue corporate bonds is based on the ratio of total bond debt to total 
assets of the firm at a particular time. It signifies the full quantity of bonds issued by the 
firm. This variable represents firm level factors that contribute to the availability of 
corporate bonds in a market. Larger firms listed in their domicile country’s stock exchange 
for relatively longer periods are expected to issue bonds more than firms that do not have 
such attributes.   
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4.6.3   Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables are built on the extensive overview in Chapter 3 and classified 
into various natural sets including the macroeconomic, institutional and cultural. The 
macroeconomic set comprises inflation, consumer prices (annual %), the natural logarithm 
of GDP to PPP, the fiscal three year moving average of GDP, the standard deviation of log 
first difference of nominal exchange rate, total central government debt (% of GDP), GDP 
per capita, PPP (current international $), external debt stocks (% of GNI), exports of goods 
and services (% of GDP) and domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). The institutional 
set includes  political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, the World Governance 
Indicator: control of corruption and public protest. The former colonialist power and the 
religion dummy comprise the cultural set. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2  show the variables used 
in previous macro and micro economic studies. 
 
Table 4.1: Variables used in bond market determinants regressions 
 Eichengreen  and 
Luengnaruemitchai 
(2004) 
Burger and 
Warnock (2006) 
Adelegan and 
Radzewicz-Bak 
(2009) 
Bhattacharya
y (2013) 
Mu et al 
(2013) 
Essers 
et al 
(2014) 
MACROECONOMIC       
Bank interest rate spread    X  
Banking 
concentration 
X      
Banking sector size X     X 
Capital account openness    X X 
Capital controls  X    
Composite political, economic and financial risk  X  
Country size     X X 
Developmental stage 
of the economy 
X      
Domestic credit provided by banking sector X x   
Domestic credit to trade     X  
Economy size X    X  
Exchange rate X  X X X  
Exports as percentage of GDP     
Exports origin   X    
Financial development     X 
Fiscal balance X X  X X 
GDP  X     
GDP growth  X     
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GDP per capita PPP  X X X  
GDP, PPP   X X   
Government debt     X 
Inflation  X    X 
Interbank rate  X  X  
Interest rate X  X X   
Investment risk X  X  X  
INSTITUTIONAL        
Democracy      X 
Institutional quality     X 
Law and order X X X  X  
Legal origin X    X X 
Natural openness X    X X 
Bureaucracy   X  X  
Corporate governance and transparency     
Corruption    X  X  
Creditor rights X     
OTHER       
Geographical/ disease 
endowment 
environment 
X      
Source: Researchers’ compilation from literature survey. 
 
Table 4.2: Variables used in corporate bond market determinants regressions 
 de Albornoz 
and Pope 
(2004) 
Hale and 
Santos (2008) 
Hosono et al 
(2013) 
Stewart and 
Watson 
(2013) 
Mizen and 
Tsoukas 
(2013) 
Advertising expenditure   X  
Bond market conditions X    
Capital expenditure/total fixed assets 
(CAPEX) 
X     
Collateralized assets owned by firm  X  
Company risk X     
Costs   x   
Current assets/ total liabilities   X 
Debt   x   
EBIT/ total assets    X 
Extent of managerial equity ownership   X  
Extent of regulation     
Firm value    X  
Firms investment or growth opportunities    
Firms non debt cash shields  X  
Free cash flow amount  x X X 
Growth in sales X     
Industry classification                      X   X  
Industry market/ book ratio X     
Information asymmetry   X  
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Intangibles X     
Interest coverage ratio   X  
Investment/assets X    
Location    X  
No of years firm has been listed on stock exchange  X 
Number of employees   X  
Operation Assets/ Total Assets    
profitability     X  
Profitability of bankruptcy or default  X  
Quick ratio  X    
R & D expenditure  x   
Real assets  X    
Recession indicator X    
ROA X     
Sales X  x   
Sales growth rate  x  X 
Size of the firm   X X 
Country of ownership    X 
Tangible assets/ total assets    
Tobin’s Q  X    
Total assets X  x   
Total debt/ total assets X X   X 
Type of business operation   X  
Uniqueness of firms product  X  
Volatility of firms value   X  
Year dummy   x   
Years in business operation x X  
net income / assets X    
Source: Researchers’ compilation from literature survey 
 
4.7 Population and sample selection 
Countries in the sample are selected according to their issuance of bonds. Only countries 
that issue government bonds with a maturity of at least one year are included in the 
government bond sample. In total, 26 African countries and five emerging economies are 
included in this study. Three countries, Gabon, Burundi and Cameroon are from Central 
Africa. Rwanda, Kenya, Mauritius, Tanzania and Uganda are the five Eastern African 
countries employed in this study. The four North African countries in this study are: Algeria, 
Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Seven countries in the sample are from Southern Africa and 
are: Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia. Six 
countries are located in West Africa, namely Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Senegal. Mexico, of North America, and Brazil of South America are   emerging 
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economies included in the study. A set of three other emerging economies is included in the 
study: India, situated in South Asia and Indonesia  in South-East Asia are included in the 
emerging economy set of countries. Turkey, a country located in South-eastern Europe and 
Western Asia completes the set.  African countries which issue corporate bonds on their 
own or operate on regional exchanges are included in the corporate bond analysis. 
Appendix 9.1 shows the countries used in this study. 
 
The firms used in this study operate from various sectors  in African countries. The sample 
of 49 countries consists of 32 bond issuing firms and 17 non-issuing firms. Appendix 9.2 
shows the firms, sector of operation, country of origin , and year founded.    
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The chapter commences with motivation for the positivist lens through which this study is 
conducted. The analytical techniques and models, tests of variables and estimation methods 
used are defined. Several models are specified as well as a critique of the standard beta and 
its subsequent modification and inclusion in  the standard baseline econometric model for 
bond market determinants. Estimation techniques include static panel estimations: Fixed 
and random effects, pooled ordinary least squares, feasible generalized least squares, and a 
dynamic model estimation using the General Method of Moments (GMM). A Bernoulli 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator estimates the parameters of the penultimate and final 
model of this chapter. The estimated results of models presented in this chapter are 
analysed, interpreted and discussed in  chapters five, six and seven. 
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CHAPTER 5: PRESENTATION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.0.  Introduction 
Panel data procedures are used in this chapter to analyse data for 26 African countries, five 
emerging economies, and 49 listed firms. Incorporation of a set of emerging economies is 
advantageous as a benchmark for comparison. The data collected attend to the research 
problem and its subsequent questions. Both annual and monthly data are used in this 
balanced set. Two dependent variables are drawn upon to explore the driving factors 
behind bond market efficiency, effectiveness, size, and liquidity in Africa. The utilization of 
dynamic and static techniques permits more robust outcomes of the methods employed in 
the estimations. The results presented in this chapter are useful in the derivation of policy 
implications  presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Key variables of Models 1 and 2 are summarized using descriptive statistics in section 5.1. 
Factors that determine the performance of bond markets in Africa are investigated in 
section 5.2 and section 5.3 is devoted to the analysis of factors that influence the issuance 
of bonds by a firm. The chapter closes with a summary in section 5.4.  
 
5.1 Factors that determine the performance of bond markets in Africa (Model 1) 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics of Model 1 panel data. 
Summary statistics for the 26 African countries including the dependent and explanatory 
variable are reflected below by means of annual data. The natural logarithm is used, where 
necessary, in the computation of descriptive statistics as suggested by Nelson (1991) and 
Alagidede (2011).   
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of African country sample, 2005-2014 
Variable Count Mean Median Interquartile 
Range 
Standard 
deviation 
Variance  Skewness Kurtosis Jacque-Bera 
Test  
Inflation 250 7.07 6.24 6.54 5.20 27.02 1.11 1.66 80.47 
Central 
government 
debt 
250 39.43 35.46 26.03 24.39 594.76 1.44 2.85 171.58 
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GDP per 
capita 
250 5809 3705 8037 4959 2.46E+07 0.90 -0.30 34.47 
External debt 250 30.66 25.89 21.65 21.27 452.58 1.51 2.97 186.88 
Exports 250 33.73 30.98 24.51 15.69 246.10 0.52 -0.11 11.42 
Domestic 
credit 
250 32.51 18.55 29.61 31.69 1004 2.23 5.03 469.86 
GDP to PPP 250 24.66 24.55 1.80 1.46 2.12 0.27 -0.44 5.07 
Fiscal 
balance 
250 -2.34 -3.07 3.68 4.34 18.87 1.42 2.53 150.82 
Political 
stability 
250 -0.30 -0.21 1.20 0.82 0.68 -0.28 -0.62 7.40 
Corruption 250 -0.40 -0.49 0.83 0.61 0.38 0.57 -0.41 15.51 
Public 
protest 
250 3.59 1.31 4.22 6.00 35.97 3.14 11.51 1790.18 
Exchange 
rate 
250 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.01 1.11 4.86 297.44 
                     Confidence Level (95.0%) 
 
The kurtosis for all of the sampled variables, except for exports of goods and services, 
exceeds the threshold of 0.3, which indicates that the variable measures of the sample have 
flatter tails than would be the case in normal distribution. The predominance of positively 
skewed distributions among the sample data may suggest non-normality; however, the null 
hypothesis of Kurtosis for normal distribution is rejected due to the Kurtosis coefficients, 
thus suggesting a leptokurtic distribution of the returns. Rejection of the null hypothesis is 
consistent with that of Simons and Laryea (2005), and Mollah (2007). The findings of the 
distributional properties of return are similar to those of Alagidede (2011) in that they 
appear to indicate extreme observations. The maximum kurtosis in the sample occurs in the 
GDP per capita variables, exchange rate and public protest and reflects, from the standard 
deviations and means, broad disparities among the observations. The GDP per capita 
followed by domestic credit to the private sector reflect the widest differences.   
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The summary statistics for this sub section are viewed in isolation and in comparison with 
the group of emerging economies comprising  Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil, India, and Mexico. 
The overall high standard deviation corroborates the common observation of riskiness in 
emerging markets (Forgha, 2012).  
 
Table 5.2: Summary descriptive statistics of emerging economies, 2005-2014 
Variable Mean Median Interquartile 
Range 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance  Skewness Kurtosis Jacque-Bera  
Test  
Observations 
Inflation 6.75 6.34 4.04 2.51 6.28 0.67 -0.50 4.20 
50 
Central 
government 
debt 
47.67 46.73 22.20 13.06 170.50 -0.23 -0.89 2.06 
50 
GDP  
Per capita 
11419 12820 8096 4786 2.29E+07 -0.31 -1.15 3.60 
50 
External  
Debt 
52.15 27.90 37.52 17.23 10.36 107.27 0.62 -0.82 
50 
Exports 23.09 23.98 7.12 6.36 40.46 -0.53 -0.47 2.76 
50 
Domestic  
Credit 
40.04 39.53 24.57 14.99 224.78 0.46 -0.68 2.71 
50 
GDP to PPP 28.42 28.34 0.74 0.54 0.29 0.44 -0.30 1.79 
50 
Fiscal balance -3.61 -3.09 2.06 2.30 5.31 -0.82 0.16 5.64 
50 
Political  
Stability 
-0.77 -0.76 0.53 0.40 0.16 0.42 -0.43 1.89 
50 
Corruption -0.30 -0.30 0.54 0.29 0.08 -0.13 -1.09 2.61 
50 
Public protest 2.14 2.00 2.82 2.09 4.38 1.69 5.34 83.24 
50 
Exchange rate 0.087 0.084 51.49 0.017 0.0003 1.743 0.62 21.81 
50 
                       Confidence Level (95.0%) 
 
The mean and deviation of the inflation variable between African and emerging economies 
are very similar. Most of the inflation measures between the two groups of countries are 
comparable except for the skewness of inflation that is noticeably higher in emerging 
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economies than in Africa. The distribution of inflation measures is 1.3 and 0.3 for kurtosis 
and skewness respectively indicating more skewness in the emerging economy sample than 
the African sample. Interquartile range measurements between the African sample and that 
of emerging economies further delineate the nature of dispersion of variable counts. Even 
when outliers are taken into consideration, African economies display higher rates of 
variability in variable measures than emerging economies. Control of corruption and 
exchange rate are the only two variables that display distribution measures of Africa that 
exceed those in emerging economies. The mean GDP per capita in the emerging economy 
sample is more than double that of the African sample. The standard deviation and 
variance, both measures of dispersion, are consistently higher for the African economies in 
comparison to the emerging economies. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Correlation Matrix for bond market determinants 
Variable Inflation Central 
government 
debt 
GDP per 
capita 
External 
debt 
Exports Domestic 
credit 
GDP to PPP Fiscal 
balance 
Political 
Stability 
Control of 
Corruption 
Public 
protest 
Exchange 
rate 
Inflation 
1 
           
Central 
government 
debt 
0.006 
(0.97) 
1 
          
GDP per 
capita -0.223 
(0.27) 
-0.093 
(0.65) 
1 
         
External 
debt -0.029 
(0.88) 
0.724 
(0.000029) 
-0.114 
(0.57) 
1 
        
Exports 
-0.037  
(0.85) 
-0.070  
(0.73) 
0.609  
(0.0009) 
0.020  
(0.92) 
1 
       
Domestic 
credit -0.210 
(0.30) 
0.177 
 (0.38) 
0.481  
(0.01) 
0.162  
(0.42) 
0.163  
(0.42) 
1 
      
GDP to PPP 
0.059  
(0.77) 
-0.199 
(0.32) 
0.294  
(0.14) 
-0.349 
(0.08) 
0.084  
(0.68) 
0.230  
(0.68) 
1 
     
Fiscal 
balance -0.009 
(0.96) 
-0.356 
(0.07) 
0.197  
(0.33) 
-0.191 
(0.34) 
0.460  
(0.01) 
-0.182 
(0.37) 
0.069 
 (0.73) 
1 
    
Political 
Stability -0.130 
(0.52) 
-0.068 
(0.74) 
0.316 
     (0.11) 
0.062 
(0.76) 
0.330  
(0.09) 
0.285 
 (0.15) 
-0.475 
(0.01) 
-0.028 
(0.89) 
1 
   
Control of 
Corruption -0.185 
(0.36) 
0.016  
(0.93) 
0.370  
(0.06) 
-0.018 
(0.93) 
0.139  
(0.49) 
0.461  
(0.01) 
-0.295 
(0.14) 
-0.214 
(0.29) 
0.725 
(0.00002) 
1 
  
Public 
protest -0.101 
(0.62) 
0.042 
(0.83) 
0.259  
(0.20) 
0.000 
-0.043 
(0.83) 
0.262  
(0.19) 
0.375  
(0.05) 
-0.131 
(0.52) 
-0.266 
(0.18) 
-0.150 
(0.46) 
1 
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Exchange 
rate 0.295 
(0.10) 
0.021 
(0.91) 
-0.030  
(0.8) 
-0.040 
(0.84) 
-0.024 
(0.90) 
0.044  
(0.83) 
-0.007 
(0.97) 
-0.148 
(0.47) 
0.094  
(0.64) 
0.105  
(0.60) 
0.048  
(0.80) 
1 
     -values in brackets, confidence Level (95.0%) 
 
Figure 5.1 (a-k) depicts the strength of the linear relationship between the variables. 
Inflation has a weak negative correlation with all variables except for government debt, 
where it displays a very weak and positive correlation. Government debt and external debt 
are highly correlated with a positive coefficient of 0.72 and a -value of 0.000029 suggesting 
high significance. The majority of variables have correlations below 0.3 with the highest 
correlation among external debt and central government debt, external debt and GDP per 
capita, exports and GDP per capita, and domestic credit and GDP per capita. This indicates 
that high measures on one relate to high measures on the other, and that low counts on 
one relate to low counts on the other. High variability exists in the -values with the 
greatest value (0.96) being on the correlation between inflation and fiscal balance. The most 
significance is found in the correlation between external and central government debt and 
control of corruption and political stability. Fiscal balance, mostly, correlates negatively with 
the variables of the study meaning that high measures of it link to low scores on the other 
variables. Conversely, low measures on other variables are associated with high counts on 
fiscal balance. Political stability also strongly correlates with control of corruption. The high 
correlation may suggest endogeneity of the variables; however, estimation techniques in 
the models to follow address this bearing in mind that only the presence or absence of a 
correlation is denoted in the correlation matrix and not causation. Despite the relatively 
high correlations of external debt and central government debt, this study understands that 
the variables have different underlying mechanisms; therefore, none will be excluded from 
the study. Visual description of data, often portraying data graphically reveals patterns that 
are difficult to identify otherwise. Figure 5.1 (a-k) displays the correlation between bond 
market capitalization and various explanatory variables. 
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Figure 5.1 (a-k): Correlational scatter plots of bond market capitalization and various bond 
market variables
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Figure 5.1 (a-k) confirms previous calculations. Inflation, central government debt, GDP, 
external debt stocks, domestic credit to private sector and political stability display positive 
relationships with bond market capitalization in the scatter plot diagrams above. Fiscal 
balance presents a clear negative association; however, exports, GDP per capita, political 
stability, governance and exchange rate have more ambiguous visual associations with the 
dependent variable.  All the variables display considerable outliers. Noticeable clustering 
appears in central government debt, external debt and particularly domestic credit to 
private sector.  
 
5.1.2 Empirical findings 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the estimation for government bonds under FE, RE and 
GMM. Unlike Mu et al (2013) and Essers et al (2014) POLS is excluded as it completely 
ignores the panel structure. The sample is analysed according to three categories. Category 
one (1) comprises of the entire sample of African countries of the study, the second 
category (2) excludes the five economies with the most capitalized government bond 
markets of the sample, being Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria and South Africa. The five 
countries are eliminated as part of the second category to elucidate clear patterns among 
the variables that may not be apparent among the excluded countries. Only sub-Saharan 
countries are included in the third category (3). Isolation of these countries clarifies the 
influence of colonial rule and distance from Europe in bond market development in Africa. 
The rationale behind separation of North and sub Saharan Africa lies in the well-
documented division in terms of shared social and cultural practices, minimal cultural 
exchange, particularly due to the desert dividing the north and south of the continent 
(Maquet, 1972).  
 
The Sargan test for the GMM estimation establishes whether overriding assumptions in 
instrumental variable estimations hold (Sargan, 1958). The -values of each of the three 
samples are smaller than the critical significance level; therefore, the null hypothesis that 
the overriding assumptions hold, is rejected meaning that the models do not suffer from 
over identification.  
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Table 5.4: Estimation results-baseline models 
 
The (F) test for the two-way FE model across all three subgroups is smaller than 0.05; 
therefore, the model is significant at the 5% level of significance. Further, the FE model 
reflects an Adjusted R2 value of 93%, 95% and 92% for samples (1), (2) and (3) respectively. 
This implies that 93% of category 1 can be explained by the FE model, 95% of category 2, 
and 92% of the third (3)  category. 
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The null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero is rejected as the probability is 
higher than 0.05; consequently, it cannot be considered significant. The R2 for the RE model 
are slightly lower than that of the FE model with 81% of the amount of variance of bond 
market capitalization explained by the explanatory variables. 
 
Religion, in sample (1) has a weak and negative effect on bond market development 
according to the GMM estimations. Sample (2) also displays a weak, negative association 
with bond market capitalization, but not significant. Colonialisation presents a strong, 
significant relationship with the dependent variable. Sample (3) also reveals a positive 
association with the dependent variable although insignificant. The category that excludes 
countries with relatively high capitalization, sample (2), shows a negative, insignificant link 
with the dependent variable. Inflation, under the GMM estimation, is negatively correlated 
with bond market capitalization across all three samples with significance below 0.001 for 
sample (1) and 0.20 for sample (3). Central government debt is not significant across all 
samples and the association is weak in the first two categories but negative in the third (3). 
Conversely, GDP, the measure utilized to capture the size of a country, exhibits the highest 
coefficient of the study and varies throughout the samples. The GDP, at a significance level 
of 5%, has a relatively strong, negative relation with the dependent variable in sample (1); 
however, the variable is positively associated with bond market development in sample (2). 
The third (3) sample follows the negative correlation of sample (1); however, at a 
confidence level of 0.2. Only in sample (2), fiscal balance reflects a weak, negative 
connection to the dependent variable. Political stability shows a relatively weak, positive 
connection with bond market capitalization, but the results are not statistically significant. A 
positive, statistically significant link between fiscal balance and bond market capitalization 
occurs in the first (1) and third (3) sample at a respective 0.2 and 0.05 level of significance. 
Public protest and exchange rate are insignificant explanatory variables under the GMM 
estimation. 
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The RE estimation reflects a positive relationship between religion and the dependent 
variable across all samples. Colonialisation is significantly and negatively associated with 
bond market capitalization for sample (1) and sample (2); however, the sub-Saharan 
category, sample (3) displays a positive correlation with the dependent variable at a 0.2 
significance level. Inflation is significant only in sample (3) with a weak, negative link. Central 
government debt is positively related to capitalization in sample (1) and sample (2); 
however, when North Africa is excluded from the sample, the association is negative and 
insignificant. Neither GDP nor GDP per capita is significantly related to the dependent 
variable under the RE estimation. External debt stocks are negatively and significantly linked 
to bond market capitalization in sample (1) and sample (2) but a positive, significant 
association occurs in sample (3). The export variable, under the RE estimation, is only 
statistically significant in sample (3) with a weak negative estimate. A negative estimate also 
appears in sample (2) though it is statistically insignificant. Domestic debt displays a positive 
correlation across all samples; however, sample (3) fails to indicate significance of the 
estimate. Sample (1) and sample (2) show negative links with fiscal balance at the 0.001 and 
0.2 levels of significance respectively, while sample (3) reflects a positive estimate though it 
is very weak and lacks statistical significance.  
 
Political stability reflects a negative connection throughout the three samples though 
statistical significance occurs only in sample (1) and sample (3). Governance is also 
statistically significant in the first (1) and third (3) samples while the relation is positive 
across all samples. Similar to the GMM results, public protest and exchange rate are 
statistically insignificant in the RE estimation with the exception of sample (2) where both 
variables are negative and statistically significant. 
 
Religion is not statistically significant under the fixed effects model and only in the sub-
Saharan sample does it display a statistically significant link with bond market capitalization. 
Inflation bears a negative, statistically significant connection at various levels of significance 
across all samples while, central government debt is only significant in sample (2). The proxy 
for size, GDP, is negatively related to the dependent variable for sample (1) and (3); 
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however, sample (2) demonstrates a very weak positive association. Furthermore, only 
sample (3) is statistically significant for the GDP predictor.  
 
Fiscal balance is positively related to the dependent variable at a significance level of 1%. A 
contrasting drift is exhibited by political stability under the FE model in samples (1) and (3). 
The results mirror the outcome of the RE model in its negative association with local 
currency bond market capitalization; thus, as political instability increases, bond market 
capitalization decreases. Sample (2), however, reveals a weak, positive correlation at the 0.2 
level of confidence. Governance has a positive association with bond market capitalization 
while, as in the RE model, the public protest and exchange rate estimates are statistically 
insignificant. 
 
5.2 Factors that influence issuance of bonds by a firm (Model 2) 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics of Model 2 fractional probit regression 
Comprehension of factors that influence a firm to issue bonds offers rich information into 
the analysis of factors that hinder or boost bond market performance in Africa. Knowledge 
of such firm level factors offers further insight for the development of a framework, which 
can be applied to African bond markets to improve their performance. Analyses of these 
variables also provide a benchmark on which bond performance in African and emerging 
economies can be compared. Prior to estimating the fractional probit regression, correlation 
coefficients for each pair of explanatory variables included in Model 2 are computed to 
determine whether linear associations or multicolinearity occurs among the variables. 
 
Table 5.5 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the second model. Statistics 
are recorded for all companies (Panel A), firms that issue bonds (Panel B), and those which 
do not issue bonds (Panel C). The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values 
and the observation count are included in the table, following Mizen and Tsoukas (2013).  
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of entire sample (Panel A) 
 Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Observations 
Risk 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00 9.28 2.78 0.20 0.00 0.20 146 
Leverage 
ratio 
13.24 5.21 0.58 62.99 3968.09 26.02 5.11 437.99 0.15 438.15 146 
Size 14.25 0.36 15.06 4.35 18.94 -0.50 -0.51 18.65 3.24 21.89 146 
Growth 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.26 0.07 5.83 0.69 2.07 -0.75 1.32 146 
Tangability 
of assets 
0.52 0.03 0.54 0.39 0.15 32.84 4.13 3.76 0.00 3.76 146 
Profitability 5.70 1.91 0.07 23.11 534.03 28.09 5.08 159.58 -0.45 159.13 146 
Age 44.01 2.58 41.50 31.20 973.52 2.57 1.35 156.00 5.00 161.00 146 
           
 
The sizes for the total sample range between mid-size and large-sized companies with a 
mean of 14.24. The growth opportunities are relatively stable with a minimum ratio of -
0.748 and a maximum of 1.31. The measure of the mean is also higher than that of the 
median. A high mean and median of tangibility of assets (52% and 54%) indicate intense 
reliance on fixed assets for the sampled firms. Features have relatively weak correlations 
with each other. 
 
Table 5.6: Correlation matrix for issuance of bonds model 
 Risk Leverage 
ratio 
Size Growth Tangability 
of assets 
Profitability Age 
Risk 1.00       
Leverage 
ratio 
-0.14 
(0.33) 
1.00      
Size 0.17 (0.24) -0.29 
(0.04) 
1.00     
Growth -0.03 
(0.83) 
-0.07 
(0.63) 
0.19 (0.19) 1.00    
Tangability 
of assets 
-0.19 
(0.19) 
0.14 (0.33) -0.20 
(0.16) 
-0.18 
(0.21) 
1.00   
Profitability -0.16 
(0.27) 
0.46 
(0.0008) 
-0.34 
(0.016) 
-0.15 
(0.30) 
0.00 (1) 1.00  
Age -0.27 
(0.06) 
0.00 (1) -0.18 
(0.21) 
-0.22 
(0.12) 
0.10 (0.49) 0.03 (0.83) 1.00 
      -values in brackets             
 
Correlations of firm specific variables are presented in Table 5.6. Most variables are 
relatively low and do not exceed 0.3 except for profitability and the leverage ratio. Risk is 
negatively correlated with all variables apart from size. The weakest correlation in the 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 132 
 
sample is between profitability and leverage ratio followed by profitability and size with 
ratios of 0.46 and -0.34 respectively. Age and leverage ratio and profitability and tangibility 
of assets display no correlation. 
 
Table 5.7: Descriptive statistics of sample of bond issuers (Panel B) 
 Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Observations 
Risk 0.040 0.008 0.028 0.047 0.002 4.739 2.214 0.198 0.002 0.200 108 
Leverage 
ratio 
0.580 0.022 0.561 0.230 0.053 7.198 1.727 1.645 0.150 1.795 108 
Size 15.733 0.382 16.602 3.974 15.793 2.373 -1.454 18.648 3.241 21.889 108 
Growth 0.134 0.023 0.094 0.238 0.057 6.594 1.805 1.813 -0.495 1.318 106 
Tangability 
of assets 
0.451 0.026 0.502 0.267 0.071 -0.806 -0.063 1.158 0.000 1.158 108 
Profitability 0.049 0.010 0.056 0.108 0.012 9.869 -2.228 0.782 -0.500 0.282 108 
Age 39.120 3.207 26.500 33.324 1110.499 3.554 1.778 156.000 5.000 161.000 108 
                  
The sample of bond issuers consists of 32 firms within sectors that include manufacturing, 
agriculture, mining and telecommunication listed on bond markets in Africa. The size of the 
firms range from small to large and the time since establishment of the firm ranges from 
over a century to seven years. A list of the firms used in the study is available in Appendix 
9.2.    
 
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics of non-bond issuers (Panel C) 
 Mean Standard 
Error 
Median Standard 
Deviation 
Sample 
Variance 
Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Observations 
Risk 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.001 0.00 0.00 0.001 38.00 
Leverage 
ratio 
49.25 19.02 0.72 117.26 13750.29 3.72 2.23 437.81 0.34 438.15 38.00 
Size 10.04 0.32 9.61 1.95 3.78 1.32 1.15 7.35 7.85 15.20 38.00 
Growth -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.33 0.11 3.14 -0.52 1.62 -0.75 0.87 24.00 
Tangibility 
of assets 
0.70 0.10 0.59 0.59 0.34 20.73 4.14 3.76 0.00 3.76 38.00 
Profitability 21.74 6.76 0.28 41.66 1735.64 4.82 2.26 159.25 -0.11 159.13 38.00 
Age 56.08 3.06 55.00 18.88 356.40 0.26 0.27 77.00 18.00 95.00 38.00 
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Seventeen non- bond issuing firms compose Panel C. Table 5.8  reveals that firms that issue 
bonds have a higher risk compared to those that do not, while non-bond issuing firms 
consistently reflect very low measures of risk at less than 0.1%. Large divergences appear in 
the leverage ratios of the two groups. Non-bond issuing firms display a mean ratio of 49.2% 
and issuers 0.58%; however, Panel C displays a relatively high standard deviation and 
variance compared to Panel B. All variables of Panel B exceed the benchmark measure of 
kurtosis and only the age variable in Panel C remains within the 0.3 threshold. The only 
variable in Panel B within the confines of the 1.3 skewness thresholds is that of tangibility of 
assets. Risk, size, growth and age are within the 1.3 skewness threshold in Panel C. 
Profitability of Panel C firms outweighs that of Panel B at ratios of 0.049 and 21,735 
respectively. Non-issuing firms are more mature than their bond issuing counterparts; they 
have an average age of 56.0 years while issuing firms have a mean age of 39.1 years. The 
negative growth opportunities of Panel C contrast the positive measure of Panel B; and size 
of the bond issuers is slightly higher than non-bond issuers with ratios of 15.73 and 10.04 
respectively. Both samples rely heavily on fixed assets, particularly Panel C. This is evident in 
the tangibility of assets of 70% for Panel C and 45% for Panel B.  The differences between 
the sample of issuing and non-issuing firms is statistically significant.  
 
Table 5.9: Results of t-test of two-Sample assuming unequal variances 
 
Mean Variance Observations df t Stat P(T<=t) one-
tail 
t Critical 
one-tail 
P(T<=t) 
two-tail 
t Critical 
two-tail 
Bond 
issuers 
8.88 380.07 682.00 
252.00 -3.80 0.00009 1.65 0.00018 
 
1.97 
 
Non-bond 
issuers 
22.89 3039.56 233.00 
Hypothesized Mean Difference= 0 
 
A Welch’s t-test, displayed in Table 5.9 examines the difference between the sample means 
of the two groups and presents statistical corroboration of the dissimilarities of the two 
samples. The -value is less than the 0.05 threshold; therefore, it is highly probable that 
significant disparities between the population means of issuers and non-issuers are present. 
A t-test of two means assuming unequal variances rejects the null hypothesis that the 
means are equal.  
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5.2.2 Estimation results of fractional probit regression. 
The intention of the fractional probit regression is to model the probability of a firm issuing 
bonds as a function of a range of firm level characteristics including the firm’s risk, leverage, 
size, and growth, tangibility of assets, profitability and age. 
 
Table 5.10: Estimation results of fractional probit regression. 
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
Wald Chi-Square Maximum 
Likelihood 
    
Intercept -1.655+ 
(1.212) 
1.866 0.172 
    
Risk -29.749** 8.045 0.005 
 (10.489)   
Leverage 
 ratio 
0.004 0.010 0.921 
 (0.035)   
Size 0.265+ 2.253 0.133 
 (0.176)   
Growth -0.105 0.022 0.881 
 (0.705)   
Tangibility  
of assets 
-0.053 0.003 0.958 
 (0.998)   
Profitability 0.031 1.273 0.259 
 (0.027)   
Age 0.025* 3.298 0.069 
 (0.014)   
Observations 147 
Number of firms 49 
Pseudo - R2 0.460 
X
2
 Statistic 25.392 ( -value = 0.0013) 
Log Likelihood         90.799    
All explanatory variables are lagged one year. Country level clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance 
indicated as *** < 0.01; ** < 0.05; * < 10; + <0.20. 
 
The binary probit model, using Fishers scoring method, has 147 subjects: 41 not admitted 
and 106 admitted. It models the predicted probability of issuance.  The -value =1 for 
deviance of the goodness of fit test and -value =1 for the Pearson Chi-Square goodness of 
fit test in agreement with the H0 that the probit regression function is appropriate. The 
Alkaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Criterion (SC) are both 63.137. The 
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Likelihood ratio, Score and Wald tests represent the null hypothesis that β = 0. The null 
hypothesis for all three tests is rejected at the one percent level. 
 
Analysis of the MLE include a constant term F (-1.655) entailing that if all the predictors are 
assessed at zero, the predicted probability of issuance would be very low. The -value, 
however, is larger than 0.05; therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and the 
estimate cannot be considered statistically significant at the alpha level. The intercept is 
significant at the 0.2 level. Risk has the strongest estimate at -29.749, indicating the variable 
as the highest quantitative contributor with a -value of 0.005 signalling statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels. Leverage does not display significance at any level and 
displays a weak, positive effect on corporate bond issuance. Size, profitability and age  have 
positive estimates; however, size is significant at the 0.2 level, profitability is slightly over 
the -value threshold for significance and age is significant at the 10% level. Growth and 
tangibility of assets, like risk, have negative estimates that are approximately ten times the 
quantity of the estimate for risk but are not statistically significant at any level. The 
parameter estimation coefficient of age is 0.0249 implying that an increase in age increases 
the predicted probability of issuance by 2.49%. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine data for 26 African countries, five emerging economies, and 
49 firms listed on the African continent through descriptive statistics and regression 
procedures. The collected annual and monthly data analysed draw answers about factors 
that contribute to the hindrance or development of bond markets on the continent. They 
also offer a huge contribution to the development of a framework for bond market 
performance determinants in Africa. Factors that determine the performance of bond 
markets in Africa have been investigated by means of panel data procedures, and factors 
that influence the issuance of bonds by a firm have been scrutinized through logistic 
regressions. Together, the two dependent variables employed investigate the driving factors 
behind bond market efficiency, effectiveness, size, and liquidity in Africa. 
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The structural results of the model of the study confirm the effects of culture, more 
particularly culture formed by colonialism in bond market development in Africa. The 
majority of the estimated parameters are statistically different from zero. Religion 
influences bond market behaviour in Africa and countries that were colonized by the British 
appear to have higher levels of bond market capitalization than their counterparts which 
were colonized by France and Portugal.  
 
The results suggest that former British colonies in the samples, generally, have the highest 
degrees of bond market capitalization. Economies that are predominantly Christian pose 
higher capitalization than their Muslim, Hindu and indigenous believer counterparts, with 
the exception of Egypt. Low inflation and fiscal balance are favoured for bond market 
capitalization in African economies. Central government debt is only beneficial to weaker 
economies and external debt and governance are advantageous to local government debt 
performance. The GDP, PPP only has a positive effect on bond market capitalization of 
weaker economies. Counter to intuition, the empirical results show that GDP has a negative 
influence on bond performance. Political stability and protest are significantly, negatively 
correlated with bond market capitalization while exchange rate displays ambiguous results 
with the dependent variable. A dependent variable of a firm’s decision to issue bonds yields 
similar results. 
 
Against the fractional probit regression, the goodness of fit tests express suitability of the 
binary probit model, and the estimate for the constant term cannot be considered 
statistically significant at the alpha level. Risk and size have the strongest explanatory power 
in firms’ decision to issue bonds while no significance of the weak, positive leverage is 
observed. Size, profitability and age  have positive and significant estimates at varying levels.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.0. Introduction 
This chapter interprets the results of the outcomes of the empirical models and 
incorporates them with the theoretical underpinnings to establish motives and explanations 
for the results from chapter five. The first part of this chapter delineates the 
macroeconomic, institutional and cultural factor findings of this study. The second section, 
6.2, explains firm level factors of bond market capitalisation.  
 
6.1 Macroeconomic, institutional and cultural factors 
The exploratory variables that follow answer questions regarding the macroeconomic, 
cultural and institutional factors that supply much needed funds to African emerging 
economies, particularly in comparison with Western economies. A framework that takes 
into account the unique nature of African economies with the aim of increasing the breadth 
and depth of bond markets is presented. Lastly, factors that fuel the development of local 
currency bond markets in Africa are discussed.  
 
Bond market capitalisation is a measure of bond market development that has been used 
extensively in bond market research including but, not limited to, Essers et al (2015), Bae 
(2012), Mu et al (2013) and Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009). The highly significant 
negative correlation established in the study rebuffs scale effects in local currency bond 
market growth in accordance with Bhattacharyay (2013), Khalid and Rajagyuru (2010) and 
Claessens et al (2007). Contradictory findings are observed, on a country level for Egypt and 
South Africa show scale effects by a positive association between bond market capitalisation 
and GDP. The GDP factor, therefore, boosts local currency bond market development 
according to outcomes of this study. According to Claesens et al (2007), the scale effects 
found in Egypt and South Africa occur through the development of local currency bond 
market infrastructure and comprise fixed costs involved in forming settlement and clearing 
systems.  This positive relationship supports evidence of Coase (1937) and Thumrongvit et al 
(2013) on the interdependence between an increase in bond market capitalization and real 
output growth and contests the proposition conveyed most notably by Lucas (1988) that 
there is no causal link between the financial sector and real economic development. The 
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intuition behind this is that additional options for government financing are most likely 
facilitated by larger economies. Overall, this study finds that the financial system would 
benefit from growth in the size of bonds outstanding as a percentage of GDP, particularly 
due to the governance diffused into the rest of the financial system.  
 
The data supports the findings of Berensmann et al (2015) that a positive relationship may 
exist between economic development, measured here as GDP, PPP and the depth of local 
currency bond markets for Egypt, South Africa and Mauritius, which are the more developed 
countries in the sample. Additionally, and in corroboration with Berensmann et al (2015), 
the relative size of local currency bond markets is least in low-income economies and 
greatest in upper-income economies. This suggests that bond markets in upper-income 
countries tend to supply more capital to their economies than low-income countries.  
 
Literature, previously, has used the previous year’s budget balance as a share of GDP and 
public debt as a percentage of GDP to assess fiscal policy; however, the three year moving 
average is favoured here because it is less susceptible to subjugation by fleeting influences 
(Eichengreen and Luengnamiemitchai, 2004). The steady, negative and significant 
correlation of fiscal balance with local currency bond markets implies that as fiscal balance 
improves the impetus for local currency bond financing decreases. This occurs, as funds 
required by governments are more available and the need to seek additional funds from 
local currency bond markets decreases. The importance of fiscal balance to bond market 
capitalisation lies in a sound fiscal policy. Robust fiscal policy positively influences bond 
market development through the conduct of state policy (Uppal, 2011). This study 
interprets the results of the regressions as emanating from corruption of governments, 
which has dire consequences for investors of local currency bond markets and hinders their 
development. Such corruption occurs as politicians’ exhibit opportunistic behaviour by 
increasing the expenditure of government beyond funds raised by taxes in order to delight 
voters (Aisen, 2007; Uppal, 2011).  
 
Wide consensus that elections closely influence  macro-economic variables such as inflation, 
fiscal balance and exchange rate has been documented (Ghezzi, Stein and Streb, 2000; 
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Bonomo and Terra, 2005; Kaeding, 2013). Quite often, expansionary policies are adopted 
during election years causing uncertainty for businesses and investors (Upal, 2011). It is 
highly likely that in much of the sample, fiscal balances increased due to politicians 
providing more government initiatives causing them to be perceived as more capable thus 
enticing additional ballots (Marcela, 2006). Voters, however, in an imperfect African 
environment have imperfect information about politicians, which may lead to their 
misguided decisions (Bohn, 2013). This may have translated into a widening of the fiscal 
deficit in the periods immediately prior to an election in most of the African countries in the 
sample. An example of this  occurred in Egypt where, during the presidency of Hosni 
Mubarak, a persistent  pattern of sharp declines in total reserves was observed six months 
prior to elections, and exchange rate devaluations were experienced shortly 
afterwards.(Blaydes, 2010).  
 
Wide fiscal deficits, according to Marcela (2006), in environments with less budget 
transparency tend to be relatively extensive. Concurrently, countries with  robust positive 
and significant associations between fiscal deficits and strikes exhibit higher levels of 
corruption. The IMF, for instance, note that fiscal transparency “is critical for effective fiscal 
management and accountability”. The IMF (2015) reiterate that transparency regarding the 
variables related to the quality of a budget and its fiscal outcomes has a significant bearing 
on the broader governance and development outcomes of an economy. Corruption, in these 
countries may also have affected the influence of fiscal balances on bond market 
development through inadequate collection of taxes and rent seeking behaviour among 
government officials (Eslava, 2011). These results echo findings of Hallerberg, Scartascini 
and Stein (2009) that countries graded positively in terms of an institutional budget index 
have lower deficits.  This study, thus, rejects the notion that the wide fiscal deficits 
prevalent in Africa are due to tax smoothing in favour of the political opportunism and 
corruption proposition because of the associations observed in the regressions and 
correlations. Corruption, thus, hinders bond market development by undermining 
transparency, which is vital for the advancement of local currency bond markets. 
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It appears, from the macroeconomic data collected, that the economies that led higher 
fiscal deficits have considerably higher levels of central government debt. According to 
Essers et al (2014), there is typically a stronger need to issue government bonds for 
countries that run fiscal deficits than those who run surpluses. However, wide, persistent 
fiscal deficits may demoralize potential investors and inhibit them from investing in a local 
currency bond market. Fiscal balance of an economy cannot be viewed in isolation. For 
instance, between 2008 -2012 the largest decline in fiscal balances occurred in frontier 
African markets contributing to an expansion of their public debts as a result of counter-
cyclical measures in response to the 2008 Sub-prime crisis (Ncube and Brixiova, 2015). This 
demonstrates the intricate interconnected relationship between fiscal balance and the 
public debt of a country. A similar tendency occurs with GDP and bond issuance. Regression 
results suggest that, although not to the extent required, economies with lower GDP issue 
more debt in the form of government bonds, perhaps because of the need for income to 
fund capital needs. This is contrary to the supply-leading hypothesis of Fink et al (2003) who 
find that in highly developed economies GDP increases as bond market capitalisation 
increases. 
 
Initiatives such as the HIPC contributed greatly to Africa’s lowest debt levels in many years 
(Blommestein and Horman, 2007; Ncube and Brixiova, 2015). The sampled economies 
display mixed results about the external debt and bond market capitalisation interaction 
and indicate that economies with large public debt tend to have less developed local 
currency bond markets. External debt levels that are unsustainable pose a negative 
impression to investors and potential investors. It conveys the message that a country is not 
able to handle its debt practices well. It is highly likely that investors in these countries were 
deterred from bond market investment because of this. Bond markets and external debt 
have an intricate relationship.  
 
The high levels of fiscal deficit as a share of GDP inherent in the sampled African countries 
are likely to bring about a rise in debt relative to GDP and influence the development of 
financial systems, more particularly bond markets, in Africa (Rangarajan and Srivastava, 
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2005). Central government debt, according to the World Bank (2015) comprises the all-
inclusive stock of direct government fixed-term contractual duties due to distinct parties at 
a specific time. This, which includes both marketable and non-marketable debt, is employed 
as a variable in this study because of their huge influence on fiscal policy and the resulting 
economic outcomes of fiscal policy (Alfonso and Jalles, 2013; Vajs, 2014).  
 
It may be that the negative relation of central government debt to bond market 
capitalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa is due to the accumulation of debt by sub-Saharan 
African governments. Concerns regarding possible policy measures that may be taken by 
governments to curtail this debt are likely to be the primary sources of this uncertainty 
(Mbate, 2013). Mbate (2013) supports this explanation and the findings of this study that a 
considerable stock of debt facilitates an ambiance of uncertainty in an economy. The sample 
that excludes the five strongest bond markets probably experienced debt accumulation, 
which improved the perceived creditworthiness in those environments with a lesser cost of 
information. The results of this study may be owed to the tax evasion, the low tax bases and 
rates prevalent in developing countries that pose a challenge for governments to finance 
fiscal deficits. As a result, public debt is sought  usually leading increased inflation and an 
imminent increase in financial market uncertainty. The resulting inflation is detrimental to 
local currency bond market performance but, issuance of local currency bonds to the public 
offers a fiscal deficit-financing route that is neither inflationary nor detrimental to 
uncertainty in a market (Ishaq and Mohsin, 2015). Bond market capitalisation in the 
sampled countries, however, is typically not high enough to reap the fiscal financing 
benefits.  
 
Bond markets in an environment shrouded by uncertainty are accepted by a myriad of 
authors as a major impediment to bond market and financial market development in its 
entirety (Knight, 1921; Kapingura and IIkhide, 2015; Sibanda and Dubihlela, 2013; Nelson 
and Katzenstein, 2014; Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes, 2013; Koeniger et al, 2004). The 
regression results present a further obstacle to bond market capitalisation, being 
corruption, which occurs in environments with relatively high information asymmetry.  It 
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suggests that countries with higher corruption measures and therefore lower perceived 
access to information have higher levels of central government debt than those with lower 
corruption. Economies, such as Algeria and Angola, are found to have among the weakest 
bond market capitalisation to GDP ratio on this account. This finding contrasts that of 
Putunoi and Mutuku (2013) and Abbas and Christensen (2007) in their study on the impact 
of central government debt in Kenya and developing countries generally.  
 
Comparable to Burger and Warnock (2006) the study finds that economies with stable 
inflation rates are inclined to have deeper and wider local currency bond markets. The 
literature has acknowledged low inflation as an imperative bond market development 
prerequisite, and outcomes of the regressions confirm this as significant across all 
aggregates of the sample (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2005; Bank of International Settlement, 
2007; Sibanda and Dubihlela, 2013). Some benefits of high inflation exist, such as its ability 
to decrease the value of real debt outstanding; however, in the context of this study, the 
negative effects it has on local currency bond market development deem it an inappropriate 
variable (Hilscher, Raviv and Reis, 2014; Reinhart and Rogo, 2009). Appropriate motivation 
for investment support of debt markets are, according to Mihaljek et al (2000), essential 
attributes of low inflation.  
 
Close inspection of data suggests that inflation applies a strong and consistent negative 
force on the size (capitalisation as a share of GDP) of local currency bond markets. This is 
consistent with Sunder-Plassmann (2013) that higher rates of inflation are usually related to 
higher inflationary volatilities thus increasing the propensity for African governments to 
inflate outstanding debt. It may be that, certain local currency bond markets in the sampled 
countries have modest local currency bond market capitalisation despite relatively low 
inflation rates due to a lack of governance. Senegal, for instance, has experienced a 
relatively steady inflation over the last decade; however, the country’s bond market 
capitalisation remains among the lowest in the sample. Governance measures of the 
country imply an environment plagued with corruption. Results suggest that longer term 
investment, which is best for the demand for bond market financing, is likely to be 
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dissuaded in economies with high inflation and large fiscal deficits as these variables 
misrepresent economic behaviour toward speculative securities (Mihaljek et al, 2000).  
 
The high inflation in many of the sampled countries may reduce the predictability and 
stability that should be inherent in bond markets because of the alteration of established 
costs of funds and returns in such conditions (Sibanda and Dubihlela, 2013).  The high 
corruption may have bought about the high inflation that is prevalent in the sampled 
countries. Resources in such economies are typically not used efficiently nor are they 
distributed effectively. This is likely to have led to inefficient decisions, which lead to 
inflation uncertainty, and ultimately inflation in many of the countries in the sample with 
lower capitalisation ratios (Jiranyakul and Opiela, 2010).  According to Akça, Ata and Karaca 
(2012) these ambiguities in economic activity are essential for the manifestation and 
dissemination of corrupt acts. 
 
The self-reinforcing corruption- inflation relationship highlights the importance of the 
characteristics of income, such as the decreasing level of real wages and reductions in the 
purchasing power of money, in African countries as this may lead to the loss of income for 
portions of a country’s population. This loss causes a further distortion in the distribution of 
income thus, resulting in various innovative means to generate revenue. Acts such as 
bribery and rent-seeking activities may have been part of the activities spurred by those 
wanting to preserve their economic existence in the sampled countries (Akça et al 2012).    
 
The majority of the sample employs a floating exchange rate as opposed to a fixed or 
pegged regime. The fixed exchange rates are likely to spur bond investment by foreign 
investors thus supporting development of bond markets; however, the growth of domestic 
intermediation may be hampered by the subsequent foreign competition and any 
underestimation of exchange rate risks that will probably occur (Goldstein, 1998; Kamil et al 
2012; Mu et al 2013).  Volatility of exchange rate is found to be negative and significant with 
bond market development in comparable studies but results of the current study are mixed 
and lack significance, suggesting that other factors such as exchange rate misalignments 
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may be present. It is probable that exchange rates are internalised by investors and hedged 
against exchange rate risk causing movements of rates to translate into small real quantities 
in the African economies (Aghion et al 2009 and Gadanecz, Miyajima and Urban, 2014).  
 
It is highly likely that, although not statistically significant, exchange rate has had a bearing 
on the performance of bond markets in African economies. Reputable reports state that 
bond markets in certain countries have suffered due to volatility in exchange rates, for 
example Ghana, South Africa and Zambia. Relative to other emerging economies, the 
exchange rates in African economies during the period of study display some volatility and 
few countries such as Ghana and Zambia, experienced sharp drops in currency (Bloomberg, 
2015). The plunge in Ghana’s cedi during 2014 compelled its government to take policy 
tightening measures. Inflation sat at 17% in December of that year in comparison to 13.5 
the previous year. The increase in inflation was caused, partly, by exchange rate volatility. A 
policy response by the Ghanaian government was to halt subsidies to the petroleum and 
utilities sectors (World Bank, 2014).  Zambia, the second biggest producer of copper in 
Africa, experienced 15% depreciation in its Kwacha, mainly due to a decrease in prices of 
commodities and other key occurrences in the country, including an election in January 
2015.  
 
The exchange rate depreciation in Ghana, South Africa and Zambia may have reduced the 
price of capital investment by foreign investors; however, it is questionable whether they 
are likely to invest in economies portrayed as unstable by market sentiment. Volatility of 
exchange rate, according to Alexander (1952), Obstfeld and Roggoff (1998) and Bahmani-
Oskooee et al (2015) affects household and firm consumption through direct and indirect 
channels. Ghanaian households and firms, according to the direct channel, have an aversion 
for exchange rate variations. The exchange rate increases, particularly between 2008 and 
2014, possibly prompted uncertainty and caused nervousness among households and firms 
thus, negatively influencing their choices regarding consumption and leisure activities 
(Bahmani-Oskooee et al 2015). Household and firm spending probably decreased as a 
response to depreciation of currency. Firms, likely decreased production to meet the 
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lessening demand and dwindling supply requirements. Interest rates probably increased in 
response to exchange rate depreciation. A short maturity dominates its government fixed 
income market, as investors are only willing to hold the bonds of the volatile exchange rate 
country for brief periods. Unfortunately such securities are not what Ghana and many 
African countries require for their pressing capital needs. Here, the drivers of bond market 
development may be different to those in a stable, efficient economy.  
 
Trade openness is a standard measure of an economy’s connection with the rest of the 
world, and is captured by the ratio of total exports of goods and services as a share of GDP 
(Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004, Gelos et al, 2011). It is logical to argue, that the 
extent of a country’s trade openness is appropriate to the development of bond markets; 
however, the outcomes of the variables are ambiguous. Capital controls, for instance, may 
be a motivation for governments and corporations to seek funding from local markets, more 
specifically, domestic bond markets rather than external sources (Mu et al, 2013). An open 
capital account is likely to expose economies to market discipline thus causing an increased 
attention to bonds by domestic investors (Essers et al, 2014; Claessens et al, 2007). The 
findings reflect a weak, non-significant positive correlation among local currency bond 
market capitalization and capital account openness in accord with the neoclassical 
hypothesis of McKinnon and Shaw (1973). The authors suggest that greater trade openness 
leads to higher interest rates, which are likely to benefit bond market development as 
investors seek higher returns. Risky behaviour by banks may occur as a consequence of 
more open capital accounts and spark boom-bust cycles in countries with imperfect capital 
markets (Tornell and Westermann, 2005). Furthermore, borrowers may be persuaded by 
agency difficulties to employ bank loans to purchase risky assets during surges in lending 
resulting in banking crisis and recessions. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) claim that trade 
openness in economies with agency problems and weak institutions may ignite short run 
crises.  The seemingly ambiguous result of trade openness and local currency bond markets 
may signify the risks of trade openness in economies that are not economically stable. 
Additionally, the ambiguous results may be owed to the legal and regulatory structure as 
suggested by Calderón and Kubota (2009) that rewards of trade openness can only be 
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reaped in countries with legal and regulatory environments that ensure astute accounting 
procedures, protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts.  
 
A converse relationship appears to exist between the banking sector, proxied by the size of 
domestic credit to the private sector, and local currency bond markets. Outcomes of the 
models exhibit a positive link between bond market development and private sector credit 
of all aggregates of the sampled economies thus, suggesting complementarities between 
these two variables (Astrauskaite and Paškevicius, 2014). These findings are consistent with 
those of Bae, (2012) and Mu et al (2013) who observe that large, well-capitalised bank 
systems foster bond market development. The results indicate that economies with more 
developed financial systems have greater developed local currency bond markets. A 
plausible explanation is that  this is a sign of better demand for such bonds in economies 
with a relatively better capitalised financial system.  
 
The significant, positive relationship between domestic credit to the private sector and local 
bond market capitalisation, established in this study, suggests that as financial systems 
develop, bond market development follows closely behind. It may be that as the banking 
sector develops, less reliance on bond markets occurs. The findings in this study support the 
school of thought that private sector credit is subject to the crowding out effect when 
government debt is issued excessively, particularly in countries with shallow financial 
markets and low national savings, which include the bulk of the sample (Mbate, 2013; 
Buscemi and Yallwe, 2012). Similar results are found by Essers et al (2014) and may also 
signify that with a higher degree of domestic credit to the private sector, banks obtain 
deposits directly from markets and invest the funds into local currency bonds thus 
facilitating a larger local currency bond market. Furthermore, better distribution systems 
including primary dealer systems are afforded by more developed financial systems and 
may encourage investors to invest in local currency bond markets. More developed financial 
systems, however, may also be attributed to larger stock markets; therefore, a causal 
relationship between financial system development and local bond market development 
cannot be immediately assumed. These findings are consistent with Turner (2003) who 
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asserts a complementary relationship between bond markets and banks, and in opposition 
to Mu et al (2013) and Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009), in their examination of bond 
markets in sub-Saharan Africa. Mu et al (2013) and Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009) 
establish a strong negative link between the banking sector and local currency bond market 
development. The divergent findings between this study and Mu et al (2013) and Adelegan 
and Radzewicz-Bak (2009) may be due to complementarities. This occurs when banks 
provide short term funding, which they are best suited for, and long term investment needs 
are catered for by the local currency bond market.  
 
The low ratios of private credit observed in the sample may indicate that many inhabitants 
of a country are unbanked. Countries such as South Africa and Mauritius display high ratios 
while others such as Algeria, Angola and Cameroon have smaller ratios of domestic credit to 
the private sector, offering only the most rudimentary banking services (Honohan and Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Levine, 2007 and Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Peria 2011). Banks in 
countries such as Algeria, Angola and Cameroon may have faced common obstacles that 
prevented them from increasing their domestic credit to the private sector.  First, 
economies of scale may not have been reached by credit providers in some of the smaller 
economies sampled thus, discouraging them from venturing more actively into some larger 
countries. Furthermore, a large part of the economy may have operated outside urban 
areas and may not possess the documentation that is required for financial transactions 
(Beck and Cull, 2013). The result is a part of the economy that is unbanked thus  reflecting in 
the low ratios. According to Oji (2015) many unbanked Africans save their money in their 
homes giving rise to a loss of potential savings that may be utilised by bond markets for 
governments to better finance deficits. Banks may miss opportunities to benefit from this 
segment of society as they may use the increased deposits to make available credit to 
neighbouring communities to activate the local economy. The financing of deficits through 
savings and the investment into local communities signal development of efficiency in the 
economy, which is a positive sign to investors of bonds. Certain societies, however, may not 
wish to access funds from financial institutions and this may contribute, in part, to the lower 
ratios of credit to private sector. Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2008) find that 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 148 
 
Muslims are considerably less inclined than non-Muslims to hold an account at a formal 
banking institution. This may have influenced the low ratio private credit observed in 
Muslim countries in relation to their non-Muslim counterparts.  
 
All Islamic thinking is based on the Quran and that includes the feelings and judgement that 
applies to the economy and financial system which eventually infiltrates the way of life of a 
Muslim society (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2013). According to Lewellyn and Boa (2014)  
institutions develop as individuals’  reason and draw conclusions and interact with each 
other. The variation between the bond market development of countries of different 
religions stems from the divergent cultural and institutional practices dictated by religion. 
Islam, for instance, propagates a system that generally leads to the wellbeing of a society 
and encompasses the spiritual affairs of life. Conventional society, according to Iqbal and 
Mirakhor (2011), is mainly in pursuit of self-interest which causes a mismatch between the 
central tenets of practices and ways of life between Muslim and conventional non-Muslim 
societies. Religion affects bond market capitalisation through financial institutions which, in 
turn, are created by beliefs and traditions of a society (Acemoglu et al 2005; Ang 2013; 
Williamson, 2012). 
 
Variables that represent the influence of colonialism on the present state of bond markets 
in Africa are significant in this study and offer insight into the nature of the bond market- 
colonialism relationship. Empirical results of the regression, in sum, suggest a pivotal role of 
colonial powers in shaping normative frameworks and informal institutions in their 
respective African countries and in the long run bond market development. Different 
experiences of colonialism were created by the various colonial powers in different African 
countries. The results confirm the propositions of Bossuroy and Cogneau (2009) that   the 
legacies of various colonial powers affected the current level of education of particular 
African countries. For example Britain, unlike Belguim, France, Germany and Portugal and 
emphasised  education and employed exhaustive means, such as missionaries, to educate 
the indigenous people, while being mindful of the cultural institution of the country. The 
values of colonial education influenced formal and informal institutions through the new 
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norms and expectations transmitted to indigenous people by the British colonisers. Belgium 
Germany, Portugal and particularly France exercised a different strategy by reserving 
education for a small selected group of indigenous people and neglecting the remainder of 
the population. This study argues that British colonial territories have been able to utilise 
technology, according to Veblen (1908,) due to the relatively substantial investment in 
education.  
 
Bloom, Canning and Chan (2006) suggest that education can assist bond market 
development through technological catch-up as graduates are expected to be more 
cognizant of and relatively prepared and capable of employing these technologies. Applied 
to Veblen (1908), the investments in education received by British colonies equipped them 
with the ability to understand and apply this technology to financial markets in native 
countries. This created expertise and a grasp of technology to apply to bond markets as is 
evident in the higher bond capitalisation as a share of GDP ratios for those countries. 
 
French colonialists actively controlled and rationed the provision of social welfare and took 
measures to ensure dissolution of the extended family (MacLean, 2002).  Institutions further 
reinforced the solo way of life which bought about the tendency for information to be kept 
at an individual level and not extended to the family unit giving rise to moral hazard, 
adverse selection and ultimately information asymmetry which is precisely counter to the 
development of bond markets. British colonisers, on the other hand, stressed the safeguard 
of the extended family and used native chiefs as a conduit for providing social welfare 
(MacLean, 2002). The use of chiefs as custodians of social welfare, by the British, signify the 
relative respect and co-operation between colonializes and the indigenous people. This 
encouraged information sharing as a way of life which is conducive for bond market 
development.  
 
Empirical evidence in this study suggests that the individualistic manner of the French 
colonialists perpetuated individualistic norms and traditions within the countries which led, 
in part, to their low bond market capitalisation. It appears, however, that the trend 
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identified above does not  apply to certain economies. Namibia, in Southern Africa also 
departs from the established course by its relatively high bond market capitalisation despite 
being colonised by Germany.  
 
Namibia, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, though colonialized by powers whose policies 
suppressed bond market development, exhibit among the highest capitalisations of the 
sample. Proximity and migration may be the cause of these findings. Rouis and Kounetsron 
(2010) suggest that migration and trade between Namibia and South Africa, and North 
Africa and Europe are viable portals of financial development for Namibia and the North 
African countries respectively. South Africa, however, has the second largest average bonds 
outstanding of the sample and also colonised Namibia, therefore the above may have 
occurred as a result of a spill over effect.  A proposition of this thesis is that the North 
African countries may have stimulated trade with Europe due to the preference for 
indigenous country goods.  This occurred as migrants in Europe from North Africa wanted 
goods from their native counties, thus increasing the demand for North African goods in 
Europe. A similar development occurred between immigrants in Namibia and South Africa. 
 
French colonies, among the sample, display the highest levels of political unrest. More 
specifically, the North African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have among 
the highest levels of civil unrest of the whole sample. According to Hofstede (1984), Licht et 
al (2007) and Cieslewicz (2013) the disruptive effects of institutional reinforcement through 
learned behaviour inflicted by colonies are partly responsible for political unrest exhibited in 
those nations in the present day. Information asymmetry in the French colonies was 
probably reinforced by the division of native inhabitants of colonial territories (Valerio and 
Tjipilica, 2006). The assimilated natives, a very small part of the population who tended to 
be literate, were granted full citizenship and civil rights while the remainder of the 
population endured restricted rights. This study argues that this division, in conjunction with 
the individualistic norms and traditions enforced on former French colonial territories 
brought about a way of life that opposed the extended family, through which, sharing of 
information occurred less as individuals became less willing to disclose information to 
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others (MacLean, 2006). The result is poorly developed bond markets evident in their low 
ratio of bond market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP. According to Bharath et al 
(2009) and Gwatidzo and Ojah (2014) in the presence of information asymmetry, bond 
markets cannot function in an efficient manner. 
 
6.2 Factors that influence bond issuance of the sampled African firms 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the firm level drivers of bond issuance in African 
economies, according to the empirical results of the previous chapter.  In the previous 
section panel data and probit regressions were employed to establish the factors that 
hinder or promote bond market development, particularly in comparison with emerging 
counterparts. Together with the macroeconomic discussion of the previous section, the firm 
level factors of this section present a holistic account of bond market performance 
determinants. Specialised literature concerning factors that affect capital decisions of firms 
are typically categorized into external factors and internal factors. External factors include 
inflation, exchange rate, government debt and the GDP of a country. Internal factors that 
affect firm issuance of bonds, according to Serghiescu and Văidean (2014), concern internal 
variables that are particular to the firm, such as tangibility of assets, profitability and asset 
turnover. This section now turns to the internal factors that impact the financing decisions 
of the firm and include firm size, age, and growth, tangibility of assets, profitability, leverage 
and risk.  
 
The book value of total assets is used as a proxy for size in studies such as Bhaduri and 
Majumdar (2005); however, this study follows that of Alzomaia (2014) and employs the 
logarithm of sales. The results  indicate that size has a small positive influence on a firm’s 
probability of bond issue.  An increase in firm size is likely to increase the probability of the 
firm issuing bonds. Larger firms are likely to issue bonds, as they may possess ability to 
finance the costs of bond issuance more than smaller firms. Thus, a contributing factor of 
corporate bond supply is the presence of large firms in an economy, rather than smaller 
firms. It may also be that, in line with Coase theorem (1937) smaller firms are at a 
disadvantage because of the transaction costs associated with bond issuance. Smaller firms 
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may not have the capital needed to issue on the bond market. They may also require a sum 
of money that is significantly lower than the starting denominations of bonds because their 
scale of operations is less than that of larger firms. Furthermore, investors may be less 
inclined to invest in small firms’ projects. Other studies on bond issuance and firm size 
including Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1998) and Ezeoha (2008), 
however, establish a negative influence of size on bond issuance. The studies were 
conducted in markets with differing contexts to those in most of the sampled economies. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) reviewed major industrialised countries, Titman and Wessels 
(1998) considered firms in the U.S. and Ezeoha (2008) investigated firms in Nigeria, which at 
the time of the study was the second largest, and most liquid corporate bond market in 
Africa. Suggestions of Welter (2012); Kang (2014) and Kovala (2014) that context is an 
important factor in bond market development are pertinent to this variable as Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and Titman and Wessels (1998) arrive at their findings from  the developed 
market setting and Ezeoha (2008) from an African market.  
 
Empirical results of this study are that, from a firm level perspective, there is a weak positive 
probability that an increase in the age of a firm influences the probability of the firm issuing 
corporate bonds. The number of years since the initial incorporation of a firm represents its 
age and, according to Carey, Prowse, Rhea and Udell (1993) captures unnoticeable credit 
risks. The positive and significant finding of this study may be clarified by the conclusions of 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) that firms of greater age have access to cheaper funds because of 
the quality reputation acquired through years of incorporation. Such firms are able to 
exploit opportunities related to experience and corporate status. One may argue that if this 
were the case, firms in the study would yield significant estimates between bond issue and 
age because of the variability of ages in the sample (between 5 and 161 years). It may be 
that firm age does affect the likelihood of bond issuance to a considerable extent, but the 
sampled firms have not formed strong reputational and experiential value to exploit the 
advantages of  age. It is also plausible that, in agreement with Loderer and Waelchli (2009), 
asset decay and structural rigidity, which erode any collateral value or reputational 
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advantage that may have been developed through the years since the firm’s incorporation, 
has occurred with the more mature firms. 
 
This study follows Titman and Wessels (1988) in employing the share of a change of total 
assets as the indicator of growth, though contrasting accounts of growth have been used by 
authors such as Davidson and Wiklund (2000) and Gupta, Guha and Krishnaswami (2013). 
The negative results from the probit regression, although not significant at the specified 
levels, are insightful as they debunk the popular idea that by issuing securities managers 
possess strong incentives to transfer wealth from holders of bonds to holders of shares. This 
situation, therefore, may give rise to agency costs in firms with greater investment 
prospects. An inverse relationship also exists between a firm’s high growth and the degree 
of debt because greater firm risk is associated with more opportunities for growth 
(Yousefzadeh, Aazami, Shamsadini and Abousaiedi 2014).  The findings are inconsistent with 
the Pecking Order theory that predicts the accumulation of debt by growth companies over 
time. The findings are, however, consistent with the Trade-Off theory’s prediction that firms 
with higher growth opportunities are likely to use less risky debt, which, in the case of this 
study, is through the issuance of bonds. High growth firms, therefore, according to the 
empirical findings of this thesis, are positive factors for local currency bond market 
performance.  
 
Economic downturns of the African economies are highly likely to adversely affect the 
growth of its firms. According to the empirical outcomes of the fractional probit regressions, 
the sampled firms that exhibit volatility in their growth rates are likely to default more 
excessively should cash flows decrease severely due to economic downturns, or other 
unfavourable economic conditions. The negative relationship, although insignificant, is 
perhaps owed to the agency costs associated with debt, causing firms to rely more on 
retained earnings more willingly than debt (Alzomaia, 2014). The agency costs of debt lie in 
the sensitive information that is required to be shared with investors when firms are issued. 
Firms in the sample, with relatively high growth rates do not necessarily issue bonds as a 
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source of debt. This may be because firms are unwilling to share sensitive information or are 
unable to access local currency bond markets.  
 
Tangibility, also denoted as fixed asset ratio, depicts the liquidation assessment of a firm 
(Bhaduri and Majumdar, 2005). The empirical outcomes of the previous section concur with 
Alzomaia (2014) regarding the positive relationship between the tangibility variable 
probability of bond issuance; however, unlike the previous study, the variable is not 
significant. Capital structure theories predict that high tangibility of assets is likely to 
increase the probability of debt capacity while volatility of assets decreases it. This is 
probably because tangible assets are less prone to information asymmetries; consequently, 
reducing agency costs associated with debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). It acts as collateral for 
firms and mitigates problems that may be associated with contracts. The potential value 
that can be seized in cases of default is increased through tangible assets.  Since firms with 
high tangibility of assets also possess lower transaction and agency costs of funding debt, it 
is probable that they will depend more on debt financing; however, the firms of the sample 
may find financing with banks easier than firms with lower ratios (Campello and Giambona, 
2013).  
 
The empirical evidence derived from the panel and fractional probit regressions suggest that 
high asset ratio firms may prefer bank financing over bond financing because of the 
expensive floating costs associated with bond issuance, particularly in Africa. Firms with high 
asset ratios tend to invest most of their funds in assets, making them sensitive to the costs 
associated with bond issuance; hence, firms in the sample with high ratios typically, are not 
bond issuers. The outcome of the study appears to oppose the Trade-Off theory that 
suggests a positive relationship between debt and tangibility of assets. The predicted 
probability for debt capacity may be increased by tangibility of assets; however, the 
underdeveloped local currency bond markets in which most of the firms operate may shift 
the debt preference, in this instance, from bond markets to banks. Volatility of assets is also 
a factor that may be present in the context of the sampled firms; thus, although a high 
tangibility of asset ratio exists the findings may not be significant because of asset volatility. 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 155 
 
 
The negative estimate, -0.053, from the empirical evidence of this study, is in conformity 
with the Pecking Order theory that sizable tangible assets and low asymmetric information 
makes equity more economical for firms. Furthermore, the insignificant -value may be due 
to the close relationships that many African firms forge with banks and the less collateral 
that the banks require of such firms because the relationships act as substitutes for physical 
collateral. This parallels the findings of Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2001) that with an increase in tangibility of assets, total debt ratios decrease. 
 
The performance of a firm, typically, is assessed by the profitability of the firm. Authors such 
as Handoo and Sharma (2014) use the operating profit rate of return; however, following 
Stewart and Watson (2012), Sadeghian, Latifi, Soroush and Aghabagher (2012) and 
Serghiescu and Vaidean (2014), return on assets is utilized in this study due to easier 
accessibility of the firm level information used to compute the variable. The empirical 
outcomes suggest that as firms become more profitable, they take out more debt and that 
profitability of firms increases the predicted probability of bond issuance. The Trade-Off 
theory suggests that this finding is due to debt financing being the preferred mode of 
funding for profitable companies because of the advantage of a tax shield. The Pecking 
Order theory contrarily implies that firms employ more debt as they become more 
profitable due to the information asymmetry and agency problems associated with 
underdeveloped bond markets in most of Africa. It is worthwhile to caution that the Trade-
Off theory establishes leverage as the compromise between the current value of expected 
costs of financial disturbances and the present value of anticipated debt tax shields. Both 
the current value and the present value are conditional on anticipated future profitability 
and not on actual past profitability. Furthermore, prediction of the Trade-Off theory is not 
examined by measures built on past profitability. Moreover, a negative correlation between 
previous profitability and bond issuance may occur with modified costs of capital structure.  
 
The literature suggests several definitions of leverage (Bhaduri and Majumdar 2005; Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen, 2008), however, the ratio of book value as a share of total debt is used 
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in this study. Book value, as opposed to market value is better suited for this study as 
markets in Africa, typically, are relatively volatile (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007; Alagidede, 2011). 
Market leverage is likely to yield deceptive results because of the volatility and mispricing of 
stock prices in the market; thus, book value is a more dependable measure here. Moreover, 
several empirical studies utilize long-term debt only, including Badoer and James (2015); 
however, close inspection of the data reflects the absence of long term debt in much of the 
sample and the predominance of short-term debt. The underdevelopment of bond markets 
in Africa may be partly due to this and the heavy reliance on expensive banks and financial 
institutions for short term funding. Both short and long term debt, therefore, are taken into 
account in the calculation of leverage ratio. The empirical outcomes from the sampled firms 
reflect very low levels of leverage, with some displaying no leverage at all and a positive 
association between firm profitability and leverage. The extensive interest margins in most 
of the markets may discourage organisations from taking bank loans and rather rely on 
retained earnings when possible. Results indicate that leverage of firms increases the 
probability of bond issuance  by a very slight amount (0.04%). 
 
Erraticism of the return on assets is used to assess risk. Empirical results from the entire 
sample suggest a negative association between leverage and risk particular to firms. A very 
strong negative and highly significant estimate of risk signals risk as the strongest 
contributor of bond market issuance of the study. The study finds that as a firm’s risk 
increases the probability of bond issuance decreases substantially.  Empirical outcomes of 
this study are in line with the Trade-off theory and concur with findings of Rijan and Zingales 
(1995) and Titman and Wessels, (1988), but are in disapproval of the Pecking Order theory. 
Financial distress may explain this inverse relationship. Doubt about probable cash flows is 
likely to have caused firms in the sample to employ less debt in their capital structures to 
reduce the cost of financial distress. This finding may appear counterintuitive in light of the 
elevated information asymmetry and agency costs encountered by many firms in Africa.  
 
One may expect a positive link between risk and bond issuance due to a probable reduction 
in agency costs bought about by large risk (Myers, 1987); but, such findings may be 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 157 
 
preliminary, because as suggested by Kale (1991)  an upsurge in business risk occurs prior to 
an increase in debt. It may also be that, during the sampled period, firms faced poor 
economic conditions and as a result their amount of bonds outstanding decreased because 
of uncertainty about their ability to finance debt.  For example, the Chairman of the Council 
of the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE), Dr Sam Mensah, voiced his concern about the 
precarious macroeconomic environment in Ghana that had depressed the growth of the 
country’s corporate bond market. According to Mensah, high inflation and interest rates 
within Ghana have increased significantly firm’s ability to issue bonds for long-term capital. 
The volatile interest rates may have tapered the readiness of the public to purchase the 
long-term instruments, which complicates a firm’s ability to market debt instruments with 
long-term maturities. Similarly, due to high inflation the public are worried about losing the 
value of their investments.   
 
Tax advantages of debt are also lessened during erratic changes in macroeconomic 
conditions through the increase of discount rates and a decline of expected cash flows. The 
decline in tax benefits associated to debt causes it to be perceived as unattractive by firms 
and is thus decreased in firm’s capital structures. Certain firm level factors of capital 
structure, such as future investment and growth opportunities, may fluctuate according to 
the highs and lows of an economy’s business cycle. Firm specific factors that affect capital 
structure decisions, particularly bond issuance must be viewed against the backdrop of the 
wider economy.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The discussion has recovered many reasons for the current state of bond markets in Africa. 
Overall, no single class of factors is exclusively responsible for bond market performance. 
Macroeconomic and institutional determinants are intertwined in bond market 
development, and firms’ decisions to issue bonds are largely dependent on macroeconomic 
and institutional variables of the countries where they operate. The study finds that the 
propensity of investors and firms to borrow from banks is a key impediment to bond market 
development. The preference for bank finance is due to the dominance of banks on the 
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continent, investor scepticism of African bond markets, the misconception of the relative 
price of issuing bonds and a confluence of factors relating to bond infrastructure and market 
perceptions. The lack of synergy between societal customs and cultures with the norms of 
market development is a likely contributor to the anaemic development of bond markets in 
Africa.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.0 Introduction 
 
This study has augmented the mainstream understanding of government and corporate 
bond market features in Africa. Government securities have supported African economies 
particularly, through fiscal deficits counteracting currency mismatches and lessening the 
overall vulnerability of African economies to shocks. Bond markets in Africa, while 
contributing to the development of African economies, have not received the attention 
merited in the literature, and this study argues for closer attention to their development. A 
heavy reliance on foreign and concessional borrowing is one of the consequences of the 
underdevelopment of bond markets in Africa and the resulting deficiency of long term 
funding instruments. Issuance of bonds by corporates also assists in the long-term 
investment prospects of firms in Africa. This study asserts that the combined government 
and corporate bond market development is beneficial to the macroeconomic and 
institutional development of African economies.  
 
Macroeconomic and firm level determinants of local currency bond market performance 
have been identified and analysed in the empirical chapter (chapter five). These factors 
were then discussed in chapter six against the backdrop of the literature review. This 
chapter draws conclusions, implications and policy recommendations about local currency 
bond market performance drawing on the literature, empirical outcomes and the discussion 
of the previous chapter. A framework for the application of local currency bond markets in 
Africa is developed with an understanding of the African context.  
 
7.1 Conclusions 
The determinants of bond market development, using 26 African economies and 49 firms 
listed on various exchanges on the continent, are established and explored in this study. The 
econometric model for bond market performance determinants in African emerging 
economies employed accounts for the unique nature of African emerging markets. Analysis 
of a combination of data from various databases and annual reports of African firms suggest 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 160 
 
that from a macroeconomic perspective, inflation, central government debt, GDP, external 
debt, GDP per capita and fiscal balance have an effect on local bond market development in 
African economies. Furthermore, political unrest, governance, religion, former colonial 
power and culture are institutional factors that exert a significant influence on local 
currency bond market performance.  The study finds that firm level factors that significantly 
affect bond market performance, from the demand perspective are firm risk, size, 
profitability and age.  
 
Bond markets in Africa have made wide strides towards increased efficiency and liquidity 
over the last decade. Liquid liabilities as a share of GDP in Africa as a whole, have increased 
from approximately 32% to 53% between 2005 and 2013. Most notable is the increase in 
liquid liabilities in Algeria and Cote d’Ivoire with increases of approximately 4% and 11% 
respectively. This translates into increased bank capital available to firms requiring funding. 
Financial development, denoted by domestic credit to the private sector continues to 
appear promising in African economies. The prevalence of banks in the continent’s financial 
system persists and interest rates remain high with the exception of South Africa where 
interest rates are comparable to more developed countries such as Canada. The relatively 
depressed private credit to GDP and liquid liabilities to GDP reflect the small size of African 
banks in comparison to other emerging and more developed economies. The study 
attributes the deficient intermediation to weak enforcement of creditor rights and the 
relative lack of credit ratings. Trading platforms in African securities exchanges have 
progressed over the last decade. Securities exchanges vary from simple intraday systems in 
Uganda to more advanced trading systems in Nigeria where margin trading and the 
employment of the NASDAQ-QMX-X Stream Trading System is now in use. Faster payment, 
delivery of securities and more efficient clearing and settlement systems may have 
contributed to the increased performance in African trading platforms. The development of 
regional exchanges such as the Bourse Regionale Des Valeurs Mobiliers (BRVM) in Abidjan 
and the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières d'Afrique Centrale (BVMAC) in Libreville 
has enabled a number of Francophone West and Central African countries that do not have 
functioning exchanges to trade bonds and stocks. Such arrangements have also made 
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available additional platforms other than country securities exchanges to boost the output 
of capital markets.   
 
Credit ratings of African countries also indicate improvements. Angola, Cameroon and 
Zambia which previously, were not rated by credit agencies were rated in 2014. Kenya’s 
rating progressed from  B, BB to B1, B+, B+ from the three most widely accepted credit 
rating agencies. South Africa, however, dropped from a rating of A in 2010 to B in 2014. 
Compared to other emerging markets, and developed economies, African economies have 
far less domestic credit to private sector ratios; for example, the relatively developed 
Egyptian economy had an average ratio of 38 between the 2005 and 2013 period, while 
Japan and Brazil had respective ratios of 182 and 53 during the same period. Again, the only 
economy that is  comparable with the more developed economies is South Africa. The firm 
information also suggests interest rates in Africa may be an inhibiting factor to bond market 
issuance. Countries that do not issue bonds have very low leverage, which may be due to 
the exorbitant costs in banking in most African countries.  A further congruence between 
Africa and the emerging country sample is the variability and  volatility among 
macroeconomic variables. The standard deviation and variance of African economies are 
consistently greater than in other emerging economies. The GDP per capita in the latter 
group is, however, more than  double that of the African sample.  
 
The sample suggests that growth rates of firms domiciled in countries with strong 
institutions perform better than those with weaker institutions. It is worthy to add that 
institutions have played an essential role in firm growth in the sample. A country’s   
institutional condition is important in so far as companies that operate in robust regulatory 
environments with  sound enforcement of property rights and neutral justice function 
better than those with weak institutions. Specifically, legal systems and measures that 
decrease agency costs such as shareholder protection are important drivers of firm growth. 
 
The overall outcomes of the analyses of firms’ habits regarding bond issuance suggests that 
bond issuers are more likely to borrow from banks than the firms which do not issue. Firms 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 162 
 
that issue debt are found to have more risk than those which do not. Non-issuers have 
higher profitability and much lower growth opportunities than issuers. An important finding 
is the statistically significant difference between firms that issue bonds and non-issuers. 
Corporate bond issuers, from the sample, have higher risk, lower leverage, larger size and 
more growth opportunities, rely less on assets and measure lower profitability and age than 
firms that do not issue bonds. Risk and size of the firm exert the highest influence on the 
decision to issue bonds. Furthermore, the results imply that the desired form of financing 
for firms in African economies is equity. This finding supports the idea that high interest 
rates on bank loans and inhibitive requirements prevent many firms from using bank 
financing. Results also suggest that dominance of the banking sector and underdevelopment 
of bond markets impel firms to utilize equity, which may not always be the most efficient 
financing channel, especially given that most African markets do not yet have well-
functioning and efficient equity markets. Based on the broad review of the literature and 
empirical results of the study, detailed policy recommendations suited to the African 
context are discussed below. 
 
7.2 Implications and policy recommendations 
Development of bond markets in economies with embryonic government securities and 
increasing performance  is a task that requires the foremost dedication from government.  A 
market-oriented government funding strategy with well-defined debt management 
strategies must be implemented to support development of local currency bond markets. 
Obstacles that inhibit the performance of bond markets are underpinned by the institutional 
character of a country.  Prior to initiatives to develop bond markets, it is imperative that a 
government is viewed as credible by investors and that the political environment is stable.  
 
The government must be viewed as a trustworthy issuer of securities, and the financial 
sector and macroeconomic fundamentals need to be sound. This is a continuous process 
where the government persistently instils practices that exhibit firm and thorough monetary 
and fiscal policies, efficient tax, legal and regulatory frameworks and streamlined and safe 
settlement provisions. Efficient legal and regulatory systems that are in line with the 
Performance Determinants of Local Currency Bond Markets in African Emerging Economies 
 
 
Shirley Asabea Ahwireng-Obeng, 2015 Page 163 
 
prevailing institutional practices instilled by colonialist must be installed. These practices 
must filter down from governmental norms to the running of exchanges and sound 
monitoring of  the regulations and laws for those practicing primary dealer systems and 
investments of government bonds. This ensures a streamlining of practices and expectations 
of participants.  Critical areas that must be tackled include new regulations and operations 
that inform the methods and practices of indigenous people. Furthermore, policymakers 
and academics who analyse bond markets in Africa must do so against the theoretical 
backdrop of middle-range theory to establish a balance between grand theories and 
functional hypotheses that continually develop and evolve in the course of routine research. 
The rationale behind this recommendation is that the prevailing financial systems of the 
modern economy are rooted in the institutions of the colonial power. Religious practices 
must also be instilled to facilitate the cultural norms and practices of the most important 
investor base- the inhabitants of a country. 
 
The interconnected relationship between external debt and central government debt must 
be set at a sustainable level, and government should be dedicated to its confirmation. This is 
important because investors translate such high levels of debt as the inability of 
governments to manage debt, which they interpret as high default risk. Sharp shifts in fiscal 
policy to accommodate external and central government debt  is not a good signal to 
investors. Incorporation of a fiscal authority may be valuable in alleviating investor anxieties 
about debt sustainability in African economies with more developed bond markets.  
 
Information regarding the debt structure must be open and available to investors and 
market participants. Debt management strategies and the funding requirements must be 
accessible to the public. This fosters transparency and trust among market participants. 
More importantly, the government needs to gain knowledge about the observations of 
primary dealers and investors to appreciate the forces of demand for government securities. 
Governments must commit to setting prices according to the market and not 
administratively. Acts such as this demonstrate government’s commitment to transparency 
and the processes of bond market development. 
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Double digit and volatile inflation should be avoided for government bond markets to 
develop, as it deters investors from investing in long-term securities. Investors are unwilling 
to invest long-term, in environments where uncertainty about future inflation rates exist. 
Besides implying economic and/ or political obstructions within an economy, double digit 
and volatile inflation limit the development of an extended yield curve of the economy.  
Economies such as Ghana, with a continual inflationary environment would benefit from the 
issuance of inflation-indexed bonds during the early phases of bond market development. 
Such a strategy, coupled with firm monetary and fiscal policies is likely to also lessen 
government costs of funding over an extended period.  
 
A yield curve must be developed from a controlled amount of newly issued bonds of varying 
maturities. This development provides more precise pricing of securities and government 
must adhere to market prices identified through the yield curve. It is advised that simple 
securities such as Treasury bills and bonds are issued and amalgamated under national 
issuance. Too many public issues promote market fragmentation; therefore, markets should 
endure to employ as few public issuers as possible.  Use of standard marketable treasury 
bonds are best for African markets as more complex issues may be complicated at the 
formative stages of bond market development. 
 
The structure of the financial system should be a foremost concern in bond market 
development at the initial stages. The investor base of government bonds must be 
heterogeneous for the market to develop. Varying risk preferences, trading objects and 
investment maturities must also compose the investor base to make certain a demand of 
bonds during alternate market situations. It is important that congruence between the 
amount of public debt and the market exists.  Economies that are not able to reach critical 
mass of investor base must make use of regional exchanges such as the BRVM stock 
exchange and coordinate activities from a regional perspective. Should debt amounts be too 
small to match the market, government should issue treasury bills  until capacity is 
increased.   
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The state of the banking system is of great consequence to bond market development 
particularly as a large segment of the investor base of bond markets are from the banking 
sector or act on behalf of clients. Macroeconomic stability in African economies is 
imperative as instability may hamper the functions of banks and dampen the development 
of the government securities market. Furthermore, banking systems must, periodically, be 
subject to stress testing and essential measures to evaluate banking sector environments 
required to ensure soundness of the banking system. This is essential as uncertainties about 
banking systems negatively affect government’s capacity to issue new debt or roll over 
existing debt. Once sound banking system measures are instilled and fostered within a 
financial system, financial sector liberalization in the form of phasing in deregulation of a 
country’s capital account is advised. The financial system needs to be liberal and 
intermediaries must exhibit healthy competition. 
 
A prerequisite of bond market development, money markets, have materialized in the 
majority of African economies. The short-term markets are usually in place before the 
establishment of longer-term bond markets. Monetary policy, conducted by the Central 
Bank, through the money market may cause many overlays between policy makers and 
bond market operators. It is advisable that a designated coordinating committee be created 
to control the process of market development in view of the participation of many 
government bodies. Such committees are beneficial to make more efficient the 
coordination between bond market and monetary policy to facilitate constructive bond 
market development.  The same instruments employed in monetary policy and treasury bill 
sales should be used in African economies, except South Africa, to evade fragmentation of 
markets due to their shallowness. The use of matching instruments is also suitable for 
African economies as it matches the few monetary instruments of such economies while 
promoting liquidity of government securities. Transparency is vital when using identical 
instruments  and where instructions are not precise and expectations are ambiguous, failure 
may result. The economies with markets at nascent stages of development should rather 
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use the central bank to receive deposits and issue bills that are utilized as a market 
intervention tool. Efficient management of these operations is essential to prevent disputes. 
 
Tap systems along with auctions are a suitable method to sell domestic government 
securities and necessitates prior knowledge of independent bidders. Syndicates will be 
beneficial to embryonic markets evident in many African economies; however, this system is 
best used in markets with relatively lower levels of corruption and information asymmetry 
and reduces placement risk. Wider and deeper investor reach can be attained through the 
use of technology and it is advised that exchanges in Africa utilise such methods more. A 
combination of sales methods that increases the competition among investors must be 
explored. 
 
Regular, prearranged consultations between governments and primary dealers must occur 
so that the dealers are explicitly aware of their regulations and obligations. Use of primary 
dealers should be viewed as a complement to investor base expansion and efforts to 
broaden investor base must be carried out in parallel with primary dealer employment. 
Close inspection by the appointed committee must be carried out to ensure that primary 
dealers meet prerequisites. The primary dealer system is very attractive in ensuring the sale 
of government bonds; however, it is essential that regulatory and legal frameworks are 
established and implemented prior to their incorporation. Involvement of primary dealers 
without these frameworks and regulations can foster an environment of collusion and 
dampen competition, which conveys adverse messages to investors.    
 
Establishment of sectors such as contractual savings and collective investment funds, for 
instance, mutual funds has large consequences for the investor base of a government bond 
market.  Governments are thus encouraged to include incentives for such sectors to issue 
and trade in local bond markets. Both local and foreign contractual and collective 
investment funds must be catered for in a manner that will facilitate their entry and 
establishment in local bond markets. Non-tradable securities are a method to attract retail 
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investors and will assist government bond markets in achieving critical mass while 
broadening their scope.  
 
The dominance of banks and high interest rate spreads suggest that greater transparency 
would benefit firms by lowering interest rate spreads and may accommodate more firms in 
need of financing. Further, more transparency and symmetry of information assists in the 
development of bond markets thus adding competition into the financing sector which 
drives down interest rates and fees charged by banks.  
 
The provision of incentives to investment banks that provide services in the preparation and 
organisation of underwriting and other duties is recommended to African governments. It 
may be beneficial if these bodies are incentivised to lower their fees and rewarded for the 
amount of bonds they issue. Governments should implement schemes that educate firms 
and the public about the benefits of bond financing. The perception of bank financing as 
lower cost than bond finance may be lessened through such programmes. Furthermore, 
regulations that prevent banks from inappropriately pricing loans must be created. Once 
government bond markets have begun to develop the yield curve can be used to price the 
interest rates of loans and these rates must be adhered to by banks and financing 
institutions. Incentives to invest in domestic corporate bonds must also be offered to non-
financial institutions to promote corporate bond investment and address the dominance of 
banks and banking institutions in African financial systems. 
 
Progress must be made in the secondary corporate bond markets to attract investors. The 
extensive literature review, data and methodology of the study suggest that banks are the 
primary parties of the corporate bond markets thus they sell amongst themselves on the 
secondary market. Their liquidity, therefore, is higher than that of non-financial firms.  
 
A principal element in the development of bond markets is the settlement system. It is vital 
that this component is taken seriously and addressed with the same importance as the 
macro elements of bond market development. These improvements must be applied to 
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both government and corporate bond systems. Implications regarding competition within 
the financial system, ease of access and risk are closely aligned to the settlement system.  
 
Many African bonds are issued as paper; however, moves towards paperless issues need to 
be implemented for the efficiency of transactions. Replacement of paper issues with the 
paperless must occur during the initial stages of bond market development initiatives. 
Settlement of trades can then be decreased from a three day to a same day cycle. Custody 
arrangements in the majority of African exchanges, currently, are provided privately. This is 
not an issue of concern because of the size and early development stage; however, the 
governance and legal framework of the private providers must be ensured, transparency 
maintained and fee structures regulated.   Delivery and payment of securities, preferably, 
should utilise cash. Cash accounts with the central bank will preserve timely payment of 
securities and a predetermined settlement cycle. This arrangement is preferable to the 
traditional system, which collects payment obligations over a period of time. The latter 
arrangement should be avoided as it may lead to unnecessary risk for all parties.  
 
A huge consequence lies in the market administration of bond market arrangements, 
particularly in an OTC structure, which is the emerging procedure in African exchanges; 
therefore, the design should meet the legal and regulatory atmosphere of the economy. 
Minimally expected norms and standards must be met to streamline the settlement process 
with the recommended macroeconomic bearings set out in this study. A framework that 
facilitates the secured exchange of securities and funds need not be complex; 
communication instruments such as a phone or email are sufficient to carry out the 
processes provided that the exchanges occur with transparency and within the bounds of 
legal and regulatory decrees. Implementation of these policies in African economies will 
steer markets towards bond market development and provide an efficient portal for 
governments, firms and residents to obtain capital. 
 
Most studies on the determinants of bond market performance rely on only one or two 
dependent variables thus limiting the scope of investigation (Claessens et al, 2007; 
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Bhattacharyay, 2013).  Studies that employ a dependent variables, such as liquidity, are 
worthy of being considered as proxy for bond market development since larger, more 
developed bond markets tend to be more liquid than smaller bond markets (Eichengreen et 
al, 2008).  Exchange rate, in this study, is not a significant explanatory variable; however, 
studies that include various measures of exchange rate volatility will be beneficial in 
extrapolating more information about the character of bond market determinants.   
 
Consideration of the reasons why African bond markets have failed to develop at the rate of 
those in emerging and developed economies would be a beneficial area of research. The 
geographical scope of the study enriches one’s understanding of colonialism and bond 
market development in Africa. A study that includes emerging economies that were 
colonized would give a deeper understanding of the institutional influences on bond 
markets and financial systems. Colonial experiences in countries outside Africa will provide a 
larger platform for such analyses. Industry leverage may be evaluated as a possible 
determinant of a firm’s decision to issue bonds. Finally, sectorial analysis as a determinant 
will give an understanding of which variables, such as debt preference, within various 
industries cause them to issue bonds.  
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 9.0   APPENDICES 
9.1 Countries used in the study 
Country Region 
Algeria North Africa 
Angola Southern Africa 
Botswana Southern Africa 
Brazil South America 
Burkina Faso West Africa 
Burundi  Central Africa 
Cabo Verde  West Africa 
Cameroon  Central Africa 
Cote d'Ivoire West Africa 
Egypt North Africa 
Gabon Central 
Ghana West Africa 
India South Asia 
Indonesia South-East Asia 
Kenya Eastern Africa 
Malawi Southern Africa 
Mauritius Eastern Africa 
Mexico North America 
Morocco Northern Africa 
Mozambique Southern Africa 
Namibia Southern Africa 
Nigeria West Africa 
Rwanda East Africa 
Senegal West Africa 
South Africa Southern Africa 
Tanzania Eastern Africa 
Tunisia North Africa 
Turkey South-eastern Europe and Western Asia 
Uganda Eastern Africa 
Zambia Southern Africa 
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9.2 Companies used in this study  
Company name Country Sector Year 
founded 
African Champion Industries Ghana Manufacturing 1967 
African Copper Plc (AFCP) Botswana Mining 1998 
Airtel Networks Zambia Telecommunication 1998 
AngloGold Ashanti Ghana Mining 2004 
Bata shoe co. Zambia Manufacturing 1937 
Bralirwa Ltd Rwanda Brewing 1957 
Cadbury Plc Nigeria Confectionery 1965 
Ciel Textile Mauritius Textile 1999 
Conoil plc Nigeria Lubricants 1927 
East African Breweries Uganda Beverages 1922 
Edgars South Africa Apparel 1929 
El--Ezz steel Rebars Egypt Construction 1994 
Fan Milk Ghana Beverage 1960 
Flour Mills Nigeria Food 1960 
Furnmart Botswana Furniture 1998 
GSK Nigeria Pharmaceutical 1972 
Guinness Nigeria Plc Nigeria Beverages 1963 
Home Afrika Kenya Housing 2008 
Kenya Airways Kenya Aviation 1977 
Kenya Electricity Generating Company 
(KENGEN) Limited 
Kenya Electricity 1998 
Les Ciments de Bizerte Tunis Construction 1953 
Lux resort Mauritius Holiday resort 1985 
Mauritius sugar syndicate Mauritius Manufacturing 1951 
Nation media group Kenya Communication 1959 
Netcare South Africa Healthcare 1996 
Niemeth Pharmaceutical Nigeria Pharmaceutical 1957 
Nigerian Aviation Handling Company Plc Nigeria Aviation 1979 
Pick and Pay stores South Africa Supermarket 1967 
Portland paints and products Nigeria Construction 2004 
PUMA Energy Zambia Energy 1975 
PZ Cussons Ghana Limited Manufacturing Ghana 1958 
ReaVipingo plantains Kenya Crops 1966 
SAFARICOM Kenya Telecommunication 1997 
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Sasol South Africa Fuel 1950 
Servicom (SERVI) Nigeria Service delivery 2004 
South African Breweries South African Beverage 1895 
Starwin products Ltd Ghana Pharmaceutical 1960 
Tatepa Ltd Tanzania Manufacturing 1995 
Telecom Egypt Egypt Telecommunications 1854 
Telecom Networks Malawi Telecommunications 2007 
Telkom South Africa Telecommunications 1991 
Transnet South Africa Rail transport 1990 
Uchumi Supermarkets Kenya Supermarket 1975 
UMEME Uganda Energy distribution network 
company 
2004 
Unilever Nigeria Manufacturing 1920 
United Balsalt Products Mauritius Construction 1953 
Vodacom South Africa Telecommunication 1994 
Williamson tea Kenya  Food processing 1972 
Zambeef Zambia Agri-production 1994 
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9.3 Variables used in the study 
  
Variable category 
Unit of 
measurement 
Frequency Definition 
Unit of 
Observation 
Source 
a)Dependent Variable 
Government bond market 
capitalisation 
% GDP Yearly 
 
Natural 
logarithm of 
government 
bonds 
outstanding as a 
ratio of GDP. 
Country  
Decision/ Likelihood to invest in 
bonds 
     
b) Exploratory Variables 
i) Macroeconomic factors 
Domestic credit 
(DomesticXb) 
 
% GDP 
 
Yearly Domestic credit 
to the private 
sector as % of 
GDP. 
Country AFMI database 
Economy size 
(GDPPPPXb) 
 
International 
dollars (billion) 
Yearly Natural 
logarithm of GDP 
at PPP 
Country IMF database 
Exchange rate 
(ExchangeXb) 
 
Local currency 
per 
$US 
Yearly Standard 
deviation of 
nominal 
exchange rates’ 
log 1st deference 
Country IMF database 
Exports 
(ExportsXb) 
 
% GDP Yearly Exports as 
proportion of 
GDP 
Country IMF database 
External debt 
(ExternalXb) 
% GDP Yearly Ourstanding 
payments to 
non-residents of 
the country 
Country IMF database, 
AFMI database 
Fiscal balance 
(FiscalXb) 
 
% GDP Yearly Three year 
moving average 
of total fiscal 
balance. 
Country 
 
IMF database, 
AFMI database 
GDP per capita 
(GDPXb) 
 
International 
dollars (billion) 
Yearly Natural 
logarithm of GDP 
per capita. 
Country 
 
IMF database 
Central government debt 
(CentralXb) 
 
% GDP Yearly Year-end 
outstanding 
marketable 
central 
government 
debt. 
Country 
 
IMF database, 
AFMI database 
Inflation 
(InflationXb) 
% change Yearly Yearly change in 
annual averaged 
Country IMF database, 
AFMI database 
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consumer price 
index 
ii) Institutional & Social factors 
Colonial power 
(ColonialXb) 
 
0 or 1 Constant 
 
Dummy 
variables where: 
1 if Britain 0 if 
other and 1 if 
France 0 if other 
and 1 if Portugal 
0 if other. 
Constant Corfield (2008) 
Control of corruption 
(GovernanceXb) 
 
Number 
(score) 
Yearly Unweighted sum 
of normalised 
scores (0-1) of 
*four 
governance 
indicators 
Country World 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Political stability 
(ProtestXb) 
 
Number 
(score) 
Yearly Unweighted sum 
of normalised 
scores (0-1) of 
**four risk 
indicators 
Country World 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
Political stability 
(PoliticalXb) 
Number 
(score) 
Yearly Unweighted sum 
of normalised 
scores (0-1) of 
**four risk 
indicators 
Country IMF database, 
AFMI database 
Religion 
(ReligionXb) 
0 or 1 constant Dummy 
variables equal 1 
for Christian and 
0 for otherwise. 
Country World Bank 
Database 
iii) Firm level factors 
Growth 
 
% sales Yearly Percentage 
change of sales 
Firm level McGregorBFA 
Research (now 
listed under 
INET BFA) 
Leverage 
 
% total assets Yearly Ratio of total 
liabilities and 
total assets 
Firm level McGregorBFA 
Research, 
published 
company annual 
reports 
Profitability 
 
% total assets Yearly Net profits over 
total assets 
Firm level McGregorBFA 
Research 
Risk 
 
Unit Yearly Standard 
deviation of the 
return of assets 
Firm level McGregorBFA 
Research 
Size 
 
Unit Yearly Natural 
logarithm of 
sales 
Firm level McGregorBFA 
Research, 
published 
company annual 
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reports 
Tangible assets 
 
% total assets Yearly Ratio of fixed 
assets over total 
assets. 
Firm level McGregorBFA 
Research, 
published 
company annual 
reports 
Age Unit Yearly Number of years 
listed 
Firm level McGregorBFA 
Research 
 
 
 
